Hi Michael, Your Glossary is very helpful for me (and perhaps for others as well) to understand your argument. Let me ask you a naive question. What is(are) the key difference(s) between "structuralism" and "neostructuralism" ?
All the best. Sung On Sat, Nov 28, 2015 at 7:01 AM, Michael Shapiro <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > Apologies for having just sent you a duplicate of my Nov. 22 post. Below > is the one I intended to send. > > *Nominalism and Realism in Linguistics from a Neostructuralist Perspective* > > > > *GLOSSARY* > > > > *abduce, *v. < *abduction*, n.: (originally in the writings of C. S. > Peirce) the only fallible mode of reasoning, viz. the formation or > adoption of a plausible but unproven explanation for an observed > phenomenon; a working hypothesis derived from limited evidence and > informed conjecture > > *denominate*, v.: to give a name or appellation to; to call by a name, to > name > > *diagrammatization*, n. < *diagrammatize*, v. < *diagram*, n.: (in > Peirce's sign theory) an icon of relation > > *doctrinal*, adj. < *doctrine*, n.: that which is taught or laid down as > true concerning a particular subject or department of knowledge, as > religion, politics, science, etc.; a belief, theoretical opinion; a dogma, > tenet. > > *explanandum*, n.: the thing to be explained (Latin) > > *explanans*, n.: the explaining element in an explanation; the > explanatory premisses (Latin) > > *hermeneutic*, adj.: of, relating to, or concerning interpretation or > theories of interpretation > *icon*, n.: (in Peirce's sign theory) an image; a representation, > specifically, a sign related to its object by similarity > > *mutatis mutandis*: with the necessary changes; with due alteration of > details (Latin) > > *neostructuralism*, n.: a new linguistic theory based on Peirce's whole > philosophy (esp. his sign theory) and supersedes traditional structuralism > > *nominalism*, n.: the doctrine that things denominated by the same term > share nothing except that fact; the view that such terms are mere names > without any corresponding reality > > *phenomenalism*, n.: a mode of thought which considers things from a > phenomenal viewpoint, or as phenomena only; the metaphysical theory or > belief that (actual or possible) phenomena are the only objects of > knowledge, or the only realities > *realism*, n.: the doctrine that matter as the object of perception has > real existence (natural realism) and is neither reducible to universal > mind or spirit nor dependent on a perceiving agent > > *semeiotic*, adj.: pertaining to and embodying the tenets of Peirce's > sign theory > > *structuralism*, n.: any theory or mode of analysis in which language is > considered as a system or structure comprising elements at various > phonological, grammatical, and semantic levels, the interrelation of these > elements rather than the elements themselves producing meaning > > *taxonomy*, n.: a classification of something; a particular system of > classification > > *teleology*, n.: the doctrine or study of ends or final causes, esp. as > related to the evidences of design or purpose in nature; also transf. such > design as exhibited in natural objects or phenomena > > > > Philosophers have always thought of nominalism as a doctrine, > not as a practice. They may therefore be excused for having trouble seeing > the relation of nominalistic linguistics to the doctrine of nominalism, > which is that the former is a way of doing linguistics to which doctrinal > nominalists could not object, but that would seem deficient to those who > are doctrinal realists. For if there are no classes in reality, but they > exist in name only, as doctrinal nominalists claim, then any way of > dividing up phenomena, including linguistic phenomena, is as good—or at > least as true—as any other. And by ‘nominalistic linguistics’ I mean the > practice of imposing an arbitrary taxonomy on linguistic phenomena. > > This use of terms and concepts from the history of philosophy > to make headway in linguistic theorizing may be interesting but also > possibly confusing, the latter for the following reason. The linguistic > phenomena classified might include linguistic universals (the Peircean > ‘types’) as well as linguistic individual events (the Peircean ‘tokens’). > And one who is familiar with the nominalist/realist distinction as a matter > of doctrine only might naturally suppose that by ‘nominalist linguist’ is > meant one who denies the reality of linguistic universals. That, of course, > would be an application of the nominalist doctrine to linguistic phenomena; > but that, one can see now, is distinct from nominalist linguistics as a > practice or method. Nominalism as a practice would not necessarily deny > that universals are real; rather, it consists in deciding their > classification arbitrarily—both their classification into subtypes, if they > are segregated from