Supplement: Please dont care too much about my below text, I think I have confused the dynamical object with the final interpretant, besides many other things with each other.
Franklin,
I remember having had the wrong idea, that some signs donot have a dynamical object, and have mentioned the example of a unicorn, and then Clark Goble wrote, that in the unicorn-case the dynamical object is the concept of unicorn, that exists (if I remember it correctly). Of course, this is neither a knowledge about unicorns, nor a belief in them, at least not nowadays, but a character in myths and fairytales, or something like that. Maybe we can call it an intension without an extension. But an intension of an existing extension may also be wrong, for example, people thought that all storks were white, before black ones were spotted in Australia. Or, that electrons circle around atom cores, before orbitals of the form of double-clubs were depicted. So it is hard to decide, I thought, whether the dynamical object is a character in a myth, or an affair in real nature. Or maybe, it is both? When a physicist, who is well-skilled about aerodynamics, hears the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they cannot fly", maybe the dynamical object is rather the real affair in nature. But when a child who has just gotten able to speak, hears this argument, then for this child the dynamical object may either be a knowledge, grown-ups have (in this case, for the child, maybe it is not an argument, but a proposition? Does an argument, once it is understood or even just believed, become a proposition?-On-Topic!), or this is the immediate object, and the affair in nature the dynamic. But this topic is easily getting complicated: What, if a grown- up tells a child, that electrons circle around atom cores, that all storks are white, or that there is a father christmas? It is about collateral information. But at which level of source of collateral information does the definition of the dynamical object stop? If there was not a stop, it would not be the dynamical object, but the final interpretant, isnt it? Or the answer might be: The dynamical object is an affair in real nature, and if it is a character in a myth, then this character and this myth is the affair in real nature. I think, all this is very difficult, please donot feel obliged to answer all this, I think, it is my turn now, to try to understand it by reading some more papers. Lest you like this topic, and think, that it is good also for everybody else in this list.
Best,
Helmut
16. November 2015 um 17:34 Uhr
"Franklin Ransom" <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
"Franklin Ransom" <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
Helmut,
To clarify the point about common knowledge and the dynamical object: The idea there is that in order to understand a sign, we need some sort of collateral information, which means we need to have had some experience of the things being signified. To put it more plainly, we need to have had some sort of experience of the dynamical object in order to understand what the sign signifies. In some cases, we can do this indirectly through experience of other objects related to the dynamical object. Knowledge itself won't be the dynamical object, but when we consider the information we have and try to interpret it, we will look to the informed breadth, or the facts of all the real objects we have experienced, in order to determine the dynamical object being signified.
This is important for the index, which is supposed to point out the object.Sometimes, we are not in a position to interpret the index because we have not experienced the object and have no indirect experience of it through objects already experienced. When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we have the collateral information--or common knowledge--that is required to accurately interpret the index. Otherwise, the index points, be we don't understand. If we were talking about a symbol, it would be different, because a symbol cannot be a symbol unless it is interpreted as such. But an index will be an index regardless of whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply requires some sort of physical connection with the object it denotes or points to.
So for instance, a disease has symptoms that are expressed by the human body. But if we have never experienced a given disease before, we don't know how to interpret the symptoms; perhaps the symptoms seem to be normal at first, such as an occasional dry cough. Only later do we realize the symptoms were significant of something more, and that they pointed to something we hadn't experienced before, because we see the result later through new symptoms that have pointed to other diseases in our previous experience, or someone who has experienced the disease before recognizes the symptoms and communicates to us that there is a disease. Through this collateral information, we come to grasp that we are dealing with a disease, and now recognize the symptoms as pointing to it.
Another case is when we ask for directions to a place we have never been before. In order to understand the dynamical object, i.e. the place signified, we have to understand it indirectly through other places we have been before. The giving of directions will typically refer to the kinds of objects we have experienced before, like certain kinds of landmarks and signs. So our collateral information, or common knowledge, gives us an indirect experience of the place by its connection with other objects, like certain kinds of landmarks and signs, that we have experienced before, and when we come upon those landmarks and signs, we will understand their physical connection to the place. And that understanding will begin with the giving of directions, which references one's starting point as having certain physical connections to follow to those landmarks and signs, that will in turn lead to the place. Once we have visited the place, it will now be a part of the real objects we have experienced; and when we learn new information about the place, we will now have the direct collateral experience or information to understand which object the new information is about.
