> On Feb 2, 2016, at 12:37 AM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: > > So the empirical support and even coherence of the postulates (in the case of > multiverses) is different in the three cases, but dark matter and dark energy > have both empirical support for their existence and their character (compared > to competing theories). This is not true of the multiverse hypothesis, which > is problematic for much more fundamental reasons of scientific methodology.
This seems right. It also seems that at least with dark matter as empirical investigations continue we see more about the structure of dark matter (or at least where it is). There are various theories for what dark matter is even if none are necessarily terribly convincing yet - and most importantly many have been falsified. Dark energy as you note is more vague if only because the empirical data is more vague. The main problem with the many multiverse theories is that as plausible and sometimes as elegant as they are we just can’t empirically see any difference. And as Peirce says for a difference to be a difference it must make a difference. Multiverse supporters typically think they will find testable implications. There’s interesting work on the relationship between black holes and multiverse for instance. But in general it seems that proponents are a tad eager in their claims that the theories are empirical. I should note that I don’t think this means they are not valuable. Just that the drive towards empiricism must be kept high. I think sometimes, such as in the case of super string theory, insufficient concern with empirics was part and parcel of the movement for a long time.
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