Here's one place where Peirce says that /Barbara/ is not enough:
"Relatives (logic of)" in Baldwin's _Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology_, New York: Macmillan, 1902, DPP 2:447-450; CP 3.636-643
http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Relatives

   [....] Since Kant, especially, it has been customary to say that
   deduction only elicits what was implicitly thought in the premisses;
   and the famous distinction of analytical and synthetical judgments
   is based upon that notion. But the logic of relatives shows that
   this is not the case in any other sense than one which reduces it to
   an empty form of words. Matter entirely foreign to the premisses may
   appear in the conclusion. Moreover, so far is it from being true, as
   Kant would have it, that all reasoning is reasoning in _/Barbara/_,
   that that inference itself is discovered by the microscope of
   relatives to be resolvable into more than half a dozen distinct
   steps. In minor points the doctrines of ordinary logic are so
   constantly modified or reversed that it is no exaggeration to say
   that deductive logic is completely metamorphosed by the study of
   relatives.
   [End quote]

Best, Ben

On 10/28/2015 12:17 PM, Christina Da Silva wrote:

I am finishing up a masters that focuses on Medieval Islamic philosophy, and this list has been an inestimably useful resource for me, so thank you to all who post here. I am now trying to find the source for some information I have in my notes, and my hope is that someone on the list can help me.

Here is my question: where does Peirce suggest that all syllogisms may be reduced to Barbara, and where does he later renounce this idea?

Thank you,
Christina da Silva

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