individuals, and whether to so segregate them. Even > their classification as real or unreal would be quite arbitrary. > > The Chomskyan (= mainstream linguistics) search for deep > structure and generative principles looks relatively realist from a > doctrinal point of view. For whether or not surface phenomena are > conceptualized in terms of types as well as tokens, the deep structure and > principles look like universals, and especially so the way Chomsky and his > followers speak of them. Chomsky and his school are nominalist linguists, > not realist linguists, because their taxonomy of surface phenomena—the > phenomena they wish to explain as following from deeper principles—is > arbitrary. (It would follow that the hypothetical structure must be > arbitrary too, for it is justified only by its capacity to explain those > phenomena.) > > ‘Realism’, of course, is used to designate the opposite of > phenomenalism as well as the opposite of nominalism. With respect to > doctrine exclusively, not method, Jakobson and his structuralist > continuators (like the author) look like phenomenalists in contrast to > Chomsky and his followers, since the former seem much more concerned with > the description of what is here being called surface phenomena, whereas the > latter plunge quickly to the (putative) underlying realities that explain > them. One could say that Chomsky et al. are in error for proceeding too > quickly: after all, how can they abduce explanatory realities when they are > wrong about the explanandum? But this is not so simple an issue as that. > For if the classification of phenomena is to be real, not nominal, then it > is often impossible to know what that classification is until the > underlying realities have been identified. > > As an example from a domain other than language, consider > whether it was possible to know that rusting, fire, and metabolism should > be classed together as members of the same natural kind before they were > all explained as different forms of oxidation. The circle here is like the > hermeneutic circle: the explanans and the explanandum are found together, > not first one and then the other. > > But there is another way of looking at this which can be > identified, mutatis mutandis, with that of *semeiotic* > <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> neostructuralism in > linguistics. Realism in contradistinction to nominalism (doctrinally) is > connected with teleology—or so, at least, Peirce appears to have thought. A > natural class is one the members of which exist because each satisfies the > same idea. That idea has a certain potency, and hence the class exists > independently of anyone’s having named it. This idea is consistent with the > argument of the preceding paragraph, according to which some natural > classes may be those classes entailed by a true explanatory theory. But it > is not limited to cases where the explanatory structures lie beneath the > surface phenomena. > > Suppose language qua phenomenon has a history, and suppose > that history can be understood by postulating goals not involving any > underlying mechanisms. For example, linguistic change might be seen as > tending toward a more adequate diagrammatization (as it is, in fact, by > *semeiotic* <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> > neostructuralists). Then we have a teleological basis for identifying > natural linguistic classes, namely those that we have to attend to in order > to understand language as diagrammatization. (This too involves a > hermeneutic circle: neither the right description of the process nor the > goal that explains it can be discovered without also discovering the other.) > > If the preceding is a roughly correct account of the > linguistic practice of *semeiotic* > <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> neostructuralism, then it > would seem that one who espouses the latter is in method, if not in > doctrine, a realist as opposed to a nominalist, but a phenomenalist as > opposed to a realist, and a teleologist to boot. One may doubt whether a > *semeiotic* <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> > neostructuralist is a phenomenalist in doctrine. For such a linguist does > not deny, in fact, he presupposes that there are realities beyond or > beneath language but for which his teleological account of linguistic > change would make no sense. That is, there must be flesh-and-blood bodies > that speak and listen, and it is their desires and needs that explain why > ever more adequate diagrammatization is an inevitable if unintended goal. > If the research program subtended by *semeiotic* > <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> neostructuralism can be > made to work, then it will indeed conflict with Chomskyan linguistics—and > prove superior to it. > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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