Gary F - see my comments. And, again, if you know of any place where Peirce
rejects the triad - please inform us.
----- Original Message -----
From: [email protected]
To: 'PEIRCE-L'
Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 9:14 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations
1) GARY F: Yes, Peirce says that “meaning is a triadic relation.” But meaning
is not a sign. Edwina, you say that a sign is a triadic relation, or a “triad,”
while Peirce says that a sign is “a correlate of a triadic relation.” Do you
really not see the difference?
EDWINA: Meaning is of course a Sign, a triadic semiosic 'form'.
You are confusing the triadic Sign [Object-Representamen-Interpretant] with
the single Representamen, which Peirce also often and frequently refers to as
the 'sign'. I am saying that the Sign (capital S) - that is, the full set of
three semiosic Relations, is a triad. It consists of three Relations: that
between the Representamen and the Object; the Representamen in itself; and that
between the Representamen and the Interpretant. See 8.334-337. See also the
diagramme of the 'three spokes' 1.347.
2) GARY F: Likewise with reference to CP 1.540, you don’t acknowledge the
difference between representation and a representamen. It might help if you
quoted Peirce’s whole sentence, and the one following it:
[[ In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word
representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the
interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call
a sign or a representamen. ]]
Once again, Peirce says that representation is a triadic relation – and that
a sign, or representamen, is the correlate of the relation that represents the
object for the interpretant.
EDWINA: I don't see your problem. The 'representation' is the relation of the
Representamen to the Object.
3) GARY F: You still have not cited a single quote where Peirce says that a
sign is either a “triadic relation” or a “triad.” No amount of repeated
recapitulation on your part can conceal that fact, or the obvious inference
from it, that Peirce simply does not use the word “sign” that way.
EDWINA: Again, you confuse the single Representamen (which Peirce also often
called the sign) with the FACT that the Peircean semiosis is triadic, made up
of three relations: that between the Representamen and the Object; the
Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen and the
Interpretant. 1.541 quite clearly outlines the triadic set of relations, as
does 2.274.
The FACT that you confuse the terms 'sign' and 'representamen' is not
something that I can deal with. The fact is, that the Sign as a semiosic
process is a triad. NONE of these three: the Object, the Representamen, the
Interpretant - can stand on their own. They function only within that semiosic
triad, the Sign.
As Peirce notes, in his 'chief divisions of signs', and
"10th. According to the triadic relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object
and to its Normal Interpretant" 8.344.
His ten classes of Signs clearly shows a triad.
"A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates
in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed
sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The
sign stands for something, its object" 2.228.
You can see in the above TRIAD, that Peirce uses the term 'sign' to also
refer to the 'representamen' and to the 'interpretant'.
And as he says, "In consequence of every representamen being thus connected
with three things, the ground, the object, and the interpretant"....2.229. NOTE
- Peirce refers to the representamen (which he has also referred to as the
'sign')...as connected with three things.
And further, "A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
the Second Correlate being terms its Object, and the possible Third Correlate
being termed its Interpretant, ..." 2.241. Note again 'the Representamen (which
he also often refers to as the sign') is 'the First Correlate of a triadic
relation"..
And, his outline of 2.243, where he outlines "Signs are divisible by three
trichotomies" {Note, these trichotomies refer to the three categories of
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness]....
"first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual
existent, or is a general law" [Note: this use of the sign refers to the
Representamen]....secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its
object...; thirdly, according as its Interpretant".
I think this shows the triad quite clearly. Again, the Object, Representamen
and Interpretant do not exist 'per se' on their own. They only exist within
that semiosic triad.
The fact that you, astonishingly, deny the triadic aspect of Peircean
semiosis - is something, again, that I cannot deal with. The fact-of-triadism-
is in all of Peirce's work.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 25-Nov-15 13:51
Gary F - the triad is a basic component of Peircean semiosis. If you know of
any place where he rejects the triad as this basic component, please inform us.
Please see his diagramme, 1.347 (The Categories in Detail) and his insistence
on this triad (1.345) where 'meaning is obviously a triadic relation' - which
means, that it is not mechanical (which is dyadic). You can also read his
discussion of the triad in 'A Guess at the Riddle'. And of course, since his
semiosis is triadic, then, you can read this perspective all through his work.
You can read his definition of the Representamen, which is the mediate part
of the triad, in various parts of his work as well: "I confine the word
representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the
interpreter of the representation" 1.540.
Note that this necessarily is a RELATIONAL process and not singular; the
Representamen does not exist 'per se'.
" A Representamen is a subject of a triadic relation to a second, called its
object, for a third, called its Interpretant, this triadic relation being such
that the Representamen determines its interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" 1.541.
Note again: This is a RELATIONAL PROCESS in A TRIADIC SEMIOSIS. Again, the
Representamen does not exist 'per se'.
Kindly remember that Peirce often used the term 'sign' to stand for the
Representamen in itself. Not for the whole triad. Again,
"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic
relation to a Second, called its Object as to be capable of determining a
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its
Object in which stands itself to the same Object". 2.274.
Again- it's in a triadic relation. The Representamen does not stand on its
own.
Thirdness, by the way, is the same as mediation (5.104) which of course
implies relations..and the Representamen is in a mode of Thirdness in 6 of the
ten Signs.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: [email protected]
To: 'PEIRCE-L'
Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 9:33 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Edwina,
Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the Representamen
is a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances is saying, but what Peirce
is saying in these quotes is that “A Sign is a representamen,” which is “a
correlate of a triadic relation.” Peirce does not say that a Sign is a “triad”
or a “triadic relation”: it is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a
Representamen (though perhaps not the only kind). If you know of any Peirce
quote saying that a sign is a “triad”, please post it here. Otherwise please
stop claiming that your peculiar use of the word “Sign” is the same as
Peirce’s.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Gary F - Again, the Representamen does not exist, as Frances is using it,
on its own; it's an integral part of the triad. The 2.274 reference is
analyzing the Sign (the triad) which includes the mediate Representamen without
a 'mental process'. …
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: [email protected]
Frances, Edwina, list,
Just to straighten out the terminology here …
For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a
“sign” is a kind of representamen. By this definition, there can be
representamens that are not signs; but empirically, Peirce has very little to
say about them. Two passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this clear:
CP 2.242, EP2:290: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic
relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic
relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a
representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are
the only representamens that have been much studied.
CP2:274, EP2:273: A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant.
Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower,
in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without
further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely
corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive
power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is
the chief, if not the only, mode of representation.
Gary f.
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