Robert, lists, I agree that sinsigns need not have interpretants and qualisigns need not have objects. But the question I am raising is "Can there be a sign without an interpreter ?" As the following quotes indicate there cannot be signs that have no interpreter, whether human or non-human (I highlighted the interpreter or its equivalent):
*Reprtoduced from: * *http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM>* *5 - 1873 - C.P. 7-356 - Logic. Chapter 5 .* Let us examine some of the characters of signs in general. A sign must in the first place have some qualities in itself which serve to distinguish it, a word must have a peculiar sound different from the sound of another word; but it makes no difference what the sound is, so long as it is something distinguishable. In the next place, a sign must have a real physical connection with the thing it signifies so as to be affected by that thing. A weather-cock, which is a sign of the direction of the wind, must really turn with the wind. This word in this connection is an indirect one; but unless there be some way or other which shall connect words with the things they signify, and shall ensure their correspondance with them, they have no value as signs of those things. Whatever has these two characters is fit to become a sign. It is at least a symptom, but it is not actually a sign unless it is used as such; that is unless it is interpreted to* thought *and addresses itself to some *mind. *As thought is itself a sign we may express this by saying that the sign must be interpreted as another sign. [...] *9 - v. 1897_- C.P. 2-228 - Division of signs .* A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to *somebody *for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses *somebody, *that is, creates in the mind of *that person* an equivalent sign or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. [...] *38 - 1907 - MS 612. Chapter I - Common Ground (Logic) .* [...] By a Sign, I mean anything that is, on the one hand, in some way determined by an object and, on the other hand, which determines some awareness, and this in such manner that the *awareness* is thus determined by that object. [...] *40 - v.1907 - MS 318, Pragmatism.* e - [...] A sign is whatever there may be whose intent is to mediate between an *utterer* of it and an *interpreter* of it, both being repositories of thought, or quasi-minds, by conveying a meaning from the former to the latter. We may say that the sign is moulded to the meaning in the quasi-mind that utters it, where it was, virtually at least (i.e. if not in fact, yet the moulding of the sign took place as if it had been there) already an ingredient of thought. *46 - 1908 -_NEM III/2 p. 886 - Letter to P.E.B. Jourdain dated "1908 Dec 5" .* [...] My idea of a sign has been so generalized that I have at length despaired of making anybody comprehend it, so that for the sake of being understood, I now limit it, so as to define a sign as anything which is on the one hand so determined (or specialized) by an object and on the other hand so determines *the mind of an interpreter *of it that the latter is thereby determined mediately, or indirectly, by that real object that determines the sign. Even this may well be thought an excessively generalized definition. The determination of the *Interpreter's mind* I term the Interpretant of the sign. [...] *51 - 1909 - NEM III/2 p.867 - Letter to William James dated "1909 Dec 25".* [...] I start by defining what I mean by a sign. It is something determined by something else its object and itself influencing *some person* in such a way that that *person* becomes thereby mediately influenced or determined in some respect by that Object.[...] *A logical Criticism of some articles of Religious Faith .* The word sign, as it will here be used, denotes any object of *thought *which excites any kind of mental action, whether voluntary or not, concerning something otherwise recognized. [...] Every sign denotes something, and the anything it denotes is termed an object of it. [... ] I term the idea or mental action that a sign excites and which it causes the *interpreter* to attribute to the Object or Objects of it, its interpretant. [...] For a Sign cannot denote an object not otherwise known to its interpreter, for the obvious reason that if he does not already know the Object at all, he cannot possess these ideas by means of which alone his attention can be narrowed to the very object denoted. Every object of experience excites an idea of some sort; but if that idea is not associated sufficiently and in the right way so with some previous experience so as to narrow the attention, it will not be a sign. *60 - MS 670 :* A Sign, then, is anything whatsoever -whether an Actual or a May-be or a Would-be,- which affects *a mind*, its *Interpreter*, and draw that interpreter's attention to some Object whether Actual, May-be or Would-be) which has already come within the sphere of his experience; and beside this purely selective action of a sign, it has a power of exciting *the mind* (whether directly by the image or the sound or indirectly) to some kind of feeling, or to effort of some kind or to thought; [...] *62 - NEM IV - p. XXI - From MS.142.* A sign is a thing which is the representative, or deputy, of another thing for the purpose of affecting *a mind* [...] *64 - MS 381 -On the nature of Signs .* A sign is an object which stands for another to some *mind.* I propose to describe the characters of a sign. In the first place like any other thing it must have qualities which belong to it whether it be regarded as a sign or not thus a printed word is black, has a certain number of letters and those letters have certain shapes. Such characters of a sign I call its material quality. In the next place a sign must have some real connection with the thing it signifies so that when the object is present or is so as the sign signifies it to be the sign shall so signify it and otherwise not. [...] In the first place it is necessary for a sign to be a sign that it should be regarded as a sign for it is only a sign to that *mind* which so considers and if it is not a sign to any* mind* it is not a sign at all. It must be known to *the mind* first in its material qualities but also in its pure demonstrative application. That* mind *must conceive it to be connected with its object so that it is possible to reason from the sign to the thing. [...] *68 - MS 793[On Signs] .* For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that *any thing possessing consciousness*, that is, feeling or the peculiar common quality of all our feeling should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two, if not three, *quasi-minds, meaning things capable of varied determinations as to forms of the kind communicated.* As a medium the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the sign is passive, that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by on effect upon the sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the sign is active determining the interpretant without being itself thereby affected. *73 - MS 801 : Logic: Regarded as a Study of the general nature of Signs (Logic) .* By a sign I mean any thing which is in any way, direct or indirect, so influenced by any thing (which I term its object) and which in turn influence a *mind *that this* mind* is thereby influenced by the Object; and I term that which is called forth in the *mind* the Interpretant of the sign. This explanation will suffice for the present; but distinctions will have to be drawn are long. All the best. Sung On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 5:07 PM, Robert Boroch <[email protected]> wrote: > Hello, > > Sign points to itself – there is no referent – the sign that is the > referent for himself – literary work could be a sign without referent, or > so-called referent that is the work itself. > > Regards, > > Robert > > > > > > *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] *On > Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji > *Sent:* Sunday, August 16, 2015 10:50 PM > *To:* biosemiotics <[email protected]> > *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8815] Can there be an interpretant without an > interpreter ? > > > > Hi, > > > > In a recent article ("Semiosis stems from logical incompatibility in > organic nature", Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology XXX (2015) > 1-6), Kalevi wrote: > > > > ". . . . interpretant is enough; there can be interpretant without an > interpreter". > > Is this true ? Can Kalevi or anyone else on these lists give me some > example of this ? > > I always thought that Peirce defined an interpretant as the effect that a > sign has on the mind of an interpreter. Perhaps this is a misunderstanding > on my part ? > > > > All the best. > > > > Sung > > > -- > > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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