A few sundry comments.
> On Oct 28, 2015, at 10:00 AM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > HI, > > Peirce said: "Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, > in bringing a second and third into relation to each other." > > > Why did Peirce say "a second and third into relation" instead of saying "a > first and second into relation" ? > > Wouldn't it have been clearer if Peirce said > > "Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing > two entities into relation to each other" ? Yes, that’s a clearer way of putting it assuming we maintain “entities” sufficiently broad. At times Peirce uses numbers to refer to place and then more often to refer to his categories. This can be confusing. > You wrote: "I should note that I think “second and third” in the sentence > don’t mean secondness and thirdness but more that there are three terms. > > The first is the sign and the second and third are the object and > interpretant . . . . “ Yes, but the object and interpretant can themselves be firstness, secondness or thirdness. So there’s a great deal of complexity here that doesn’t appear at first glance. I rather like how Gary put it. To get at the details of what Peirce means you have all his existential graphs. I think someone once put in here on Peirce-L that we should conceive of the implications as a kind of fractal unending depth. > On Oct 28, 2015, at 10:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > I enlarged and hopefully clarified my response here. > > Brief Notion of The Triad — Everything Comes — Medium http://buff.ly/1WhQxnr > <http://buff.ly/1WhQxnr> Yes, I think this is right. I’ve got my response from last week for Edwina coming where I have some quotes from “New Elements” that deal directly with what you write. I particularly like when you say, "the Second is always Ethics.” I’d not considered it that way before but it makes a lot of sense. Not ethics as the sort of metaethics philosophers are often interested in of course. But ethics as how force or power act on us. While I didn’t address it in my response to Edwina this is very key to Derrida’s notion of ethics he lifts from Levinas’ phenomenology as well. Things act on us and provide an ethical demand to which we respond. Semiosis tends towards its perfection (the entelechy) because of this ethical demand. While Levinas doesn’t put it in these semiotic terms the idea is that signs want to represent their object. That somewhat anthropomorphic “want” gets at this tendency which can certainly be conceived of ethically. That would allow us to deal with Peirce’s notion of “summum bonum” or agape in his semiotics. About the only place I might disagree is in how you use index. But I’d need you to unpack this a little more to be sure.
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