> On Oct 29, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > wrote: > > In what sense can phenomenology "draw" things from logic? If it can draw > something, what can it it draw?
An other question. We tend to think of logic as functional in its own right. For deduction and the mathematics of other types like Bayesian inference that’s true. It seems for abduction and perhaps types of induction that for the logic to function correct it can’t easily be separated from where it is applied. (There isn’t a way that I can see to talk about adductive inference without talking about the particular context of such inference for instance) Does this relate to the question of phenomenology (in the Peircean sense) and logic? The reason I ask is because you say: > ...remember that phenomenology can draw its principles from mathematics, and > that the normative sciences can draw their principles from both math and > phenomenology--but not the other way around. I wonder how we deal with things like quasi-empirical methods in mathematics (started I think by Putnam who clearly was influenced by Peirce in his approach). Admittedly the empirical isn’t the phenomenological (or at least it’s a complex relationship). I’m here thinking of mathematics as practiced in the 20th century and less Peirce’s tendency to follow Comte in a fascination with taxonomy. My understanding is that we’re talking just about a hierarchy of abstract principles. As such mathematics as a category in the taxonomy is about generality of laws. In this sense an area of study is simply separate from the hierarchy in terms of principles. We have to then separate phenomenological principles from phenomenology in general which may indeed draw from logic. The analysis may then lead to discovery of general principles. Of course for Peirce phenomenology is the study of the categories in their general form. His very inferences for why there must be three fundamental categories arises out of logic. At least it seems that way to me. Likewise when early only he switches from 5 categories to 3 (dropping Being and Substance) it’s because he sees them as unthinkable and irrelevant in a certain way. But that seems drawn from logic too. Jeffrey seems to say something similar when he talks about explanatory adequacy and observations. Apologies if I’m just missing the focus in this discussion. It just seems that if by “draw” we mean how particular laws are tied to more general laws then we can’t . If by “draw” we mean the method of analysis then of course we can and must. It just seems to me that while Peirce uses common terms like mathematics he means something subtle and nuanced about them such that his taxonomy of the sciences isn’t really a taxonomy of the sciences in any normal sense.
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