Jeff, Again, just to note in case you didn't see my other post, I thought it better to move discussion to a more appropriately titled thread, in case you are interested in responding.
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 2:56 PM, Franklin Ransom < [email protected]> wrote: > List, > > I think it would be best to move any further discussion to a separate > thread, since no one is in any way discussing "Vol. 2 of CP, on Induction" > anymore in this thread. I'm starting a new thread titled "Terms, > Propositions, Arguments", which I hope is sufficiently vague as a > description of any further discussion of our issues. > > -- Franklin > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 6:30 PM, Franklin Ransom < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary F, list, >> >> I don't find myself entirely convinced of your argument, Gary, but I >> think I should re-read KS all the way through again before commenting. I am >> in part resistant because it would seem to change what he had said about >> the informed depth and informed breadth of propositions in 1893, and >> because in KS he also makes a point of referencing ULCE when he mentions >> information and area as applicable, though these ideas were applied to >> terms, and not propositions, in UCLE, and he does not explain any further >> in KS how these ideas apply to propositions specifically. >> >> -- Franklin >> >> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask, >>> >>> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions >>> and not signs? >>> >>> >>> >>> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New >>> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his >>> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the >>> Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), >>> and in part III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the >>> proposition by first defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. >>> predicate and subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term >>> which is still undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and >>> depth, he can only be referring to the breadth and depth of the >>> proposition, not of its parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can >>> *be* a predicate (or “essential part”) of a sign (namely a >>> proposition), but it can’t *have* a predicate. >>> >>> >>> >>> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential* >>> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only >>> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a >>> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used >>> alone, and would have no meaning by itself.” >>> >>> >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> >>> >>> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G. >>> Bateson] { >>> >>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:[email protected]] >>> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27 >>> >>> >>> >>> Gary F, list, >>> >>> >>> >>> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage >>> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them >>> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either, >>> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something >>> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and >>> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to. >>> >>> >>> >>> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of >>> propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way >>> depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects >>> is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce >>> still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do >>> with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to >>> which it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in >>> which it is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what >>> is being explained in KS. Did he change his views here? >>> >>> >>> >>> Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in >>> the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same >>> object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a >>> sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose, >>> that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a >>> part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's, >>> characters, I call an *interpretant* of A. What we call a "fact" is >>> something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an >>> element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to >>> express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly >>> as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect >>> Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this >>> language) would be the very Universe." >>> >>> >>> >>> Note that *every* sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of >>> the same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in >>> fact have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and >>> signs in KS have breadth and depth, as denoting objects and signifying >>> characters. Since any sign, to be a sign, will have an interpretant, it >>> seems clear that whether it is a term, proposition, argument, or any sign >>> whatsoever, it must have breadth and depth (if it had no breadth, there >>> would be no object, and if it had no depth, it would signify nothing about >>> the object). But not only does every sign have breadth and depth, every >>> sign has them in the sense of denoting objects and signifying characters. >>> >>> >>> >>> How to understand this? Do predicates and subjects simply apply to >>> propositions only, or do they apply generally to all signs? >>> >>> >>> >>> Franklin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >
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