Matt, Gary F, Edwina, John, lists,
(*1*) As the following quote from Peirce retrieved from
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM shows, Peirce's
sign is BOTH DYADIC and TRIADIC, depending on which aspect of the sign is
prescinded.
In other words, Peirce uses the word "sign" in two ways ---
(i) as "anything" which has a "dyadic relation Þ" to B or object, and
(ii) as "anything" which is "in a triadic relation . . . such as to
determine C (i.e., interpretant; my addition) to be in a dyadic relation µ,
to B".
*30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July
1905 .*
"So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a
priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:
A "sign" is anything, A, which,
(1) in addition to other characters of its own,
(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic
relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the
relation Þ."
(*2*) In the above quote, Peirce defines three relations:
(i) the dyadic relation between sign and object (i.e., A and B) DESIGNATED
AS Þ,
(ii) the triadic relation between A and B mediated by C (i.e., A and B
through C) WITHOUT ANY SYMBOLIC DESIGNATION.
(iii) the dyadic relation between interpretant and object (i.e., C and B)
DESIGNATED as µ.
What is missing here is that Peirce did not mention explicitly the dyadic
relation between sign and interpretant that must exist. This gap becomes
clear when we represent the above definition of sign diagrammatically as
shown in Figure 1 below. To fill up this gap, I took the liberty of using
the letter "g" (from gap) as shown in the diagram:
Þ g
B --------------> A ----------------> C
(Object) (*sign*) (Interpretant)
| ^
| |
|___________________________|
µ
Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of Peirce's triadic *Sign*.
Þ = sign production
g = sign interpretation
µ = sign grounding
(*3*) I recommend, in agreement with Edwina, that we, as a semiotic
community, adopt the convention of designating with "sign" the DYADIC
relations between sign and object and between sign and interpretant and
designating with "Sign' the TRIADIC relation between "sign" and object
mediated by interpretant.
HAPPY THANKS GIVING !
On Thu, Nov 26, 2015 at 1:37 AM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote:
> This was bugging me, so I went searching. The first place I saw 'sign'
> denoting a triad was not by Peirce, but by Cornelis de Waal, pg. 79 of
> Peirce, A Guide for the Perplexed, in the first paragraph: "The sign is a
> genuine triad--one that cannot be reduced to a combination of dyads."
>
> In the Collected Papers Peirce's use of a triadic sign is rare, but here
> are two examples:
>
> CP 8.305: "I shall show that a Concept is a Sign and shall define a Sign
> and show its triadic form."
>
> 6.344: "Signs, the only things with which a human being can, without
> derogation, consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself, are
> triadic; since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact,
> which latter it brings into connexion with the former."
>
> Matt
>
> On 11/26/15 12:49 AM, John Collier wrote:
>
> I don’t have quotes handy, but I am pretty sure that Peirce uses “sign” in
> both ways. This caused me some problems in the past in applying his ideas
> to biosemiotics and other non-mental phenomena until I realized he was
> using the term in more than one way. I think if one is careful about the
> context it is possible to select which usage Peirce makes in each case.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>]
>
> *Sent:* Thursday, 26 November 2015 4:14 AM
> *To:* 'PEIRCE-L'
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations
>
>
>
> Yes, Peirce says that “meaning is a triadic relation.” But *meaning* is
> not *a sign*. Edwina, you say that a *sign* is a triadic relation, or a
> “triad,” while Peirce says that a sign is “a *correlate* of a triadic
> relation.” Do you really not see the difference?
>
>
>
> Likewise with reference to CP 1.540, you don’t acknowledge the difference
> between *representation* and a *representamen*. It might help if you
> quoted Peirce’s whole sentence, and the one following it:
>
> [[ In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word
> *representation* to the operation of a sign or its *relation* to the
> object *for* the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject
> that represents I call a *sign* or a *representamen*. ]]
>
> Once again, Peirce says that *representation* is a triadic relation – and
> that a sign, or representamen, is the *correlate* of the relation that
> represents the object for the interpretant.
