Jeff, lists, You've raised some very interesting and, I think, important questions. I'll need to reflect on them and then do some additional research if I'm going to have much to contribute towards understanding the question of the exact nature and place of the percept in semiosis (and in P's classification of signs).
Meanwhile, and coincidentally, not so long ago I happened to be wondering about what followed the comment in the passage from the "Prolegomena" (not, I don't think, from the "Apology for Pragmatism" as you wrote) that you just pointed to, that famous remark reading: "Finally, and in particular, we get a Seme of that highest of all Universes which is regarded as the Object of every true Proposition, and which, if we name it [at] all, we call by the somewhat misleading title of "The Truth." (CP 4.539) I can tell from your remarks that you've been considering what follows, a passage which seems to me key to our getting a handle on the relationship of the percept to the Peircean sign. I've copied it below as it might help us focus our discussion. *[L]et us go back and ask this question: How is it that the Percept, which is a Seme, has for its direct Dynamical Interpretant the Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the usual way with Semes, certainly. All the examples that happen to occur to me at this moment of such action of Semes are instances of Percepts, though doubtless there are others. Since not all Percepts act with equal energy in this way, the instances may be none the less instructive for being Percepts.* However, Reader, I beg you will think this matter out for yourself, and then you can see -- I wish I could -- whether your independently formed opinion does not fall in with mine. *My opinion is that a pure perceptual Icon *-- and many really great psychologists have evidently thought that Perception is a passing of images before the mind's eye, much as if one were walking through a picture gallery -- *could not have a Pheme for its direct Dynamical Interpretant.* I desire, for more than one reason, to tell you why I think so, although that you should today appreciate my reasons seems to be out of the question. Still, I wish you to understand me so far as to know that, mistaken though I be, I am not so sunk in intellectual night as to be dealing lightly with philosophic Truth when I aver that weighty reasons have moved me to the adoption of my opinion; and I am also anxious that it should be understood that those reasons have not been psychological at all, but are purely logical. *My reason, then, briefly stated and abridged, is that it would be illogical for a pure Icon to have a Pheme for its Interpretant, and I hold it to be impossible for thought not subject to self-control, as a Perceptual Judgment manifestly is not, to be illogical. *(emphasis added, CP 4.540) We had a discussion on peirce-l a while back on what Peirce might have meant by a "pure perceptual icon" (or, "pure icon") and I want to see if I can locate that discussion as it might prove helpful. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, May 7, 2015 at 12:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Hi Gary R., Lists, > > A little while back, you made the following claim about the nature of a > percept: "The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan > Houser as saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a > sign its a rhematic iconic qualisign." > > I've been trying to square Peirce's explanations of percepts and > perceptual judgments with his classification of different kinds of signs > and the relations they bear to objects and interpretants. Thus far, I've > not been able to locate any place with his texts where he treats a percept > as an iconic qualisign. > > In his discussion of Universes and Predicaments in the Apology for > Pragmatism, he explicitly says that percepts function as immediate objects, > and that we then pick out certain qualities in the experience. In doing > so, the qualities we pick out by focusing attention on them function as > qualisigns. (CP. 4.539) I'd like to reconstruct his argument in this short > section of the essay, and my strategy is to start by setting a bit of the > stage. What is especially interesting about Peirce's account is that he > says that his theory of logic forces him to say that the perceptual > judgment is not the immediate interpretant of the percept (as the immediate > object) in its relation to the qualisign. His reason stems from a > commitment on his part to explaining these processes as logical > inferences. A perceptual judgment can't be the interpretant of these two > because that would be an invalid inference. > > The point he is making, I believe, is that the qualisign is only > functioning as a rhematic sign (a seme), and the percept, too, is only a > seme. From two semes, one cannot make a valid inference to a interpretant > like a perceptual judgment, because this judgment is a pheme (a dicent). > As such, Peirce needs find a way to to bridge the gap between percepts and > perceptual judgments. How do percepts and qualisigns get built up into > richer sign relations that can serve as the premisses in an inference > (uncontrolled as it may be) to a perceptual judgment? An explanation, I > take it, is given in the discussion of telepathy in terms of the > antecipuum, percipuum, and ponecipuum as the immediate interpretants of the > antecept, percept and ponencept. > > I've spent some time trying to fit the pieces together, but his discussion > of the role that percepts play in the semiotic process in "Universes and > Predicaments" is so dense that it is posing something of a challenge. His > discussion of the perception of time as a continuous process in the piece > on telepathy seems to offer some suggestions for thinking about how this > all might work. Does anyone have recommendations for other things Peirce > has written that might shed light on the matter, or for secondary sources > that might be helpful? I've read the secondary sources I could find on > perceptions and percepts, but I'm looking for something that digs through > these particular passages in "Universes and Predicaments" and the > discussion of the percipuum in the essay on telepathy. > > --Jeff > > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2015 9:04 AM > To: [email protected] > Cc: Peirce-L > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions, > > John, > > The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as > saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a > rhematic iconic qualisign. > > Best, > > Gary > > [Gary Richmond] > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > > On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier <[email protected]<mailto: > [email protected]>> wrote: > I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that > I have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained > there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages > and discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no > problem with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are > judgments. > > Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction > coming first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which > requires and abduction. We can’t do other kinds of reasoning without this > first classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out). > > John > > From: Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]<mailto: > [email protected]>] > Sent: April 25, 2015 2:46 PM > > To: Peirce-L > Cc: <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, > Ch. > > Frederik, lists, > > Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the > recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's > paper "The Scent of Truth" (Semiotica 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I > recommended the paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well. > Nathan writes: > > The importance of perception is that in what > Peirce calls ‘‘the perceptual judgment’’ it attaches the equivalent of > text, > at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an > intellectual component into consciousness. > > We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the > perceptual > judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it > against us, and > we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . . > (CP 7.643) > > We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and > secondness, > are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component > is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the ‘other’ > that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception > adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces > the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness. > > What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations > to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second > level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce’s use of > the > word ‘judgment’ to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the > starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A > judgment > involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what > else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of > inference identified by Peirce, it is only abduction that can operate at > this > primitive level of thought. > > Strictly speaking, according to Peirce, perceptual judgments are the result > of a process that is too uncontrolled to be regarded as fully rational, > so one cannot say unequivocally that perceptual judgments arise from > sensations (or percepts, as the sensory component in perception is called) > by an act of abductive inference, but Peirce insisted that ‘abductive > inference > shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation > between them’ and that ‘our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, > are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences’ > (CP 5.181). This helps explain Peirce’s commitment (somewhat reconceived) > to the maxim: ‘Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.’ > (CP 5.181). (The scent of truth, 461-2) > > These passages seem to support what you just wrote. Do you agree? Btw, > Cathy Legg wrote that in the Q&A of a paper she presented at APA recently > she was asked exactly what is a percept in the perceptual judgment. She > thought it was "a good question." I think Nathan's parenthetical remark in > the paragraph just above provides a neat answer: it is "the sensory > component in perception"). > > Best, > > Gary > > [Gary Richmond] > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> > > On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 1:19 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Dear Gary, lists > > In the discussion of this P quote > : > "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, > I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the > general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in > our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on > necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the > perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150) > > it may be too easy to get the impression that as there is "no immediate > consciousness of generality", there must be, instead, perception as > immediate consciousness of First- and Secondness from which generatlity is > then, later, construed by acts of inference, generalization etc. But that > would be to conform Peirce to the schema of logical empiricism which seems > to have grown into default schema over the last couple of generations. > And that is not, indeed, what Peirce thought. What IS "immediate > consciousness" about in Peirce? He uses the term in several connections. > Sometimes he says it is a "pure fiction" (1.343), sometimes he says it is > identical to the Feeling as the qualitiative aspect of any experience > (1.379) but that it is instantaneous and thus does not cover a timespan > (hence its fictionality because things not covering a timespan do not > exist). > But Feelings are Firstnesses and, for that reason, never appear in > isolation (all phenomena having both 1-2-3 aspects). So > immediate-consciousness-Feelings come in company with existence (2) and > generality/continuity (3). That is why what appears in perception is > perceptual judgments - so perception as such is NOT "immediate > consciousness". It is only the Feeling aspect of perception which is > immediate - and that can only be isolated and contemplated retroactively > (but then we are already in time/generality/continuity). Immediate > consciousness, then, is something accompanying all experience, but > graspable only, in itself, as a vanishing limit category. Thus, it is > nothing like stable sense data at a distance from later generalizations. > > Best > F > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
