Gary F, list,
Gary, thank you, thank you so much for finding that quote about the
information of propositions and arguments! I spent so many hours, and not
just yesterday, trying to find that quote again. I'll have to keep it
somewhere I'll be sure to find it. Btw, it's 407, not 406, at least in the
Intelex version on Past Masters.
Now, you said:
One place where Peirce uses the terms *breadth* and *depth* in reference to
> the proposition (rather than the term) is “Kaina Stoicheia” (1904), EP2:305:
> e
I'm confused. I had just read that passage again yesterday, and then again
when you quoted it. But I don't see reference to the breadth and depth in
reference to the proposition. Rather, it is still to terms, understood with
respect to the roles they play in propositions and how such roles determine
the information a given term signifies. This is just what we find in ULCE;
there is nothing new in Kaina Stoicheia. Perhaps I have misunderstood
something?
Returning to the quote from the note to CP2:407, I wonder what he meant
that "[i]n fact, every proposition and every argument can be regarded as a
term." I recall Stjernfelt said in NP, p.79, that "both Rhemes and
Dicisigns may be seen as potential or truncated Arguments rather than
autonomous figures:", and he goes on to quote Peirce:
I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and fundamental
> logical relation, that of illation, expressed by *ergo*. A proposition,
> for me, is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness of its
> premiss and conclusion. This makes every proposition a conditional
> proposition at bottom. In like manner a "term," or class-name, is for me
> nothing but a proposition with its indices or subjects left blank, or
> indefinite. ("The Regenerated Logic, 1896, 3.440)
However, this goes in the direction of arguments, not in the direction of
terms. How can every proposition and every argument be regarded as a term?
If he had said this before explaining how the concept of information
applies to propositions and arguments, I would have thought that he simply
meant they can be regarded as terms insofar as they too have information.
But since he concludes with that statement, my guess is that he meant
something more by it. But what? Or maybe I'm reading too much into it, and
he just meant to say exactly that, that like terms, propositions and
arguments also have information.
Franklin
On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 9:36 AM, <[email protected]> wrote:
> Franklin, regarding this point:
>
> [ I would also like to point out that "Upon Logical Comprehension and
> Extension" (ULCE) only deals with terms, not propositions or arguments. I
> seem to recall that in his later years Peirce had specified what
> information would be like for propositions and arguments, but after looking
> around a bit, I can't find a text to cite and I don't exactly recall how it
> worked, only that it didn't work the same way for them as for terms. ]
>
>
>
> You may be thinking of this note to CP2:406:
>
> [[ I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was
> first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth
> and depth was equally applicable to propositions and to arguments. The
> breadth of a proposition is the aggregate of possible states of things in
> which it is true; the breadth of an argument is the aggregate of possible
> cases to which it applies. The depth of a proposition is the total of fact
> which it asserts of the state of things to which it is applied; the depth
> of an argument is the importance of the conclusions which it draws. In
> fact, every proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term.—1893.
> ]]
>
>
>
> One place where Peirce uses the terms *breadth* and *depth* in reference
> to the proposition (rather than the term) is “Kaina Stoicheia” (1904),
> EP2:305:e
>
>
>
> [[ If a sign, *B*, only signifies characters that are elements (or the
> whole) of the meaning of another sign, *A*, then *B* is said to be a
> *predicate* (or *essential part*) of *A*. If a sign, *A*, only denotes
> real objects that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by another
> sign, *B*, then *A* is said to be a *subject* (or *substantial part*) of
> *B*. The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of
> the characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical
> *depth*. This is the oldest and most convenient term. Synonyms are the
> *comprehension* of the Port-Royalists, the *content* (*Inhalt*) of the
> Germans, the *force* of DeMorgan, the *connotation* of J.S. Mill. (The
> last is objectionable.) The totality of the subjects, and also,
> indifferently, the totality of the real objects of a sign is called the
> logical *breadth*. This is the oldest and most convenient term. Synonyms
> are the *extension* of the Port-Royalists (ill-called *extent* by some
> modern French logicians), the *sphere* (*Umfang*) of translators from the
> German, the *scope* of DeMorgan, the *denotation* of J.S. Mill.
>
> Besides the logical depth and breadth, I have proposed (in 1867) the terms
> *information* and *area* to denote the total of fact (true or false) that
> in a given state of knowledge a sign embodies. ]]
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } The future ain't what it used to be. [Yogi Berra] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
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