To put the point more generally, there are all manner of physical connections in nature. But we are not in a position to understand each and every one of those connections, because there are many things we have not experienced. As we gain experience of more things, we become able to interpret physical connections we were not able to before. And this is not true of us simply as individual interpreters, but as a community of inquiry, or scientific community.
-- Franklin
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On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:28 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Franklin,right! For example, the idea, that a common knowledge can be a dynamical object I had thought to have gotten from a letter to Lady Welby. My idea of self-refering sign, I think, comes from aspects of other theories, like autopoiesis, re-entry, and so on. And to find this aspect subsumed under the idea of the immediate object, whose function I have been understanding as another... well, not start again. See you later, and thank you very much for your friendly counseling!Best,HelmutHelmut,You're welcome, and I'm glad it was so helpful to you.I wish you the best of luck with the letters to Welby, and I express a word of caution regarding them. It probably doesn't get more complicated or 'higher-level' in understanding than those letters, and much of what is going on there is highly experimental for Peirce. I understand the sentiment to want to jump in right there (I did that myself some years ago), but it's not a good place to begin. The primary benefit of those letters (so it seems to me) is their suggestiveness of ideas. but that's not very helpful if one doesn't have a more basic understanding in place to test.It's sort of like the common layman attempt to talk about abstract theoretical physics without knowing any of the basic ideas of physics, how they're defined, and how calculus applies to them. Many people can't help it, because everyone experiences time and space and such, and so each person thinks they have a sense of the subject matter and can kind of grasp what's being said (no matter how abstract the idea and the real need for understanding the mathematics that goes with it). But really, a layman's understanding is no understanding, and sometimes directly contradicts the truth. I would say it is similar with the semiotics discussed in the letters. We all think about signs and meaning, so we can't help wanting to understand it all right away; but if one isn't well-prepared, it won't be very helpful, and may actually prove harmful, for genuine understanding. Even those early papers I suggested can be challenging (especially "On a New List of Categories)", but at least they're not so experimental as the letters to Welby, and they will make clear certain elementary ideas in Peirce's semiotic, because that is the purpose of those papers.Well, just a word of caution regarding the letters. If you think you can handle it, by all means, have at it. But if you start feeling the need for some rules of navigation to help you out on that open sea, I would just suggest the same papers I already have. If you would like to discuss any of them in a thread, I'll be happy to participate, with the exception of the letters to Welby; I learned the hard way to avoid those for now.-- Franklin----------------------------------------------------------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:Franklin,thank you. Yes, it was very helpful, and a bit shocking for me to see, how many things I have been misunderstanding. My line of misunderstandings was based on not knowing, that the immediate object is about the sign itself too, as you have written. I will have to read more before taking part on this list. Beside the papers you have recommended, Letters to Lady Welby are good for me, I think, because there are many examples given.Best,HelmutHelmut,I'm not familiar with those volumes, and when looking around I was unable to locate an English equivalent by Kloesel. Yes, I agree, the Collected Papers are expensive; I was fortunate to get them from Intelex before they stopped selling them to individuals. There is also a copy of the CP going around in an electronic version on the internet. I got a copy of that for under $3. It's not the best way, because images are lacking, which is very unfortunate for Vol.4 especially, and then also many symbols aren't portrayed well. Still, not bad for the price that I found it at. The commens is certainly helpful. The Guide for the Perplexed is secondary literature. I'm not familiar with Noth or Ort.If you are inclined, I would suggest Essential Peirce, vol. 1 and 2 (there are only those two volumes). Also, it is a good idea to keep in mind that if you visit cspeirce.com, you will find at the top of the home page a link to writings by Peirce that have been made available online. I myself usually go there to reference the ULCE paper. If you have not had a chance to read the following papers yet, I highly recommend "The Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". "On a New List of Categories" is important for deeper understanding. Probably "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" would be good. I don't think these are writings that would typically be thrown in with semiotics (except for "On a New List"), but they are invaluable for understanding the basic perspective and understanding that Peirce brings to his theory of semiotic.Now with respect to your substantive remarks, I think there are a number of things to say.When you say "The first is the meaning of the sign, that what the sign is about" and then "the sign has to present itself, so, be about itself as well", it's unclear here what you mean by this. So let me give two guesses on my part. First of all, there is the presentative aspect of the sign. That is, we consider an object, and in what sense that object serves as a sign. In