>
>
>
> You still have not cited a single quote where Peirce says that a *sign*
> is either a “triadic relation” or a “triad.” No amount of repeated
> recapitulation on your part can conceal that fact, or the obvious inference
> from it, that Peirce simply does not use the word “sign” that way.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <tabor...@primus.ca>]
> *Sent:* 25-Nov-15 13:51
>
> Gary F - the triad is a basic component of Peircean semiosis. If you know
> of any place where he rejects the triad as this basic component, please
> inform us.
>
>
>
> Please see his diagramme, 1.347 (The Categories in Detail) and his
> insistence on this triad (1.345) where 'meaning is obviously a triadic
> relation' - which means, that it is not mechanical (which is dyadic). You
> can also read his discussion of the triad in 'A Guess at the Riddle'. And
> of course, since his semiosis is triadic, then, you can read this
> perspective all through his work.
>
>
>
> You can read his definition of the Representamen, which is the* mediate
> part of the triad*, in various parts of his work as well: "I confine the
> word representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the
> object for the interpreter of the representation" 1.540.
>
> Note that this necessarily is a RELATIONAL process and not singular; the
> Representamen does not exist 'per se'.
>
>
>
> " A Representamen is a subject of a triadic relation to a second, called
> its object, for a third, called its Interpretant, this triadic relation
> being such that the Representamen determines its interpretant to stand in
> the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" 1.541.
>
>
>
> Note again: This is a RELATIONAL PROCESS in A TRIADIC SEMIOSIS. Again, the
> Representamen does not exist 'per se'.
>
>
>
> Kindly remember that Peirce often used the term 'sign' to stand for the
> Representamen in itself. Not for the whole triad. Again,
>
>
>
> "A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine
> triadic relation to a Second, called its Object as to be capable of
> determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
> relation to its Object in which stands itself to the same Object". 2.274.
>
>
>
> Again- it's in a triadic relation. The Representamen does not stand on
> its own.
>
>
>
> Thirdness, by the way, is the same as mediation (5.104) which of course
> implies relations..and the Representamen is in a mode of Thirdness in 6 of
> the ten Signs.
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca
>
> *To:* 'PEIRCE-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 25, 2015 9:33 AM
>
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
>
>
>
> Edwina,
>
>
>
> Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the
> Representamen is a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances is saying,
> but what *Peirce* is saying in these quotes is that “A *Sign* is a
> representamen,” which is “a correlate of a triadic relation.” Peirce does
> *not* say that a Sign is a “triad” or a “triadic relation”: it is a
> *correlate* of a triadic relation, and a Representamen (though perhaps
> not the only kind). If you know of any Peirce quote saying that a sign is a
> “triad”, please post it here. Otherwise please stop claiming that your
> peculiar use of the word “Sign” is the same as Peirce’s.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <tabor...@primus.ca>]
>
> Gary F - Again, the Representamen does not exist, as Frances is using it,
> on its own; it's an integral part of the triad. The 2.274 reference is
> analyzing the Sign (the triad) which includes the mediate Representamen
> *without* a 'mental process'. …
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
> ----- Original Message -----
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca
>
>
>
> Frances, Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> Just to straighten out the terminology here …
>
> For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a
> “sign” is a kind of representamen. By this definition, there can be
> representamens that are not signs; but empirically, Peirce has very little
> to say about them. Two passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this
> clear:
>
>
>
> CP 2.242, EP2:290: A *Representamen* is the First Correlate of a triadic
> relation, the Second Correlate being termed its *Object,* and the
> possible Third Correlate being termed its *Interpretant,* by which
> triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First
> Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some
> possible Interpretant. A *Sign* is a representamen of which some
> interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens
> that have been much studied.
>
>
>
> CP2:274, EP2:273: A *Sign* is a Representamen with a mental
> Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs.
> Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act
> fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which
> turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with
> the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of
> the sun. But *thought* is the chief, if not the only, mode of
> representation.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
>
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>
>
> --
> Matt
>
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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