Edwina, List: I have to run, but it sounds like you are saying that a Rheme only has an immediate interpretant, a Dicent has both a dynamic interpretant and an immediate interpretant, and an Argument has all three interpretants. Is that right? If so, I have not seen anyone make that claim before; I have always been under the impression that all signs have all three interpretants--just like all signs have both objects--and that each can be divided into First, Second, and Third. Hence Peirce's terminology of Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative for Ii, Sympathetic/Shocking/Usual for Id, and Gratific/To produce action/To product self-control for If. What am I missing?
Regards, Jon On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 5:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > I'm not sure what you mean by the 'three divisions of each'. Are you > saying that, for example, the Dynamic Interpretant, which is in a > categorical mode of Secondness, and is an 'actuality'...is also...in 'three > divisions'...by which I am guessing you mean, in the three categories of > Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness? > > I don't see that. I can see that a triadic Sign can be made up of all > three categories, but I don't see how ONE Relation (eg, that between the > Representamen and the Immediate Interpretant)...can be made up of all three > categories. The triadic Sign might, for example, not include any more > intensive interpretation than the Immediate Interpretant (a rheme). Or, it > might include TWO Interpretants - with the first one, the Immediate, being > a rheme in Firstness and the next one, the Dynamic, being a dicent in > Secondness...and it might not continue on to a Final Interpretant. > > Edwina >
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