Frederik this is extremely helpful, thank you! On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 9:33 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <[email protected]> wrote:
> Dear Gary, John, lists > > It is correct that Firstness is no abstraction in the sense of Hypostatic > Abstraction (even if the *term* Firstness is such an abstraction). But > Firstness as such is an abstraction in the sense of "prescission" or > "prescissive abstraction" - It is often overlooked how P's categories, > already from their emergence in the 1860s, are tightly connected with the > epistemologic means of accessing them - namely, his three types of > distinction, *dissociation, prescission* and *discrimination*, > respectively. > In "Diagrammatology" ch. 11 (2007), I made this summary: > > (…) the three categories are interrelated as follows (arrow here meaning > possibility of distinction; broken arrow impossibility): > > 1. <--/--> 2. 2. <--/--> 3. > > The categories may not be dissociated. > > 1. <---- 2. 1. --/--> 2. > 2. <---- 3. 2. --/--> 3. > 1. <---- 3. 1. --/--> 3. > > A lower category may be prescinded from a higher, not vice versa. > > 1. <---- 2. 1. ----> 2. > 2. <---- 3. 2. ----> 3. > 1. <---- 3. 1. ----> 3. > > All categories may be discriminated from the others. > > > So, 3. necessrily involves 2. and 1., and 2. involves 1. - so that 1. can > be reached by prescission from 3. and 2. Thus 1. is not "first" in any > temporal or phenomenological sense - it is not like we "begin" with > firstness in order to build up the higher categories - rather, we isolate, > by prescission, the lower from taking our point of departure in the > higher. > In cognition, this corresponds to the idea that we are always-already > within the chain of inferences from one proposition to the next - but > preconditions of that chain in terms of simpler signs (e.g. tones, tokens, > icons, indices, rhemas) may be adressed by prescission (so that the whole > semiotic theory forms a sort of anatomy of the chain of arguments which is > really, as a whole, the starting point). This is why neither semiotics nor, > correlatively, metaphysics are compositional in Peirce. > > Best > F > > > > Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.04 skrev Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > : > > John, > > The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as > saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a > rhematic iconic qualisign. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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