Gary F, list, I don't find myself entirely convinced of your argument, Gary, but I think I should re-read KS all the way through again before commenting. I am in part resistant because it would seem to change what he had said about the informed depth and informed breadth of propositions in 1893, and because in KS he also makes a point of referencing ULCE when he mentions information and area as applicable, though these ideas were applied to terms, and not propositions, in UCLE, and he does not explain any further in KS how these ideas apply to propositions specifically.
-- Franklin On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask, > > If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and > not signs? > > > > I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New > Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his > “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the Proposition > which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), and in part > III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the proposition by first > defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. predicate and > subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term which is still > undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and depth, he can > only be referring to the breadth and depth of the proposition, not of its > parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can *be* a predicate (or > “essential part”) of a sign (namely a proposition), but it can’t *have* a > predicate. > > > > Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential* > breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only > *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a > rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used > alone, and would have no meaning by itself.” > > > > Gary f. > > > > } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G. > Bateson] { > > http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway > > > > *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27 > > > > Gary F, list, > > > > I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage > from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them > propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either, > so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something > deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and > subjects ("substantial parts") apply to. > > > > In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of > propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way > depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects > is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce > still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do > with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which > it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it > is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being > explained in KS. Did he change his views here? > > > > Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in > the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same > object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a > sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose, > that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a > part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's, > characters, I call an *interpretant* of A. What we call a "fact" is > something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an > element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to > express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly > as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect > Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this > language) would be the very Universe." > > > > Note that *every* sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of the > same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in fact > have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and signs > in KS have breadth and depth, as denoting objects and signifying > characters. Since any sign, to be a sign, will have an interpretant, it > seems clear that whether it is a term, proposition, argument, or any sign > whatsoever, it must have breadth and depth (if it had no breadth, there > would be no object, and if it had no depth, it would signify nothing about > the object). But not only does every sign have breadth and depth, every > sign has them in the sense of denoting objects and signifying characters. > > > > How to understand this? Do predicates and subjects simply apply to > propositions only, or do they apply generally to all signs? > > > > Franklin > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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