On 12/10/15 4:06 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
Or we may recognize that we simply don’t have any confident way at
this time of conducting that sort of analysis.
I don't see a way out.
Induction can't work when there are potentially infinite samples to be
drawn, and the long-run opens up the pool of potential samples to
infinity. Maybe Peirce's phenomenology limits the potential samples at
any given time (I still haven't decided what I think about that), but
what principle makes the potential samples in the long-run finite? What
class of argument could possibly secure this sort of principle?
Induction won't work; and deduction is only as good as its major-premise
which needs to be established inductively. All that's left is abduction.
My guess is that Peirce postulated the uniformity of certain aspects of
nature and rested them on his Neglected Argument. (He rejected
'uniformity of nature' as a ground for induction, not as a hypothesis.)
Matt
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