Peirce's semiotic, this will mean that it either serves as a medium according to a, or the, quality the object embodies (Firstness), the brute existence of the object (Secondness), or the object as having some kind of habit (Thirdness). This is what the trichotomy dealing with qualisign, sinsign, and legisign is about. It deals with the sign in its presentative aspect, what the basis is for its power of mediation. Then besides this kind of presenting, there is the dynamical/immediate object distinction. There is the object in itself, independent of what we think of it, and this is the dynamic object; I believe this fits with your thought that one aspect is "the meaning of the sign, what the sign is about". Then there is the object as represented by the sign within the sign, and that is the immediate object. As the quote from Frederik's book shows, the idea is that the immediate object is not only about the dynamic object, but also the sign itself. So you say, "the sign has to present itself, so, be about itself as well." This seems to be exactly what the immediate obect accomplishes. So I think you have been misunderstanding, and this distinction between dynamical and immediate is what you are looking for. It is simply misleading because it is referred to as immediate object rather than, say, immediate sign, or self-representing sign. This is my guess.Then there is what you have to say about arguments and propositions, and here I think you have some confusion. The issue was not whether an argument contains a proposition and a term; everyone takes that for granted, and in fact probably more than one term, and more than one proposition. The issue is whether the original argument itself could be regarded as a term, and likewise whether a proposition could be regarded as a term. This is different from the idea of containing. We haven't been discussing whether arguments contain propositions and terms, but whether an argument can itself, just as the argument it is, be regarded as being itself a term in some way? That's the issue which has been discussed.Okay, now about some remarks you made about arguments and propositions. You said "[t]he dynamical object of this argument is the reason why it is like this, in nature, and also the common knowledge about this reason." I'm not so sure about this. It seems to me the reason is expressed in the final interpretant, unless by reason you mean efficient cause, and then it would be the dynamical object. Also, the dynamical object will not be the common knowledge about the reason. Knowledge is of the nature of an interpretant, not the object. As for the immediate object being an idea, the 'why it is like this', conveyed by the sign, I don't think there is necessarily a 'why' expressed in the immediate object; in general, I'm not sure there ever is such a case.You also said the proposition is formed by abduction, induction, and deduction, but this isn't quite right. It was probably 'formed' by an abduction. If we want to get clearer about what it means, we would submit it to deduction. If we wanted to put it to experimental test, we would submit it to induction, once we had a clear enough understanding of what it means in practice.You said: "It for instance has to contain a term of conclusion like "so" or "therefore". So an argument contains a term." Okay, this is not what is meant by a 'term'. A term is either a predicate or a subject of a proposition. It is the name of a class. That is the sense in which term is meant in the discussion that has taken place. "So" or "therefore" would indicate a conditional relation, which is not a term, but something that can be applied to terms.You said: "In the other thread it was about the question, whether every sign contains inference, yes, because you can tell eg. that a sign is not an argument, when it is a string of letters without a spacing. Then it is a word, which cannot be an argument, and this consideration is a deduction." I think this is a rather weak line of reasoning, and is largely due to your misunderstanding of the issue at hand and the terms of the discussion. While strings of letters and spaces and such might be of interest to someone working in, say, symbolic logic, and the discussion of well-formed formulas, it's not really relevant in the semiotic theory of logic. Besides this, the idea of all signs having the form of inference is not that we infer that some script objects written on a page without spacing is a particular kind of sign, but that the sign itself is an inference of some kind. That is, not that we infer that a set of script objects is a word, but the word itself, qua sign, contains inference in itself. Well, this is true of arguments and propositions, easily enough. Whether this is true of all signs, I think it might depend on how one thinks of it. Since any sign mediates between an object and an interpretant, there is a sense in which understanding or interpreting a sign leads one to infer the object.Okay, perhaps I could somehow go through and comment on something else, but that's enough for now, I need a break for a bit. I hope what I have said has been helpful.