Jeff, thanks for this, as (like Gene's post) it takes the thread in new
directions that I hadn't anticipated, but would like to follow. My time to do
that is limited today, but I can make a few rather general comments.
The Chuangtse quote is a favorite of mine because it encapsulates one of the
central ideas in Turning Signs, which extends the familiar concept of
action-perception cycles to what I call the practice-(per)ception cycle, or
simply the meaning cycle. So it's not a statement about scientific inquiry;
it's a more general pairing of the twin observations that a practice is formed
by people practicing it, and that the forms of the pragmata or “things”
involved in that practice are determined by the forms of people’s interaction
with the external world. (The dynamic object is, of course, external to the
sign while the immediate object is internal to it, as Peirce explained in
several places; but pragmatically, an object can only be something that come
quasi-mind can interact with.) I hadn’t thought about the role of hypoicons in
all this, so my remarks about metaphor may, in more precise semiotic terms,
refer only to what Peirce called “metaphors,” i.e. hypoicons which “represent
the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism
in something else” (EP2:274).
Perhaps others will respond more specifically to your post before I can get
back to it myself. I hope so.
Gary f.
} Hell is wishing you were somewhere else. [gnox] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 23-Oct-15 17:07
Gary F., Gene, List,
Let me set to the side the rancor that has been expressed about the general
idea that appears to be expressed in the quote: A road is made by people
walking on it; things are so because they are called so.
— Chuangtse 2 (Watson 1968, 40)
Gary, it looks to me like you are asking us to reflect on two points, both of
which are quite interesting:
1) In what way might the creative use of hypo-icons (such as metaphors) help
us to reshape the way we recognize the immediate objects we are referring to in
the act of connecting an immediate interpretant with its object and its sign.
For the sake of clarity, let's focus on a particular kind of relation that
holds between an immediate object and a sign--such as a relation between a
percept of a yellow chair with a green cushion and the feelings of yellow and
green that are functioning as rhematic, iconic, qualisigns. If my child says,
for instance, that sitting in this chair reminds her of being in a field of
rich green grass on a sunny summer day, can the hypo-icons that she is
expressing creatively shape the hues of the colors that I seem to see when I
look at the chair--leading them to be seen as richer and more vibrant?
Agreeing with Gary and Gene, I think the answer is yes. As a matter of
interpreting Peirce's writings on perception and semiotics, I think he accepts
the positive answer as being the right one.
2) In what way might this process of using hypo-icons creatively further shape
the way we use rhematic indices to refer dynamical objects? Does the
creativity affect this process, or is the process of referring to dynamical
objects so constrained by considerations having to do with finding the literal
truth that no such creativity can or should infect this process? Once again, I
think the answer is yes--hypo-icons can and should be used to creatively shape
the way we use rhematic indices to individuate the objects for our inquiries.
What is more, I think Peirce accepts this as being the right answer.
There are an indefinitely large number of ways that we can carve up the objects
of our inquiries, and our aim is to find those that will be more fruitful for
us. One of our goals is to seek the most adequate scientific explanations of
the nature of the objects of inquiry as is possible. Even here, there are many
diverse kinds of considerations that will shape the kinds of hypotheses that
will prove to be fruitful if accepted. What is more, Peirce is keen to point
out that there are other kinds of purposes that guide our inquiries. Many are
prudential in character and pertain primarily to matters of practice. Even in
the realm of pure inquiry into the truth, however, there are considerations of
both truth and significance. My hunch is that finding more significant ways to
see the world and our place in it hinges much on our capacity to revise the way
we perceive the world--as well as our ability to evaluate the manifold
perceptions that we are gathering together as parts of the observations that we
are drawing from for the sake of forming hypotheses and then, later, putting
them to the test.
While he puts it in more general terms, my sense is that Doug Anderson is
defending both of these kinds of points in his writings on abduction. Looking
farther afield, there are quite a number of other philosophers (such as Merleau
Ponty), who are exploring the same kinds of questions but in other terms. The
nice thing about Peirce's semiotic theory is that it provides the resources
needed to frame the issues with greater perspicuity.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
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