Greetings!  I am by no means a Peirce scholar--I am a professional engineer
and amateur philosopher--but I became interested in his ideas a few months
ago for various reasons.  I have read a considerable amount of the
secondary literature since then, as well as EP1 and portions of EP2 (still
in progress).  I have also been looking through the list archives and
monitoring some of the recent discussions.  In one of the latter, Ben Udell
made this comment that caught my eye:

<QUOTE Ben Udell, 08/06/2015,
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16922>
To top it off, years ago at peirce-l, I harshly and wrong-headedly
criticized Atkin's account of Peirce's immediate, dynamical, and
final/normal interpretants, as regards certain points about which Atkin was
in fact quite correct (the final/normal interpretant determines the
dynamical interpretant, and those interpretants determine the immediate
interpretant).
<END QUOTE>

Ben and I exchanged a few e-mails about this, which led us to the discovery
that his memory was mistaken--his criticism had actually been directed at
what Atkin wrote about the alignment of the three interpretants with the
three grades of clarity.  However, I was still surprised by what Ben said
about the determination of the interpretants (If>Id>Ii); my previous
readings had pretty consistently indicated the reverse order (Ii>Id>If).
Digging further into the list archives led me to a 2008 post in which Ben
cited this passage:

<QUOTE Peirce, 12/23/1908, EP2:481>
It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is
equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
Necessitant.  Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the
Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object,
which determines the Sign itself,
which determines the Destinate Interpretant,
which determines the Effective Interpretant,
which determines the Explicit Interpretant,
the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they
would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes ...
<END QUOTE>

Ben then added this comment:

<QUOTE Ben Udell, 10/28/2008,
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/4881>
(It seems fair to take "Destinate Interpretant," "Effective Interpretant,"
and "Explicit Interpretant" as, respectively, "Final Interpretant,"
"Dynamic Interpretant," and "Immediate Interpretant.")
<END QUOTE>

Apparently, Peirce never spelled out how he would map the
destinate/effective/explicit interpretants to the immediate/dynamic/final
interpretants.  Ben matched them up based on Peirce's usage elsewhere of
"destined," "predestinate," and similar terms, along with the fact that
"explicit" can simply mean "expressed."  On the other hand, I pointed out
that "destinate" can also mean "set apart for" or "intended," while
"explicit" can also mean "fully revealed or expressed without vagueness" or
"fully developed or formulated."

However, it really comes down to Peirce's first sentence quoted above.  If
the immediate interpretant is an Actual, which can the final interpretant
be--a Possible (Ii determines If) or a Necessitant (If determines Ii)?
Same question regarding Ii/Id and Id/If.  Unfortunately, Peirce did not
provide clear answers and explanations like he did for Od>Oi>S
(EP2:480-481,485-489, 1908), as well as S-If>S-Id (L463, 1904).  The bare
terminology from EP2:482-483,489-490 (1908) is not terribly illuminating:

Ii = Mode of Presentation = Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative.
Id = Mode of Being = Sympathetic/Congruentive, Shocking/Percussive, Usual.
If = Nature or Purpose = Gratific, To produce action, To produce
self-control.

Alternatively, L463 indicates Ii = qualities of feelings or appearances,
actual experiences, thoughts or other signs of the same kind in infinite
series.  This seems consistent with Short's thesis that all three
interpretants can be emotional, energetic, or logical; but it is not much
help in sorting out the order of determination.  To muddy the waters
further, Ii is often defined as a sign's interpretability, the effect that
it *may *have (Possible); Id as any effect that it *does *have (Actual);
and If as the effect that it *would *eventually have (Necessitant).

I would be grateful for some assistance with all this, especially specific
illustrative examples, which I have had a hard time formulating myself.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to