Ben, Jerry, lists, Ben: ". . . . . When Peirce uses the word 'individual' he generally means something such as this horse (Bucephalus), that building (the Empire State Building), yonder tree (located on 7th St. in Manhattan), etc. In "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined" (starting on p. 289 in EP 2, also appearing in CP 2.233-72) Peirce introduces his 10-class system made out of three trichotomies of signs; he recapitulates it in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby in CP 8.327-41. In that system,
any individual serving as a sign is a sinsign; also in that system, all symbols (072615-1) are legisigns, none are sinsigns, i.e., no symbols are individuals. . . ." Sung: I know that the 10 classes of signs Peirce defined based on the 9 types of signs (or sign relations) do not admit of any "symbolic sinsign" and all symbols are legisigns, i.e., only "symbolic legisigns" are allowed, as Ben mentioned. I have one question. In 1998, Lu et al. [1] were able to isolate a single molecule of the enzyme called "cytochrome oxidase" and measured its enzymic activity, for the first time, as a function of time. Why can't we consider this enzyme molecule that Lu et al. studied as an INDIVIDUAL and its name "cytochrome oxidase" as a SYMBOL ? In other words, what would be wrong to consider cytochrome oxidase as a symbol standing for the actual enzyme molecule (i.e., a sinsign) rather than a natural law (i.e., legisign) ? If we can divide sign processes into two categories --- MICROSEMIOTICS (i.e., the study of molecular signs such as DNA) and MACROSEMIOTICS (i.e., the study of macroscopic signs such as Peircean writings) --- depending on the physical size of the representamens invovled (e.g., moleucules in the former and printed words in the latter) [2-6], I wonder if not all the assertions that Peirce made based primarily on macrosemiotics apply to microsemiotics, just as not all the assertions valid in macrophysics (e.g., Newtonian mechanics, thermodynamics) are found to be valid in microphysics (e.g., quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics). If this analysis is right, the interesting debate that is on going between Ben and Jerry may be akin to the debates in the last century between classical physicists and quantum physicists. All the best.s Sung References: [1] Lu, H. P., Xun, L. and Xie, X. S. (1998). Single-Molecule Enzymatic Dynamics. *Science* *282*:1877-1882. [2] Ji, S. (1997). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Molecular Biological, Bioinformatic and Linguistic Implications. *BioSystems* *44*:17-39. [3] Ji, S. (1999). The Linguistics of DNA: Words, Sentences, Grammar, Phonetics, and Semantics.* Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci*. *870*:411-417. [4] Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Micro- and Macrosemiotics. In: *Semiotics 2000: “Sebeok’s Century”* (S. Simpkins and J. Deely, eds.), Legas,Ottawa. Pp. 354-374. [5] Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Micro- and Macrosemiotics. In: Semiotics 2000: “Sebeok’s Century” (Simpkins, S., and Deely, J., eds.), Legas, New York. Pp. 357-373. [6] Ji, S. (2002). Microsemiotics of DNA. *Semiotica* 138 (1/4): 15-42. (The PDF files of References 2 through 6 are available at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Proceedings & Abstracts or Refereed Journal Articles.) On Sun, Jul 26, 2015 at 10:29 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Jerry, you're simply using the word 'individual' in another way than > Peirce does. When Peirce uses the word 'individual' he generally means > something such as this horse (Bucephalus), that building (the Empire State > Building), yonder tree (located on 7th St. in Manhattan), etc. In > "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are > Determined" (starting on p. 289 in EP 2, also appearing in CP 2.233-72) > Peirce introduces his 10-class system made out of three trichotomies of > signs; he recapitulates it in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby in CP 8.327-41. > In that system, any individual serving as a sign is a sinsign; also in that > system, all symbols are legisigns, none are sinsigns, i.e., no symbols are > individuals. He's explicit about it. Peirce also discusses there and > elsewhere how the same sign can incorporate icons, indices, symbols. You > see a chemical analogy with Peirce's sign classifications, but if the > analogy puts you at odds with what Peirce said in plain English, then your > analogy isn't quite working. Trying to get me to be less "rigid" in my > interpretation of Peirce won't help your analogy if I'm correct about > Peirce. Anyway, Peirce may have been inspired by some chemical analogies, > and his meditations on complex chemical structures surely helped him think > more skillfully about other complex structures, but he was quite explicit > about not basing philosophical semiotic (or any other kind of cenoscopy) _ > *logically*_ on any idioscopic principles or theories (such as physics or > chemistry). > > I didn't mention species, but since you bring it up: The word 'species' in > Peirce's time was taken to refer to a _*kind*_ as opposed to a total > population of that kind. There is a relatively recent shift of meaning, as > John Collier has pointed out, by some biologists to refer by the word > 'species' not just to the species as a kind but to the species' total > population during the course of the species' existence - that total > population as a somewhat scattered and long-existent collective individual > - sort of like an individual swarm or flock, etc., but with much more > dispersion, longevity, and turnover in membership. In that sense, the sense > of a concrete individual (soever scattered, etc.), a species is an > individual even in Peirce's sense. Is that your sense of 'biological > species'? Meanwhile, I look up 'chemical species' and find that definitions > vary on whether it is an _*ensemble*_ of identical atoms or identical > molecules or identical ions etc. under observation, or whether it is simply > the unique _*kind*_ to which the identical atoms or identical molecules, > etc. belong. An individual ensemble is a collective individual, as far as I > can tell. But if 'chemical species' just means the kind to which identical > atoms (or the like) belong, then it is not an individual in Peirce's sense, > except in an abstract universe of discourse with abstract singulars. Now, > we often talk that way, speaking of 'individual kinds' and so on. I > suspect that that's what you mean by 'individual species' both in biology > and in chemistry - you mean a (taxically more-or-less bottom-rung) _*kind*_. > Or maybe you do mean this or that individual ensemble. In any case I really > don't think that by 'chemical species' you mean, for example, the total > population of O_2 molecules as a single concrete collective (though > dispersed) object throughout space and time. Anyway in Peirce the main > sense of 'individual' is not that in the phrase 'individual kind'. > > You have not clarified your sense of the word 'individual'. In calling an > atomic symbol 'individual', do you mean (A) an individual instance of the > symbol, a symbolic expression appearing on a certain page of a certain copy > of a certain book? Or do you mean (B) that atomic symbol in general, across > all its instances in a given language or (C) that atomic symbol in general, > across all its instances in all languages and thought? (B) and (C), in > Peirce's system, are legisigns, i.e., generals serving as signs. If you > mean (B) or (C), then you're simply using the word 'individual' in another > way than Peirce does. > > Best, Ben > > On 7/24/2015 4:17 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:Ben, List: > > > Although we discussed aspects of this question before, fresh citations > may shed a different hue on the meaning of the CSP's usage in various > contexts. Frankly, I think that your reading of the meaning of the term > "symbol" is to rigid. > > First, CSP's trichotomy separates the concept of a sign (qualisign, > sinsign and legisign) sharply and distinctly from the concept of symbol > (and its association of symbol, index and icon) as the identities > associated with and related to the first row terms. > > If my recall is correct he asserts that the terms (icon, index and > symbol) contains parts of one another. (This is consistent with chemical > units where all three are used in representation and all three are > representations are products of the human mind from analysis of data and > historical precedence. > > In this sense, the formulations of arguments (rhema, dicisign, > arguments, that is logically meaningful terms) necessary draws on the > immediacy of (icon, index, symbol) meanings to formulate the arguments, > general or not. > > In Natural Propositions, FS cites the book of Mark Greaves, the > Philosophical Status of Diagrams, (from the Stanford group). This book > compares CSP's logical diagrams with various other forms - Aristotle, the > Square, Venn, and so forth. This book is an historical perspective that > compares logics and diagrams. An extra-ordinary book to be sure! > > Are symbols used in diagrams? Are symbols used in graphs? Are symbols > used in calculations? > > CSP writes wrt 'beta' graphs, > > "It reasonings generally turn upon the properties of individual objects > to one another." 4.510-4.511, (Greaves, p. 167 ) > > When looking at the trichotomy as a whole, I believe that you are > seeking to outlaw the intertwining and interlacing of meanings of terms, > under the guise of "independence". For example, > > Nevertheless, a symbol that incorporates an index (supplied by one's > mind or more physically) makes a sign that can represent an individual > action as an instance of a practice, a form of conduct, a norm, a general. > > makes no sense to me. The atomic symbols incorporate indices > (physically measurable attributes. And they are NOT generals. > > More generally speaking, to the extent that an individual is an > instance of a general, it is the individual that represents the general, > not vice versa, Peirce's idea here being that generals, norms, etc., > govern, more-or-less determine, individuals, not vice versa (or not > significantly vice versa); and objects influence, more-or-less determine, > signs to represent them, not vice versa, so the individuals take the sign > role, the generals the object role, in such cases. > > Again, I find this gloss to be meaningless. In the natural sciences, a > species is a species is a species. The concept of a individual (species) > is fundamental to the logic of biology and medicine as well as chemistry. > It is necessary for logic. > The sentence seems to me to be an ad hoc mixture of concepts of set > theory, mathematical independence, and shapeless philosophical usages. > > In the pragmatic world, a symbol may represent you as your name, Ben, or > a collection (your family). Grammatically, this is merely a case of single > or plural with respect individuals. What philosophical point is gained by > invoking this sort of sentence? > > For closure, I return to my opening remark, your gloss here is to rigid > for my simple mind. