See my responses below.
----- Original Message -----
From: Helmut Raulien
To: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected] ; [email protected]
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2015 11:21 AM
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing things
Dear Edwina, Gary F., List,
Maybe the problem is, that we cannot say, that before there were humans who
were able to call something somehow, there were no things.
EDWINA: Obviously, there were things before humans! Not sure of your point.
So I propose to amplify the "being-called-" condition towards "application-"
or "interaction-" condition. I think, that there are three conditions, that
together make a thing: Material condition (cateory 3), form condition (category
2), application- or interaction condition (category 1). Application or
interaction with a thing is a possibility, because the thing is a thing still,
when no interaction is actually taking place- "quality, reference to a ground"
("On a new list of categories", Peirce), so category 1. Form is a "relation"
with the environment (border..), "reference to a correlate", so category 2.
Matter is structure that grants continuity, so category 3. However, I cannot
find, that matter is "representation, reference to an interpretant". Or can one
say so, by fetching a bit far? Anyway. Matter- and form-condition is my
renaming of Aristotles causa materialis and causa formalis, which I interpret
not as causes, but as conditions.
EDWINA: Again, I'm not sure of your point. After all, a leaf on a tree is a
'thing' and existed long before humans - and is ALWAYS in interaction with its
surroundings, whether it be with the air (release of oxygen); or with the sun;
or with the deer that is eating it.
Best,
Helmut
"Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>
Never mind the ad hominem - and the smiley face is irrelevant. Stick to the
issue. Again, the issue is that your outline sounds to me to be pure
postmodernist nominalism/relatavism. The opposite of Peirce's insistence on the
objective reality of objects - regardless of what anyone thinks of that
object....whereas you are saying that 'things are so because they are called
so'!
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: [email protected]
To: 'Edwina Taborsky'
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2015 9:39 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing things
That sounds to me like Edwina. J
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 23-Oct-15 09:25
Sounds to me rather similar to postmodern relativism/nominalism.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
We see what we focus on: what we see distinguishes itself from the visual
field: the dynamic object determines the sign to determine its interpretant.
Cognition begins by making distinctions; recognition continues with emergence
of relations from the phaneron, now that things have emerged from the phaneron.
A road is made by people walking on it; things are so because they are
called so.
— Chuangtse 2 (Watson 1968, 40)
The chaotic background murmur and crackle of neurons firing, cells doing
what they muddily must to stay alive, organizes itself into definite rhythmic
patterns, and lo, forms emerge and begin to branch. Presence parts from itself
and proliferates as the branches take names. But a metaphor reverses the
process by unmaking a familiar distinction, revealing a richer and stranger
relationship. By thus renewing our vision, metaphors ‘literally create new
objects’ (Jaynes 1976, 50) – immediate objects. Naming is creation, metaphor
recreation. “A road” is a metaphor: a road is made by people walking on it;
things are so because they are called so.
Gary f.
} Thought is not an out-of-body experience. [Mark Turner] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
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