> > On Feb 19, 2016, at 4:03 PM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: > > Husserl explicitly uses the idea of “bracketing” questions of existence in > phenomenology. In other words, you ignore existence and truth issues. <> Yes, in that they are similar. In other ways they are quite different. The list starter, Joe Ransdell, did a nice overview. I think Joe neglects the range of views in post-Husserlian phenomenology but for Husserl himself I think he gets the big points.
> In other words, you ignore existence and truth issues. <> I think it’s more than that. You also end up ignoring a lot of context as well. You are suspending or bracketing all the intentional acts involved in your existence. In some ways a lot of post-Husserlian phenomenology like Heidegger involves various rethinking of this. Some of Husserl’s students felt this was falling back into neo-Kantianism. With Peirce I think there’s a difference from Husserl even in this bracketing even if I suspect Peirce would be in agreement with trying to move past psychologism. The elements of idealism present in Husserl probably are there in Peirce, although the nature of Husserl’s idealism is still very much a matter of debate and controversy. Peirce on the other hand explicitly ties himself to Schelling’s idealism of a sort with the adoption of “objective idealism.” Both Schelling and Husserl share the idea that there’s something “underneath” experience that is prior to reflection. The difference between those two ends up being the type of act that accesses this underneath. With Peirce I don’t think we really have a good technical movement in that regard. He doesn’t seem to pay attention to the same sorts of things Husserl does IMO. I don’t have the sense that Peirce sees the act as creative the way say Schelling does. But then I also don’t see Peirce doing quite the same sort of analysis of time that would help us figure out his exact position. (Others may disagree with me there) If we read Peirce’s phenomenology in terms of his mature semiotics and analysis of the sign then I suspect we can work something out that ends up being closer to Heidegger rather than Schelling or Husserl. How fair a move that is many will disagree with. I think in some ways though Peirce’s more platonic-like idea of precinding generals has an echo of Schelling. > On Feb 19, 2016, at 3:32 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > In this case, "Lebenswelt" is not something objective either, but subjective > too, but with the subject not being an individual, but a society. I’ll admit my Husserl is pretty rusty at this stage. So I really should be careful what I say before reviewing my old notes. However I think he wants something on the boundary of objectivity and subjectivity. Whether that’s something different or something on the border of the two I recall being a matter of debate. That’s an issue for Derrida’s critique of Husserl in “On the Origin of Geometry.” He ends up making a similar move when talking about Saussure although in many ways Saussure is really a place holder for Husserl. The way Saussure’s semiotics was received ends up being similar to this issue of subjective/objective in Husserl. To critique Husserl Derrida ends up appropriating Peirce in On Grammatology. So the sign in the Peircean sense ends up being the way to critique Husserl’s notion of the phaneron. More or less anyway. The critique of the Peirce/Derrida connection ends up in various ways being that Derrida misses that Peirce has more than just symbols in his semiotics. Of course Derrida knew that, having read most of the Peirce collection available while at Harvard. (He spent a year there studying Peirce) In phenomenology this critique of Derrida is just that the phaneron is an example of firstness not thirdness and it’s an error to treat it as thirdness. Perhaps being more fair to Derrida against Husserl one could easily ask how an universal could be anything but thirdness in that quote you brought up. Quoting it again. "[B]y the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds." (Adirondack Lectures, 1905; in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1 [eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931], paragraph 284) This issue of firstness vs. thirdness in the phaneron is perhaps more worthy of discussion here rather than Husserl, Schelling or Derrida. Although I’m fine talking with them too. I’d say all three categories are in any phaneron. Kelly Parker actually sees Peirce’s phaneron paralleling Plato’s Sophist and which has being, life, and thought as three aspects of nous. The aspect of the phaneron in its thirdness is thus habit unifying experience. In this reading Peirce is just saying we have common experience in our experiences as minds. Which seems hard to deny honestly even if one does buy into holism and continuity.
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