Nailing when Peirce first said one thing about Barbara, and then the other, looks like a bit of a research project. Peirce, manuscript c. 1895, "The Logic of Quantity", CP 4.91:

   [....]
   But Mill is wrong in supposing that those who maintain that
   arithmetical propositions are logically necessary, are therein ipso
   facto saying that they are verbal in their nature. This is only the
   same old idea that _/Barbara/_ in all its simplicity represents all
   there is to necessary reasoning, utterly overlooking the
   construction of a diagram, the mental experimentation, and the
   surprising novelty of many deductive discoveries.
   [.... End quote]

Best, Ben

On 10/28/2015 12:45 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Here's one place where Peirce says that /Barbara/ is not enough:
"Relatives (logic of)" in Baldwin's _Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology_, New York: Macmillan, 1902, DPP 2:447-450; CP 3.636-643
http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Relatives

    [....] Since Kant, especially, it has been customary to say that
    deduction only elicits what was implicitly thought in the
    premisses; and the famous distinction of analytical and
    synthetical judgments is based upon that notion. But the logic of
    relatives shows that this is not the case in any other sense than
    one which reduces it to an empty form of words. Matter entirely
    foreign to the premisses may appear in the conclusion. Moreover,
    so far is it from being true, as Kant would have it, that all
    reasoning is reasoning in _/Barbara/_, that that inference itself
    is discovered by the microscope of relatives to be resolvable into
    more than half a dozen distinct steps. In minor points the
    doctrines of ordinary logic are so constantly modified or reversed
    that it is no exaggeration to say that deductive logic is
    completely metamorphosed by the study of relatives.
    [End quote]

Best, Ben

On 10/28/2015 12:17 PM, Christina Da Silva wrote:

I am finishing up a masters that focuses on Medieval Islamic philosophy, and this list has been an inestimably useful resource for me, so thank you to all who post here. I am now trying to find the source for some information I have in my notes, and my hope is that someone on the list can help me.

Here is my question: where does Peirce suggest that all syllogisms may be reduced to Barbara, and where does he later renounce this idea?

Thank you,
Christina da Silva


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