-- Franklin-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:Franklin,thank you very much for yor friendly attention!The three volumes are called: "Semiotische Schriften" (Semiotical Writings), Koesel / Pape, Suhrkamp 2000, and contain writings and lectures by Peirce. I think, they exist in English too, but in the English edition, Pape does not belong to the editors, I think. I do not have them now, as I had borrowed them from the public library, but I will buy them. Buying the collected papers is too expensive, I think, they cost about some thousand euros / dollars. I like very much the online dictionary "Commens" from Helsinki. and of course, the Guide for the perplexed by Cornelis de Waal. Secondary literature I have read is eg. by Wilhelm Nöth ("Semiotik", I think, and Nina Ort "Reflexionslogik").I think, the two aspects of a sign that I have suggested, are not the dynamical and the immediate object. I meant, that a sign has two aspects: The first is the meaning of the sign, that what the sign is about. But to be able to do this, the sign has to present itself, so, be about itself as well. Both aspects have both, a dynamical, and an immediate object. I think, this is quite trivial, there is not much about it. I have only talked about it to say, that in this respect, an argument also contains a proposition and a term, because this was the question of the thread. For example, the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they cannot fly". The dynamical object of this argument is the reason why it is like this, in nature, and also the common knowledge about this reason. The immediate object is the idea, why it is like this, conveyed by the sign. Now why does this argument contain a proposition? The proposition is: " "Penguins have very small wings, so they cannot fly" is an argument". This proposition is something, the recipient of the sign has to make, in order to know, that he has to cope with an argument. This proposition is formed by abduction, induction, and deduction (that was the topic in the other thread), and has to do with the fact, that there is a string of letters, interrupted by spaces, and with the word "so", and so on. In this self-presenting signification of the sign, the dynamical object is the sign-class this sign belongs to, and the immediate object is the sign itself. So the sign is self-referring in the way, that it is its own immediate object. It has to say: "I am an argument", to be understood as such. It for instance has to contain a term of conclusion like "so" or "therefore". So an argument contains a term. This is quite trivial, I have only mentioned it, as I was thinking of in what manner might an argument imply a proposition and a term. In the other thread it was about the question, whether every sign contains inference, yes, because you can tell eg. that a sign is not an argument, when it is a string of letters without a spacing. Then it is a word, which cannot be an argument, and this consideration is a deduction. Phew- as I said, I donot want to cause a confusion- but I cant help to do, sorry.Best,HelmutHelmut,I'm not aware of the three volumes of Pape or what they contain. Looking it up just now, I see it seems to all be in German? So it's hard for me to gauge the work. Are these translations of Peirce's papers, or is it original work by Pape that discusses CSP's philosophy, or both?I am not so much trying to suggest reading more before taking part (though reading more is always good), as I am trying to get a grasp of your interest in Peirce, and what you've taken time to familiarize yourself with in his philosophy. I usually find each person has their own way into Peirce, and then gradually each of us gets to understand the bigger picture over time and we help each other along with that. I myself came by way of interest in W James, epistemology, and logic. Please don't feel a need to read a lot more before participating.I'm not sure about the idea of self-representation of a sign. In EP1, "Grounds for the Validity of Logic", p.74, Peirce concludes that a proposition cannot imply its own truth. If a sign could represent itself, this would seem to imply that it could imply its own truth. Besides this, if I understand Peirce rightly, a sign, in order to be a sign (or for that matter, for any representation to be a representation), it cannot be the thing signified or represented. This is the importance of understanding a sign as a medium between an object and an interpretant that constitutes a triadic relation. If you should find an example of a sign which perfectly represents its object in every respect so as to be indistinguishable from the object, and so see the object as representing itself, I should say that there is no sign at all, but simply the object. It is part of the logic of representation that a representation must somehow be unlike what it represents, because it cannot be the thing itself. A sign which represents its object completely, perfectly, is no sign at all, but simply the object itself. To put it another way, if a sign were to represent itself, it would be its own object. But this is absurd, because it would be no sign at all then, but simply the thing itself.But I might be wrong about this. For instance, in EP2, "New Elements", p.321, Peirce writes:"It is, of course, quite possible for a symbol to represent itself, at least in the only sense in which a thing that has no real being but only being represented, and which exists in replica, can be said to be identical with a real and therefore individual object. A map may be a map of itself; that is to say one replica of it may be the object mapped. But this does not make the denotation extraordinarily direct. As an example of a symbol of that character, we may rather take the symbol which is expressed in words as "the Truth," or "Universe of Being." Every symbol whatever must denote what this symbol denotes; so that any symbol considered as denoting the Truth necessarily denotes that which it denotes; and in denoting it, it is that very thing, or a fragment of it taken for the whole. It is the whole taken so far as it need be taken for the purpose of denotation; for denotation essentially takes a part for its whole."Sooo, maybe I'm wrong. But I think what he is saying here is more nuanced than that a sign can self-represent. Every symbol has replicas, and he is saying the object represented may itself be considered a replica of the symbol. This doesn't make it the symbol though. I also think that in this case the replica is not itself a sign; at least, not a sign of itself. It's as if we took the symbol "pencil" and then instanced an actual pencil as a replica of the symbol. I don't think this makes the symbol able to represent itself though; after all, if