Franklin - thanks for your reply. Please see my comments below:
----- Original Message -----
From: Franklin Ransom
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 2:53 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina,
I will quote myself from the response I gave to Matt Faunce right before
replying to you.
"Matt, list,
Can you give your source for this?
1) I cannot. I confess that my statement was not well-thought out. I did not
mean to imply anything about the possibility of developing scientific
terminology in any given human language. What I meant "about the development of
a language to the point where it can articulate scientific terminology" is
thinking about the case of where we find ourselves today, in the state in which
scientific terminology has actually developed to the point it has. Obviously
not every human language in history has developed to the point of having the
terminology that the sciences today command. For example, the use of Latin
words for developing terms identifying species in biology, and the whole host
of such terms that have been developed. Or the development of mathematical
language to the point where physical theories like the general and special
theories of relativity can be articulated.
EDWINA: I don't think that 'language' develops as a language and then
possibly at some time, this development enables it to 'develop scientific
terminology'. Indeed, I don't know what you mean by 'development of a
language'. You seem to be suggesting that there is something in the grammar
that must develop!?
I think that the terms used to 'name scientific issues' can be created in any
language. I don't see what has to develop in a language to render it then and
only then, capable of 'articulating scientific terminology'.
2) I take it for granted though that it is widely acknowledged that human
languages do differ with respect to the rules of construction and the things
that can be said. If there has not been a vocabulary established in a given
language for discussing projective geometry, people speaking only that language
won't be able to say things about it without going through the work of
developing a system of terminology in order to say things about it, or by
translating from another language.
EDWINA: Of course a language can develop a new system of terminology! The
English and other modern-use languages have all developed such a capacity for
'discussing projective geometry'. Any language can and does develop new terms.
All the time. That's the nature of thought, and thus, of language - its
openness to new terms.
3) My essential point though was just to point out that trying to look to
human language as a model for representing reasoning, or the subject matter of
logic, is an ill-considered and ill-advised venture, precisely because there is
so much difference between human languages. It's not as though a universal
human language has been discovered by linguists, so I raised concerns about
Sungchul's reliance on 'human language' as his model for representing
reasoning. If one is to accept Sunchul's approach, we would have to admit that
there are different kinds of reasoning, one for each human language, and logic
would cease to be a general science of reasoning, and would become
indistinguishable from linguistics."
EDWINA: I agree with you that language should not be used as a model for
representing reasoning or logic, since - although language IS logically ordered
- this doesn't mean that its logical order is also a model for logical
reasoning. Peirce repeats that 'reasoning is of a triadic constitution' (6.321)
- and this doesn't fit in with the constitution of a language. As he also says,
logic is 'independent of the structure of the language in which it may happen
to be expressed" 3.430.And I also reject, as do you, that there are 'different
kinds of reasoning, one for each human language'. But the very FACT that 'the
world is chiefly governed by thought [1.349] means that it includes ALL three
modal categories. Not just Thirdness, habit, a 'frozen language'.
4) If you think this statement does not clarify my position well enough,
please let me know what specifically you feel continues to be an important
issue. If it helps, by saying that human languages differ with respect to the
things that can be said, I don't mean to imply that the language can't develop,
say, a mathematical science that will permit it to talk about, say, principles
of geometry. But if the work has not been done to develop that terminology,
then the average member of that linguistic community will find it very
challenging to think and express those principles, and will have to commit to
developing the language in a determinate to talk about those sorts of ideas.
EDWINA: I think that you have indeed explained your position - and I've
outlined, I think my differences. By the way, the average member of our own
linguistic community finds it very difficult to think about and express current
principles of science.
5) I would like to add that you have not acknowledged that your own position,
Edwina, is in conflict with Peirce's views, in that language does have an
impact on what we think, and so does play some role in determining the thoughts
we have, as individuals and as a community. Thought determines thought, and all
thought being in signs, this means that language does determine thought to some
extent. Your "radical freedom from language" theory is really just nothing but
the discredited idea of the Cartesian ego. The habits of language persist and
we are forced often to work within the confines of those habits. Yes,
innovation and creativity is possible, but not in the "blank slate" way you
suggest. Peirce would not have to spend so much effort on terminology, to the
point of articulating an ethics of terminology, if the words we use don't
matter for how we think. Just consider your debates regarding sign and
representamen. Does it matter that you get that terminology right with everyone
else, if you agree that language doesn't really matter and everyone really does
understand already what is being thought about? Why care about getting clear
about the language being used, if not to get clear about the thinking with
everyone else?
EDWINA: I don't agree with your view that my view is in conflict with
Peirce's views. After all, a major axiom in Peircean semiosis, which describes
thought, is the category of Firstness, the capacity for freedom and innovation.
