Jeff wrote: If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what is first? In this way, we focus the attention not on this or that red thing, and not even on this or that feeling of red, but on the kind of relationship that obtains when the predicate is considered separately from the things that might stand in that relationship.
>From the standpoint of logic, I would tend to fully agree with you. But from that of phenomenology, I have some reservations. There *are* *in fac*t red things, and blue things, and snow may indeed appear much more blue than white in a given situation of light and shade. And there are, in addition, possible firstnesses which even modal logics can't really quite handle *in reality*. This is to suggest that firstness, logically speaking, *is*, as you say, an abstraction, but that the "first instance" is *not* a logical abstraction, but a phenomenon. and even, for the sake of argument, a mere *possible* phenomenon. So, from the conceptions of first, second and third, we abstract from the thought of any particular thing that might stand in relation to x--is first, y--is second and z--is third. By pealing the things that x, x and z might stand for away from the relation, we get the notions of the relationships of firstness, secondness and thirdness considered in themselves. Here, I am following Peirce's explanations of how we should talk about relatives, relations and relationships. Again, I would tend to agree with you--and Peirce--when one considers the categories strictly from the standpoint of logic. Btw. Joe Ransdell and I tended to disagree on this matter. He would, I think, be siding with you in this matter, in a sense suggesting that logic as semiotic was 'sufficient', not quite imagining that phaneroscopy could really be a scientific discipline--at least, not much of one. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 9:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., Gary R., List, > > If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an > abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the > first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what > is first? In this way, we focus the attention not on this or that red > thing, and not even on this or that feeling of red, but on the kind of > relationship that obtains when the predicate is considered separately from > the things that might stand in that relationship. > > So, from the conceptions of first, second and third, we abstract from the > thought of any particular thing that might stand in relation to x--is > first, y--is second and z--is third. By pealing the things that x, x and z > might stand for away from the relation, we get the notions of the > relationships of firstness, secondness and thirdness considered in > themselves. Here, I am following Peirce's explanations of how we should > talk about relatives, relations and relationships. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 4:07 PM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories > > Matt wrote; > > My uses of 'First', 'Second', or 'Third' are to denote specific > instantiations of the categories of Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness. > This is similar to how I use 'a general' as a specific instantiation of > generality. Perhaps we all should follow this standard. Saying "category > the Third" just seems like bad grammar. Same with saying "a Thirdness." > > I'm not sure that I fully agree. Sometimes Peirceans like to speak of, > say, Thirdness, as a category, or in some other way which does not > represent an "instantiation" of a category (I'm not even sure what > "instantiation" means exactly in regard to 1ns and 3ns especially). > > Also, since except for certain types of analysis, the categories are all > three present in any genuine tricategorial relation, "instantiation" seems > a problematic expression. Perhaps I'm missing your meaning, however. > > I agree with you that saying "category the Third" is just (Peirce's) bad > grammar. I don't know anyone else who uses that expression today. And I > would also say that "a Thirdness" is not only bad grammar, but probably > altogether meaningless. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > [Gary Richmond] > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > > On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 6:11 PM, Matt Faunce <[email protected]<mailto: > [email protected]>> wrote: > My uses of 'First', 'Second', or 'Third' are to denote specific > instantiations of the categories of Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness. > This is similar to how I use 'a general' as a specific instantiation of > generality. Perhaps we all should follow this standard. Saying "category > the Third" just seems like bad grammar. Same with saying "a Thirdness." > > Matt > > On 10/28/15 5:49 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Gary, list, > > Thanks for your contribution to the discussion of this question which, > however, seems to focus on Peirce's writings on categories prior to the > 20th century. > > At the moment my sense (and that's pretty much all it is, while I do think > that at least a mini-research project is in order) is that as he > approaches, then enters, the 20th century that Peirce uses the -ness suffix > more and more, especially in introducing his tricategoriality into a > discussion. Once that's been done, the context makes it clear what is first > (i.e, 1ns), etc. in the ensuing discussion. > > So, in a word, I think he sees that employing the -ness helps disambiguate > its use in any given context, especially in introducing his no doubt > strange, to some even today, notion of three phenomenological categories. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]<mailto: > [email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of > the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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