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > On Jul 23, 2015, at 11:52 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Hi, Jerry, > > You're welcome again. Now, in Peirce's view, symbols not only are generals > but also do not, of themselves, symbolize anything but generals, so that > excludes individual actions from being symbolized. Nevertheless, a symbol > that incorporates an index (supplied by one's mind or more physically) > makes a sign that can represent an individual action as an instance of a > practice, a form of conduct, a norm, a general. More generally speaking, > to the extent that an individual is an instance of a general, it is the > individual that represents the general, not vice versa, Peirce's idea here > being that generals, norms, etc., govern, more-or-less determine, > individuals, not vice versa (or not significantly vice versa); and objects > influence, more-or-less determine, signs to represent them, not vice versa, > so the individuals take the sign role, the generals the object role, in > such cases. (I give an example in an appendix to this message.) A symbol is > itself individually instanced, in Peirce's system, not by a concrete > individual symbol, which doesn't exist in Peirce's system, but instead by a > kind of indexical sinsign that points to one's experience of the symbolized > object. > > But is the question you're asking something more like: Are there > unconscious, instinctual, merely animal-level symbols? In Peirce's system, > they're certainly allowed, since a symbol is a sign that represents by norm > or disposition of interpretation regardless of (non-)resemblance or > dynamical (non-)connection to its object. Such a norm or disposition could > be instinctual. There are places (I forget where off-hand) Peirce says that > not all symbols are artificial (I mean in the sense that words are), some > are natural in some sense. Unfortunately I don't remember those discussions > well. > > Best, Ben > > Appendix: So, let's say you have an accurate computer-program model of a > storm. Indices help make the program part of a representation of the storm; > but without the indices, the program is a general diagram, and the actual > storm an individual diagram, of the same object, a mathematical structure. > (It would be an impossibly lucky program, to have been made without > indexical connection to the actual storm yet mirror the storm so well that > indices merely need to be added to make the result able to represent the > storm to an interpretant.) > > On 7/23/2015 11:38 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: > > Thanks again, Ben. > (Where would this list serve be without you?) > > After reading this again, it became obvious to me (I am a slow learner) > that the underlying issue here is the origin of symbolization with respect > to biological / human actions. > > Ben, do you suppose that instinctual actions (such as those that are > directly comparable to animal behavior, such as fight or flight, or > feeding,) are not symbolized? The quasi-hypotheses being merely mental > patterns of spontaneous neuronal assemblies that manifest the material > reality by activating communication toward the ecosystem through internal > electrical musculatures? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > On Jul 23, 2015, at 10:16 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Hi, Jerry, you're welcome. Yes, some of the pages contain few words. If > something looks wrong, you can check it against the manuscript online at > <http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:12486086> > http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:12486086 (also linked at my > transcription > <http://www.iupui.edu/%7Earisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm> > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm ) and > please do let me know if something's missing. I don't think I missed > anything but sometimes it takes one a few days to see an error, because, I > guess, of slowness of change of frame of mind. > > MS 831 is undated but one can see that it must have been written after the > publication of _Studies in Logic_ (1883) because Peirce mentions its > publication. > > Another way maybe to narrow the date down: In MS 831, Peirce uses the > words "inference" and "reasoning" to mean pretty much the same thing, and > uses "quasi-inference" to mean instinctive or otherwise automatic > inference. There comes a time when he uses "reasoning" to mean "conscious, > deliberate inference," thus widening the sense of "inference" to encompass > instinctive inference (quasi-inference in MS 831). I'm not sure how > consistent he was about that in later years, but assembling the dates of > later quotes on reasoning and inference might help suggest a more specific > time period during which he wrote MS 831. > > Best, Ben > > On 7/23/2015 10:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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