Hi Michael, Thanks. That helps.
Sung On Sat, Nov 28, 2015 at 11:35 AM, Michael Shapiro <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Sung, > > "Neostructuralism" is the brand of structuralism based on Peirce's whole > philosophy, esp. his semeiotic. It is a name invented by me for the > purposes of setting off my way of doing linguistics from the current > mainstream brand. > > Best, > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: Sungchul Ji > Sent: Nov 28, 2015 11:02 AM > To: Michael Shapiro > Cc: CSP > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] material relevant to Peircean linguistics > > Hi Michael, > > Your Glossary is very helpful for me (and perhaps for others as well) to > understand your argument. > Let me ask you a naive question. What is(are) the key difference(s) > between "structuralism" and "neostructuralism" ? > > All the best. > > Sung > > On Sat, Nov 28, 2015 at 7:01 AM, Michael Shapiro <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> List, >> >> Apologies for having just sent you a duplicate of my Nov. 22 post. Below >> is the one I intended to send. >> >> *Nominalism and Realism in Linguistics from a Neostructuralist >> Perspective* >> >> >> >> *GLOSSARY* >> >> >> >> *abduce, *v. < *abduction*, n.: (originally in the writings of C. S. >> Peirce) the only fallible mode of reasoning, viz. the formation or >> adoption of a plausible but unproven explanation for an observed >> phenomenon; a working hypothesis derived from limited evidence and >> informed conjecture >> >> *denominate*, v.: to give a name or appellation to; to call by a name, >> to name >> >> *diagrammatization*, n. < *diagrammatize*, v. < *diagram*, n.: (in >> Peirce's sign theory) an icon of relation >> >> *doctrinal*, adj. < *doctrine*, n.: that which is taught or laid down as >> true concerning a particular subject or department of knowledge, as >> religion, politics, science, etc.; a belief, theoretical opinion; a dogma, >> tenet. >> >> *explanandum*, n.: the thing to be explained (Latin) >> >> *explanans*, n.: the explaining element in an explanation; the >> explanatory premisses (Latin) >> >> *hermeneutic*, adj.: of, relating to, or concerning interpretation or >> theories of interpretation >> *icon*, n.: (in Peirce's sign theory) an image; a representation, >> specifically, a sign related to its object by similarity >> >> *mutatis mutandis*: with the necessary changes; with due alteration of >> details (Latin) >> >> *neostructuralism*, n.: a new linguistic theory based on Peirce's whole >> philosophy (esp. his sign theory) and supersedes traditional >> structuralism >> >> *nominalism*, n.: the doctrine that things denominated by the same term >> share nothing except that fact; the view that such terms are mere names >> without any corresponding reality >> >> *phenomenalism*, n.: a mode of thought which considers things from a >> phenomenal viewpoint, or as phenomena only; the metaphysical theory or >> belief that (actual or possible) phenomena are the only objects of >> knowledge, or the only realities >> *realism*, n.: the doctrine that matter as the object of perception has >> real existence (natural realism) and is neither reducible to universal >> mind or spirit nor dependent on a perceiving agent >> >> *semeiotic*, adj.: pertaining to and embodying the tenets of Peirce's >> sign theory >> >> *structuralism*, n.: any theory or mode of analysis in which language is >> considered as a system or structure comprising elements at various >> phonological, grammatical, and semantic levels, the interrelation of these >> elements rather than the elements themselves producing meaning >> >> *taxonomy*, n.: a classification of something; a particular system of >> classification >> >> *teleology*, n.: the doctrine or study of ends or final causes, esp. as >> related to the evidences of design or purpose in nature; also transf. such >> design as exhibited in natural objects or phenomena >> >> >> >> Philosophers have always thought of nominalism as a >> doctrine, not as a practice. They may therefore be excused for having >> trouble seeing the relation of nominalistic linguistics to the doctrine of >> nominalism, which is that the former is a way of doing linguistics to which >> doctrinal nominalists could not object, but that would seem deficient to >> those who are doctrinal realists. For if there are no classes in reality, >> but they exist in name only, as doctrinal nominalists claim, then any way >> of dividing up phenomena, including linguistic phenomena, is as good—or at >> least as true—as any other. And by ‘nominalistic linguistics’ I mean the >> practice of imposing an arbitrary taxonomy on linguistic phenomena. >> >> This use of terms and concepts from the history of >> philosophy to make headway in linguistic theorizing may be interesting but >> also possibly confusing, the latter for the following reason. The >> linguistic phenomena classified might include linguistic universals (the >> Peircean ‘types’) as well as linguistic individual events (the Peircean >> ‘tokens’). And one who is familiar with the nominalist/realist distinction >> as a matter of doctrine only might naturally suppose that by ‘nominalist >> linguist’ is meant one who denies the reality of linguistic universals. >> That, of course, would be an application of the nominalist doctrine to >> linguistic phenomena; but that, one can see now, is distinct from >> nominalist linguistics as a practice or method. Nominalism as a practice >> would not necessarily deny that universals are real; rather, it consists in >> deciding their classification arbitrarily—both their classification into >> subtypes, if they are segregated from individuals, and whether to so >> segregate them. Even their classification as real or unreal would be quite >> arbitrary. >> >> The Chomskyan (= mainstream linguistics) search for deep >> structure and generative principles looks relatively realist from a >> doctrinal point of view. For whether or not surface phenomena are >> conceptualized in terms of types as well as tokens, the deep structure and >> principles look like universals, and especially so the way Chomsky and his >> followers speak of them. Chomsky and his school are nominalist linguists, >> not realist linguists, because their taxonomy of surface phenomena—the >> phenomena they wish to explain as following from deeper principles—is >> arbitrary. (It would follow that the hypothetical structure must be >> arbitrary too, for it is justified only by its capacity to explain those >> phenomena.) >> >> ‘Realism’, of course, is used to designate the opposite of >> phenomenalism as well as the opposite of nominalism. With respect to >> doctrine exclusively, not method, Jakobson and his structuralist >> continuators (like the author) look like phenomenalists in contrast to >> Chomsky and his followers, since the former seem much more concerned with >> the description of what is here being called surface phenomena, whereas the >> latter plunge quickly to the (putative) underlying realities that explain >> them. One could say that Chomsky et al. are in error for proceeding too >> quickly: after all, how can they abduce explanatory realities when they are >> wrong about the explanandum? But this is not so simple an issue as that. >> For if the classification of phenomena is to be real, not nominal, then it >> is often impossible to know what that classification is until the >> underlying realities have been identified. >> >> As an example from a domain other than language, consider >> whether it was possible to know that rusting, fire, and metabolism should >> be classed together as members of the same natural kind before they were >> all explained as different forms of oxidation. The circle here is like the >> hermeneutic circle: the explanans and the explanandum are found together, >> not first one and then the other. >> >> But there is another way of looking at this which can be >> identified, mutatis mutandis, with that of *semeiotic* >> <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> neostructuralism in >> linguistics. Realism in contradistinction to nominalism (doctrinally) is >> connected with teleology—or so, at least, Peirce appears to have thought. A >> natural class is one the members of which exist because each satisfies the >> same idea. That idea has a certain potency, and hence the class exists >> independently of anyone’s having named it. This idea is consistent with the >> argument of the preceding paragraph, according to which some natural >> classes may be those classes entailed by a true explanatory theory. But it >> is not limited to cases where the explanatory structures lie beneath the >> surface phenomena. >> >> Suppose language qua phenomenon has a history, and suppose >> that history can be understood by postulating goals not involving any >> underlying mechanisms. For example, linguistic change might be seen as >> tending toward a more adequate diagrammatization (as it is, in fact, by >> *semeiotic* <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> >> neostructuralists). Then we have a teleological basis for identifying >> natural linguistic classes, namely those that we have to attend to in order >> to understand language as diagrammatization. (This too involves a >> hermeneutic circle: neither the right description of the process nor the >> goal that explains it can be discovered without also discovering the other.) >> >> If the preceding is a roughly correct account of the >> linguistic practice of *semeiotic* >> <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> neostructuralism, then it >> would seem that one who espouses the latter is in method, if not in >> doctrine, a realist as opposed to a nominalist, but a phenomenalist as >> opposed to a realist, and a teleologist to boot. One may doubt whether a >> *semeiotic* <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> >> neostructuralist is a phenomenalist in doctrine. For such a linguist does >> not deny, in fact, he presupposes that there are realities beyond or >> beneath language but for which his teleological account of linguistic >> change would make no sense. That is, there must be flesh-and-blood bodies >> that speak and listen, and it is their desires and needs that explain why >> ever more adequate diagrammatization is an inevitable if unintended goal. >> If the research program subtended by *semeiotic* >> <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> neostructuralism can be >> made to work, then it will indeed conflict with Chomskyan linguistics—and >> prove superior to it. >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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