> On Dec 10, 2015, at 6:15 PM, Matt Faunce <[email protected]> wrote: > > Induction can't work when there are potentially infinite samples to be drawn, > and the long-run opens up the pool of potential samples to infinity. Maybe > Peirce's phenomenology limits the potential samples at any given time (I > still haven't decided what I think about that), but what principle makes the > potential samples in the long-run finite? What class of argument could > possibly secure this sort of principle? Induction won't work; and deduction > is only as good as its major-premise which needs to be established > inductively. All that's left is abduction.
I tend to see “in the long run” as more a regulatory concept rather than something actual. For a long time I did worry about how the “in the long run” worked and raised concerns similar to yours. The question of whether it really functions the way Peirce needs it to function if it’s not potentially actual in some sense is still a big issue I think gets neglected too much. So don’t think I’m brushing that aside. I do share some of your concerns there. I’ve just come to think that for Peirce the fundamental issue is the meaning of truth which then brings in the issues I raised as regulatory concepts. All that said, I’m not sure infinity works quite the way you suggest simply because Peirce is not dealing with a normal potentially countable infinity. That is his continuity ends up dealing with higher order infinities - even if he does differ from the typical cardinal/ordinal sets we deal with in mathematics. Now I’ll confess it’s been more than 10 years since I last studied Peirce on these particular issues or where he differs from Cantor and company. So my memories are a tad fuzzy. Forgive me for errors. I think however that if there’s a potential countable infinity of the sort that Peirce’s in the long run in his semiotics allows this to be dealt with by semiotics running in higher orders like or so on. I’m curious as to what others thing here. The second issue is whether we really need this. The concern ends up being more or less a common critique of convergence theories. That is you might test out to Tx but that the pattern completely shifts at Tx+1. I think Peirce’s conception works simply because in the long run is regulative as I mentioned but also because what is doing the testing is an infinite community rather than a finite one. That is the way Peirce attempts to get out of this is via his Hegelian/neoPlatonic like conception of the universe as an argument working itself out. So when we talk about truth it’s this universe that counts. That is we can maintain Peirce’s notion without having to deal with a practical knowing community. For any finite community then (i.e. any practical community we worry about) we’re always fallible from Peirce’s conception. What I sense you wanting isn’t a point of relative stability in our beliefs through continued inquiry. Rather I think you’re looking for something more akin to what Putnam takes up against Peirce. A kind of warranted assertability ala Dewey’s change from Peirce. If we’re looking for that sort of strong warrant then I’d probably agree we may not get it. I’m not sure we need that but I can completely understand why many might find Peirce ultimately unsatisfactory relative to these finite groups. He can offer inquiry but not certainty. (I’m not sure in practice Dewey/Putnam can do better mind you)
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