Gary F, list, Yes, that is the approach I would adopt as an interpretative hypothesis. It squares with quite a number of things he says and the different kinds of instincts he considers. Having said that, I think it might help if the explanation were made more general:
Instinct, being a habit shared by individuals that belong to a natural kind, has been shaped by the laws of evolution and will continue to be weeded out by the forces of selective pressure if the “ledger” doesn’t “balance”. Or, something like that--at least for starters. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: [email protected] [[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 1:01 PM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct Jeff, Gary et al., My first thought was that instinct being a habit of the species (not just the individual), it would have been weeded out by natural selection if the “ledger” didn’t “balance”. Isn’t that a possibility for what Peirce had in mind? Gary f. From: Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: July 15, 2015 3:21 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct Jeff, John, list, Jeff, quoting Peirce, wrote: This claims is particularly interesting: "Association may happen to be of advantage to the associating individuals; but each individual's instinct brings no more advantage to him than the sum of all the advantages that it brings to so many others. It is double-entry book-keeping; and the sides of the ledger must balance." Why must the sides of the ledger balance? I've been mulling this over since I read it and haven't yet been able to come to an adequate answer to your question. At the moment I'm thinking it might have something to do with Peirce's idea that every individual is a kind of society, while every society is also a kind of individual. I'm hoping that John or someone else on the list can put a brighter light on this. Best, Gary [Image removed by sender. Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 11:49 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Gary, John, list, I agree that this passage is particularly important for understanding Peirce's account of instinct. The first step in developing a better explanation of the nature of instinct is to provide a more adequate natural classification of the different kinds of instincts. It appears that the driving idea in this classificatory scheme is the role of association in the explanation of the different kinds of instincts. This claims is particularly interesting: "Association may happen to be of advantage to the associating individuals; but each individual's instinct brings no more advantage to him than the sum of all the advantages that it brings to so many others. It is double-entry book-keeping; and the sides of the ledger must balance." Why must the sides of the ledger balance? --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 7:36 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct John, First, I agree with you that Miguel's snippet from "A Theory of Probable Inference" is a gem (esp. the "important truth, that all human knowledge, up to the highest flights of science, is but the development of our inborn animal instincts") and will have me rereading that piece later in the week. I happened upon this passage wherein Peirce writes of the instincts in considering the classification of sciences. He suggests that there are "two distinct kinds," namely, (1) those that may help to preserve the stock through preserving the individual, and (2) those that are social in the sense of advantaging "some other individual or individuals than the agent." (I've broken this long passage, part of an even longer paragraph, into smaller paragraphs for readability.) The second Family, that of Systems of Performance, has quite clearly two Subfamilies. Both the one and the other are, substantially, and in the gross, confined to animal and human performances, including organized associations. One Subfamily studies those systems of performance which are mainly confined to the brutes, to the lower animals generally, being in the instinctive stage of development; so that there is an inborn faculty by virtue of which the performance is determined in almost all its details. The Instincts are said to be all adaptive, although it would seem to be in very small measure that play is so. However, the instincts seem to be of two distinct kinds, those which are adapted to the preservation of the stock, if at all, through preserving the individual in whom the instinct acts, and those which are social, and therefore, so far as they are adaptive, are adaptive primarily to the advantage of some other individual or individuals than the agent [emphasis added].. Association may happen to be of advantage to the associating individuals; but each individual's instinct brings no more advantage to him than the sum of all the advantages that it brings to so many others. It is double-entry book-keeping; and the sides of the ledger must balance. But then, over and above this, association is generally connected with reproduction, and is therefore advantageous to the stock quite independently of its advantage to the individual. In many cases, the social instincts are expensive to the individual, even dangerous, sometimes fatal. It appears to me that this Subfamily has but one Genus and that this Genus has two Subgenera relating to the two kinds of instincts. There is a certain difficulty in the fact that instincts for war are on the one hand social, since war is a sort of social reaction, and is moreover often dangerous, sometimes certainly fatal, yet on the other hand, it seems improper to distinguish war from preying, and preying is generally an affair of bread-winning, adapted to the preservation of the agent. It seems to me, however, that in war the enemy is not looked upon as fellow-creatures, but is treated as a thing, and I believe that though the instinct brings danger, it is nevertheless a selfish one, and ought to be classed with those which go to preserve the agent. This is inconvenient, it is true, as regards duels motived by jealousy, which is the chief kind of fighting among herbivora. The leading instincts studied in the first Subgenus are those of Feeding and Food Getting. The study of these will make the first Species. The study of instincts of War will be the second, with two Subspecies, the study of instincts of active war making one, the study of self-preservation including the instincts of self-concealment being the other. Other species will study the minor instincts, such as those of personal Cleanliness, of Medicine (dogs eating grass, etc.), of hibernation, and the singular instinct for collecting and hoarding all sorts of useless things, as seen in rats, in mag-pies, and some other animals, a genuine collecting mania, apparently quite useless. Then I am inclined to think that we must admit a Species for the study of instincts of working materials, such as the tree-felling instinct of beavers, the instinct of the wood-pecker. With this I would reckon all instinctive mechanical skill. CP 7.378 This may not closely relate to your particular interest in instinct, but I found the passage intriguing. Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 8:36 PM, John Collier <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote: Thanks to everyone who responded, but especially to Miguel for sending this gem. Now I just have to figure out what lies behind it. I agree with Jeff that the Century Dictionary entries are not particularly useful. I should be asleep. Best to all, John From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>] Sent: July 15, 2015 1:18 AM To: John Collier; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recently published: Hitler and Abductive Logic Dear John, In the last paragraph of an extremely interesting text, "A Theory of Probable Inference", W4: 408-450 (1883); Peirce points that "Side by side, then, with the well established proposition that all knowledge is based on experience, and that science is only advanced by the experimental verifications of theories, we have to place this other equally important truth, that all human knowledge, up to the highest flights of science, is but the development of our inborn animal instincts." Best, Miguel Angel Fernandez El 14/07/2015 a las 19:08, John Collier escribió: Folks, I am very interested in instincts for various reasons. I recently gave a talk on Piaget’s views on instincts at the International Society for Philosophy, History and Social Sciences in Biology in Montreal last week. I would be most interested if there is a Peircean position on instincts that can be supported by his writings. I would be surprised if this were not so, but so far I have not seen anything that I could use. Best to all, John
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