Jeff, List,
It seems to me there is something slightly off about looking for
the hypotheses that underlie phenomenology. I do not think any
number of verbal evasions will fix the problem. The whole point
of anyone's version of phenomenology is to “bracket away” all such
hypotheses and to “cleanse the doors of perception”, etc. We may
be convinced by subsequent reflections: “the myth of the given”,
“data are really capta”, all of Peirce's many analyses, and the
results of experimental cognitive psychology, to name just a few,
that such levels of purity are not really possible for the complex,
concrete creatures we appear to be, but that is the project anyway.
On the other hand, as far as Peirce's distinctive perspective
on mathematics ‘per se’ goes, there is a tempting but unhappy
tendency to adulterate it with all the notions of logicism,
syntacticism, and other species of nominalism that I think
we really ought to try and cleanse from the pons thereto.
Regards,
Jon
On 10/31/2015 4:52 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> Hello Ben, List,
>
> I was particularly interested in the prospect of making a comparison between the hypotheses that we are working with
in mathematics and the hypotheses that we are working with phenomenology. There are good reasons to point out, as you
have, that the hypotheses in phenomenology are based on something that is, in some sense prior. Call them, if you will,
particular discernments.
>
> Having searched around a bit, I don't see a large number of places where Peirce uses this kind of language when
talking about phenomenology. Having said that, here is one: "Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is
Phenomenology, which simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon and discerns its ubiquitous elements...." (CP 5.121)
>
> There are interesting differences between the ways that we arrive at the hypotheses that serve as "starting points"
for mathematical deduction, and ways that we arrive at the hypotheses that are being formulated in phenomenology. One
reason I retained the language of "starting points" that was in the original questions that Peirce asked about
mathematics is that hypotheses are, at heart, quite closely related to the questions that are guiding inquiry. We
normally think of hypotheses as explanations that can serve as possible answers to some questions. In some cases, I
think it might be better to think of the formulation of the questions were trying to answer as itself a kind of hypotheses..
>
> We can ask the following kinds of questions about hypotheses in math, phenomenology, normative science and the like.
What are we drawing on when we formulate these hypotheses? How should we develop the hypotheses from the "stuff" that
we are drawing on so that the hypotheses we form will offer the greatest promise as we proceed in our inquiries.
>
> With these kinds of issues in mind, let me rephrase the questions about phenomenology so as to respond to the concern
you've raised:
>
> 1. What are the different kinds of hypotheses that might be fruitful for
phenomenological inquiry?
> 2. What are the general characters of these phenomenological hypotheses?
> 3. Why are not other phenomenological hypotheses possible, and the like?
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeff Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> NAU
> (o) 523-8354
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