This means that new signs, new thoughts, new words, are basic to Peircean
semiosis - and this is most certainly NOT similar to a 'blank slate'. I don't
agree with you that my view that cognition [not the same as consciousness]
which I consider is a basic property of our species - and of all matter - is
akin to the Cartesian Ego - which is a 'thing in itself'. The Peircean Mind is
a basic property/process of matter, and I repeat a favourite quote
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" 4.551
Certainly, Thirdness, as habit, expressed in the normative meaning of words,
and thus their restriction in meaning, contributes to the shared
community-of-knowledge that a linguistic group shares. But such shared
meanings, as in the debate some of us have with the meaning of 'sign' and
'representamen' , are debates about communal meanings among a group. This is
NOT the same as the ability of a language to articulate novel thoughts. As I
said, since thought is a basic capacity of our species, and thought operates
within semiosis and the three categories...then, the category of Firstness
enables novel interactions with the envt and thus, new terminology. My point is
that ANY peoples, - since they have the capacity for thought - and thus, ANY
language, can achieve such a result - and it doesn't require any 'development
of the language'.
Edwina
-- Franklin
----------------------------------------------
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 10:23 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
Franklin - I'm not sure that you are saying anything that much different
from your previous
"Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the
things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the
development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific
terminology is not a development shared by every human language."
I note that you refer not simply to the words available to the society but
to the logical rules-of-construction' and 'the things that CAN be said'.....and
your conclusion that not every human language can 'articulate scientific
terminology' seems to me the same conclusion in this post.
I note again, that you refer to the 'rules of construction' and suggest
that in certain languages, these rules prevent scientific expression. How?
My view is that ALL peoples have the SAME cognitive abilities, the same
logical capabilities - and they can adapt their languages to express ANY
thought. That includes new terms (we didn't refer to telephones 1,000 years
ago). Therefore - a language, such as, eg, that of the Dobe !Kung, can readily
either adapt and use the same word (telephone) or come up with their own term.
BUT - cognitively and logically, since we all are the same species - then, we
can all think the same way. Language - either in its grammar or its words -
does not confine or define us.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Franklin Ransom
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 2:48 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, list,
I never meant to imply that language determines thought in toto. So far
as all thought is in signs, and a language represents a system of signs, and
signs determine other signs, then it must be admitted that language determines
signs and, since all thought is in signs, this means that language determines
(some) thoughts. That doesn't mean that every thought anyone ever has is
determined by a given language. It does mean that to a significant extent, our
thoughts are determined by the language in which we express many of our
thoughts, because those thoughts are to a great extent interpretants of that
language.
I find it absurd that my position has been represented as
'sociolinguistic relativism or determinism'. If you read what I said in
attempting to respond to Sunchul's query regarding language, I discussed the
different ways in which one could mean language, which included the
consideration of logic as the language of thought, as well as considering that
language, taken in a very broad sense, could include all the kinds of signs
there are. Moreover, I never agreed that human language is an appropriate way
to think of reasoning; in fact, I emphatically denied it, and was giving good
reason for why logic, which does engage in the analysis of thought, could never
be reduced to a study of human language.
-- Franklin
-------------------------------------------
On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
wrote:
Franklin Ransom is using a discredited analysis of language, referred
to as sociolinguistic relativism or determinism, where language defines the
knowledge base; i.e., language determines thought. Followers of this linear
causality are such as Whorf-Sapir, and Basil Bernstein. It doesn't stand up to
empirical analysis. But it enjoyed its own limelight within the works of
various people who saw language or culture as determinant of thought, and even,
there were some who suggested that some languages should be eradicated (eg
native) because the language was defined as 'primitive' and prevented the users
from thinking 'in a modern or scientific way'.
Instead, the human brain creates language and thus, can express
anything by coming up with new terms and expressions.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, December 14, 2015 11:48 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
On Dec 14, 2015, at 3:08 AM, Matt Faunce <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction
and the things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time;
the development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific
terminology is not a development shared by every human language.
Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite
from two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for
the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward Vajda writes
" Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity."
"Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age
technology speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most
highly industrialized society. There are no primitive languages. Virtually no
linguist today would disagree with this statement."
I don’t know about that quote in particular. However a decade or so
back Michael Tomasello had a fascinating book on the evolution of language in
The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. While he doesn’t speak of it in
Peircean terms he creates a model where it appears a certain kind of thirdness
in terms of interpretation of signs develops. Once that evolves then he sees
language’s capabilities as being largely there and develops fast. It’s been a
while since I read it but I think he keeps the traditional dating of the
evolution of language to around 80,000 - 100,000 years. The evolution after
that is really developing the language and culture once you have the capability.
I know he has a newer text based upon some lectures he gave called
The Origins of Human Communication although I’ve not read that one.
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