the map has a replica that is the object mapped, how does the object mapped qua replica of the map represent in turn the map? We could say there is a likeness of the object to the map. But that would be as an icon, not as the symbol that the map is.In the case of "the Truth" or "Universe of Being," I take it that the symbol in some sense represents itself, but it is not the whole of what it represents; it is a fragment or part of the whole that is represented.For a more developed account of the matter, consider an argument given by Frederik Stjernfelt in his Natural Propositions, which book was discussed on the list at length some months ago. I'll finish with this quote from the text, and only offer it since it seems you are interested in this issue. NP, p.68 (italics and brackets from the original):"The syntax of the proposition is also the starting-point of the investigation of its interpretant in Syllabus. The object of the Dicisign, of course, is the entity referred to by the subject. The interpretant is not merely the predicate, but the claim, made possible by the syntax, that the predicate actually holds about an existing object:'...the Interpretant represents a real existential relation, or genuine Secondness, as subsisting between the Dicisign and the Dicisign's real object.' (Syllabus, 1903, EPII, 276; 2.310)This leads Peirce to the surprising conclusion that--since the object of the interpretant is the same as that of the sign itself--this existential relation between Dicisign and object forms, in itself, part of the object of the Dicisign. Consequently, the Dicisign has two objects; one, primary, is the object referred to--another, secondary, is the very reference relation claimed to exist between the Dicisign and that object:'Hence this same existential relation [between Sign and Object] must be an Object of the Dicisign, if the latter have any real Object. This represented existential relation, in being an Object of the Dicisign, makes that real Object, which is correlate of this relation, also an Object of the Dicisign. This latter Object may be distinguished as the Primary Object, the other being termed the Secondary Object.' (Syllabus, 1903, EPII 276; 2.310)What is here called Primary/Secondary object is what is later developed into the doctrine of Dynamic/Immediate Object, cf. below. Correspondingly, the predicate part describes some character of the Primary Object--at the same time as it depicts the indexical relation which the Dicisign claims to hold between itself and its object. This is, in short, the truth claim of the proposition--which can be analyzed as the Dicisign saying there exists indeed an indexical relation between itself and its object. This is why the Dicisign, in its interpretant, is represented as having two parts, one referring to the object, and the other--the predicate--referring to the relation between the sign itself and the object."So perhaps, Helmut, you might be looking for the concept of the Immediate Object, which, in being defined, is distinguished from the concept of the Dynamic Object. The Dynamic Object is external to the sign, while the Immediate Object is internal to the sign.I hope this helps.-- Franklin-------------------------------------------------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:Franklin,I have read the three volumes by Pape, and read a lot in the commens dictionary, and secondary literature, but I agree, that I should read more before taking part here in the future. Just now, to what I have meant by this second kind of dynamical object: It is the sign class, which the sign belongs to, and therefore a concept outside of the sign. "externalized, objectivated" is confusing, I agree. I meant something like self-representation of the sign, like: "I am an argument", which is a proposition, and "argument" or "proposition", which are terms. I took "proposition" synonymous with "dicent", and "term" with "rheme", so the talk about sign classes. It was all about the sign identifying itself as a special kind of sign, nothing Hegelian. So- see you later, when I will have read much more by Peirce.Best,HelmutHelmut,I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you here. What you have said is partly rather vague, and partly rather confusing. You mention both "the dynamical object concerning an external meaning" and "[t]he dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized/objectivated from itself." I don't know what it means that the sign is externalized from itself, and I'm not sure if you think there is an object that is independent of the sign (which is what the dynamical object is supposed to be, at least in CSP's theory; maybe not in yours?). I'd almost guess that you are attempting some sort of Hegelian dialectic here, but I don't know much about that stuff, and am not particularly interested in it. Moreover, I am somewhat unclear as to whether you are interested in discussing Peirce's work. If you might oblige, would you be able to say how acquainted you are with CSP's writings? Perhaps we could begin from there, starting with what you already understand so that we can find a common ground for discussing these ideas.-- Franklin------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:Franklin, Gary, list,I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized / objectivated from itself to make itself understandable. An argument transports the outside respect with its argumentative character, and the inside respect with its proposition- and term- character. I have written such a thing before about legi-, sin- and qualisign, it is a bit crude, just a guess, maybe you can do something with it, maybe Im wrong, I dont know, you tell. I do not want to confuse anybody.Best,HelmutGary F, list,----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague.I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions.But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments may be regarded as propositions.In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to form such an argument" (EP2, p.308).In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject; its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions. In the case of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the case of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term appears as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the term, and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of the proposition as its subject.Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount to supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth given as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies what Peirce says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with respect to, not simply propositions, but signs in general.That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be regarded as propositions. There are also some other points that are relevant to the claim that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. Although Peirce does admit that it is the proposition which is the main subject of the scholium as a whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple of times before the paragraph in question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to explain rhemas and arguments as well after the passage in question, and then comes to focus on the idea of the symbol, which applies to all three. And, as I have suggested, Peirce is showing how terms and arguments may be regarded as propositions, So while his discussion of signs is focused around the idea of proposition, what he says of propositions has consequences for our understanding of signs in general, and so for terms and arguments. Although "[w]hat we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself," it is also true that "[t]he purpose of every sign is to express 'fact,' and by being joined to other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such...would be the very Universe" (ibid, p.304). So here we see that fact is focused on the idea of the proposition, but it has consequences for how we should understand what all signs are up to, what the purpose of every interpretant is, regardless of whether it is the interpretant of a proposition or of another type of sign.Then, at the end of the text when Peirce revisits the idea of judgment, we find him saying the following: "The man is a symbol. Different men, so far as they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is the determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judged proposition has." (ibid, p.324) Now I would suppose that the judgment is a certain kind of proposition, but the man-symbol is not likely to be regarded as being a proposition, nor an argument. It is a term, but we see in this respect that it is like a proposition, because just as the judgment is a determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judgment has, in turn "[a]ssertion is the determination of the man-symbol to determining the interpreter, so far as he is interpreter, in the same way" (ibid). That is, the man-symbol now acts like a proposition in communicating the interpretant of the judged proposition to the interpreter, though the man-symbol is not properly a proposition but a term; but despite normally being considered a term, in this case it expresses a fact, which is properly what a proposition does.--Franklin-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and not signs?
I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), and in part III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the proposition by first defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. predicate and subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term which is still undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and depth, he can only be referring to the breadth and depth of the proposition, not of its parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can be a predicate (or “essential part”) of a sign (namely a proposition), but it can’t have a predicate.
Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has potential breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only potential depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like man “is never used alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
Gary f.
} The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G. Bateson] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: 8-Nov-15 15:27
Gary F, list,
I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either, so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being explained in KS. Did he change his views here?
Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same object with the same signification or meaning. Any sign, B, which a sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose, that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's, characters, I call an interpretant of A. What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe."
Note that every sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of the same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in fact have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and signs in KS have breadth and depth, as denoting objects and signifying characters. Since any sign, to be a sign, will have an interpretant, it seems clear that whether it is a term, proposition, argument, or any sign whatsoever, it must have breadth and depth (if it had no breadth, there would be no object, and if it had no depth, it would signify nothing about the object). But not only does every sign have breadth and depth, every sign has them in the sense of denoting objects and signifying characters.
How to understand this? Do predicates and subjects simply apply to propositions only, or do they apply generally to all signs?
Franklin
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