Supplement: After looking in my bible, I say: "Sorry, error". First sentence is "In the beginning God created sky and earth". I am not sure, from where I had remembered the sentence "In the beginning there was the word", I guess it is an old song by Peter Tosh.
Stephen, list,
The way you distinguish between "word" and "language" reminds me of the first sentence of the bible: "In the beginning there was the word", in which I think, that "word" is a translation of "logos". So maybe "logic" is possible without language, and a logical _expression_, that is not language, can be equivalent with, or even be called, a "word"?
Best,
Helmut
 
 Freitag, 22. Januar 2016 um 12:46 Uhr
"Stephen C. Rose" <stever...@gmail.com> wrote:
 
While the plethora of possible propositions may have many forms the word, not a language, but the fact of the word is dominant, special and most certainly the lead in any effort to broaden the appeal of Peirce's thinking to the universal audience it deserves. The plethora is obvious but the word remains central.
   
On Fri, Jan 22, 2016 at 4:03 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk> wrote:
Dear John, list - 
You are right. 
To Peirce, propositions are not only linguistic, but may also use diagrams, pictures, gestures etc.(hence his generalization of propositions to "dicisigns").
For that reason, the unity of propositions can not be a matter of linguistic syntax only. Rather, linguistic syntax is but one example of how that unity is brought about.
Thus, it is co-localization in a certain and non-trivial use of the word which fuses subject and predicate into propositions. 
Apart from ch. 3 of my 2014 book, Francesco Bellucci has also addressed this issue in recent papers. 
Best
F
 
 
Fra: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Dato: torsdag den 21. januar 2016 10.46
Til: Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk>, Robert Eckert <recke...@mail.naz.edu>, "peirce-l@list.iupui.edu" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging
 

I was thinking about Frederik’s work when I composed my answer. I think this is a further reason to distinguish between Peirce and Chomsky, the latter focussing on syntax, but definitely not on reference (the object, roughly), merely their grammatical role, which some people interpret as assigning a semantic role, but not Peirce, if Frederik is right (and I understand him correctly).

 

John Collier

Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate

University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier

 

From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk]
Sent: Wednesday, 20 January 2016 1:25 PM
To: John Collier; Robert Eckert; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

 

Dear Peircers - 

 

Indeed a deep question. 

In Peirce, it is connected to his complicated theory of what constitutes the unity of propositions ("Dicisigns" - . I addressed this in "Natural propositions" (2014)). 

 

To Peirce, this question is independent of the issue of the components of propositions (subjects and predicate) taken individually and seems to have two aspects, one being the basic, relational structure underlying predicates, the other being a (most often disguised) self-reference of propositions connected to 1) their truth-claims and 2) the issue of the "immediate object" as the sign's claimed connection to its object.

 

Best,

Frederik

 

Fra: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Svar til: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Dato: onsdag den 20. januar 2016 06.40
Til: Robert Eckert <recke...@mail.naz.edu>, "peirce-l@list.iupui.edu" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

 

Interesting questions, Robert. They certainly deserve further investigation.

 

One difference I see is that Chomsky’s merge is a syntactic operation, whereas, If I understand him correctly, Peircean coupling has a semantic aspect as well. Chomsky consistently separates syntax and semantics, but he perhaps has a more narrow view of semantics than Peirce did. This latter issue is especially worth exploring, I think.

 

I believe that Chomsky’s merge (and many if not all of his earlier syntactic operations) is nonreducible to component parts (especially linguistic behaviours), and in this respect seems to be a Peircean third. Likewise for Peircean coupling. So in this respect they are species of a common genus. But I don’t think this directly implies they are of the same species of this genus for the reasons I gave before.

 

I have considerably more I could say, but I will leave it at that for now. I was exposed to Chomsky (as a professor of mine) and to Peirce (by independent study) more or less at the same time as an undergraduate, and I am probably more inclined than many to see connections between the two. This has only been reinforced by my subsequent studies, though the differences have also become more apparent.

 

John Collier

Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate

University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier

 

From: Robert Eckert [mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, 20 January 2016 1:49 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

 

Dear list,

 

Is it possible that Peirce's thirdness, Percy's coupling and Chomsky's merging are the same?

 

Could this bringing together, symbolization, merging, of two other things, explain our language ability?

 

If so, this basic exemplification in diagrammatic form defines humans.



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