Gary F., Gene, List, Let me set to the side the rancor that has been expressed about the general idea that appears to be expressed in the quote: A road is made by people walking on it; things are so because they are called so. — Chuangtse 2 (Watson 1968, 40) Gary, it looks to me like you are asking us to reflect on two points, both of which are quite interesting:
1) In what way might the creative use of hypo-icons (such as metaphors) help us to reshape the way we recognize the immediate objects we are referring to in the act of connecting an immediate interpretant with its object and its sign. For the sake of clarity, let's focus on a particular kind of relation that holds between an immediate object and a sign--such as a relation between a percept of a yellow chair with a green cushion and the feelings of yellow and green that are functioning as rhematic, iconic, qualisigns. If my child says, for instance, that sitting in this chair reminds her of being in a field of rich green grass on a sunny summer day, can the hypo-icons that she is expressing creatively shape the hues of the colors that I seem to see when I look at the chair--leading them to be seen as richer and more vibrant? Agreeing with Gary and Gene, I think the answer is yes. As a matter of interpreting Peirce's writings on perception and semiotics, I think he accepts the positive answer as being the right one. 2) In what way might this process of using hypo-icons creatively further shape the way we use rhematic indices to refer dynamical objects? Does the creativity affect this process, or is the process of referring to dynamical objects so constrained by considerations having to do with finding the literal truth that no such creativity can or should infect this process? Once again, I think the answer is yes--hypo-icons can and should be used to creatively shape the way we use rhematic indices to individuate the objects for our inquiries. What is more, I think Peirce accepts this as being the right answer. There are an indefinitely large number of ways that we can carve up the objects of our inquiries, and our aim is to find those that will be more fruitful for us. One of our goals is to seek the most adequate scientific explanations of the nature of the objects of inquiry as is possible. Even here, there are many diverse kinds of considerations that will shape the kinds of hypotheses that will prove to be fruitful if accepted. What is more, Peirce is keen to point out that there are other kinds of purposes that guide our inquiries. Many are prudential in character and pertain primarily to matters of practice. Even in the realm of pure inquiry into the truth, however, there are considerations of both truth and significance. My hunch is that finding more significant ways to see the world and our place in it hinges much on our capacity to revise the way we perceive the world--as well as our ability to evaluate the manifold perceptions that we are gathering together as parts of the observations that we are drawing from for the sake of forming hypotheses and then, later, putting them to the test. While he puts it in more general terms, my sense is that Doug Anderson is defending both of these kinds of points in his writings on abduction. Looking farther afield, there are quite a number of other philosophers (such as Merleau Ponty), who are exploring the same kinds of questions but in other terms. The nice thing about Peirce's semiotic theory is that it provides the resources needed to frame the issues with greater perspicuity. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: [email protected] [[email protected]] Sent: Friday, October 23, 2015 9:47 AM To: 'Peirce List' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing things Gene, thank you for that very salient comment! Do you mind if I copy it to my blog (with attribution to you of course)? Your point about “metaphor” is well taken; I’m using it here very broadly. Or, if we take the narrow meaning as the baseline, my “metaphor” is actually a synechdoche for Dewey’s “aesthetic experience.” As for recognition, habituation is certainly one aspect of it, one side of the coin … but I also see a recreative side in recognition (when it’s prompted by a creative metaphor), and that’s the side I’m focusing on in this context. Phaneroscopically, the point is that the Firstness involved in Thirdness keeps it alive. Gary f. } Where there are humans, you'll find flies and Buddhas. [Issa] { http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway From: Eugene Halton [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 23-Oct-15 11:44 To: Peirce List <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing things Dear Gary F., I would add that it is not only metaphor that, “reverses the process by unmaking a familiar distinction, revealing a richer and stranger relationship,” as you put it. This is also the essence of aesthetic experience. Dewey termed this “perception,” where the qualitative immediacy of the object determines the interpretation, rather than the habits of interpretation brought to the situation by the interpreter, which Dewey termed “recognition.” In Dewey's use of these terms, recognition is arrested perception, where full openess to the object is foreclosed by habituation. Fuller openness to the qualities of the object can indeed unmake a familiar distinction to reveal a richer and perhaps stranger relationship, such as Peirce’s example of snow in shade as actually appearing blue. Aesthetic experience in this sense, as a potential element in all experience, involves an openness, a vulnerability to experience. Gene
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