Clark, John C, Helmut, List ~

The quote below suggests the phaneron is the 'raw material' of experience 
available to the phenomenologist.  It comprises that which must be sorted out 
and processed into a 'meaningful' collection of signs and sign-relationships. 

Regards,
Tom Wyrick


1905 [c.] | Letter draft to Mario Calderoni | CP 8.213
"I use the word phaneron to mean all that is present to the mind in any sense 
or in any way whatsoever, regardless of whether it be fact or figment. I 
examine the phaneron and I endeavor to sort out its elements according to the 
complexity of their structure. I thus reach my three categories." 
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/phaneron



> On Feb 19, 2016, at 5:03 PM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Husserl explicitly uses the idea of “bracketing” questions of existence in 
> phenomenology. In other words, you ignore existence and truth issues. I see 
> this as a form of abstraction, so the phenomena for Husserl are an 
> abstraction form everyday experience, in which we do presume existence 
> (typically at least). I am unclear if Peirce had a similar view, but the 
> quote Helmut gave from Peirce does suggest that, in the setting aside of 
> questions of reality.
>  
> John Collier
> Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
> University of KwaZulu-Natal
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>  
> From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:[email protected]] 
> Sent: Friday, 19 February 2016 3:32 PM
> To: [email protected]
> Cc: Peirce-L
> Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?
>  
> Clark, list,
> thank you for the hint to Husserl. Now I just have looked him up at 
> Wikipedia, and I think I like his phenomenology. I just had read something 
> about and from Habermas, especially about the dualism of system and 
> "Lebenswelt" (life-world). Now just I have seen, that the term "Lebenswelt" 
> is from Husserl. Is it a sort of collective Umwelt? If it is, then is it the 
> Umwelt (subjective environment) not of an organism as a subject, but of a 
> society-as-a-subject? In this case, "Lebenswelt" is not something objective 
> either, but subjective too, but with the subject not being an individual, but 
> a society. Regularly at this point, with me, an objecting reflex is excited: 
> I do not want to take a society for a subject. If a society is about to 
> become a subject, it is lethal for the individuals, because they will cease 
> to be subjects. This is, because in a systems hierarchy, there can only be 
> one subject-level (one system of interpretance, one interpreting sytem, or 
> one subject, that makes everything else objects). But this is opening another 
> barrel. But all in all, I would say, that "Lebenswelt" is not something 
> objective or ontologic as my had-been-understanding of the Peircean 
> "phaneron", as I think, that you have also pointed out, and also, that even 
> for Peirce, "phaneron" may not be a "definite idea", but "something pointed 
> to in experience". Vagueness, alright. We cannot fix an egg to a jelly fish 
> with a nail, but can talk about both.
> Best,
> Helmut
>  
>  19. Februar 2016 um 22:27 Uhr
> "Clark Goble" <[email protected]> wrote:
>  
>  
> On Feb 19, 2016, at 1:47 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
>  
> "[B]y the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or 
> in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds 
> to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply 
> that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt 
> that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present 
> at all times and to all minds." (Adirondack Lectures, 1905; in Collected 
> Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1 [eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul 
> Weiss; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931], paragraph 284)
>  
> So Peirce has not entertained a doubt. But that is not a scientifical 
> premiss. Or has he justified this idea somewhere else? Because this idea of 
> the phaneron perhaps is the only idea from Peirce I cannot approve, because I 
> do not understand it: Our minds are separated, arent they? Besides very rare 
> events that seem to be telepathic.
>  
>  
> The other problem of course is what presence means in this context. (Not a 
> small point - as I’ve noted Derrida’s critique of presence draws a lot on 
> Peirce’s semiotics) 
>  
> Sticking with Peirce it’s worth asking about the relationship between place 
> and time in the formulation of presence. Especially when a doctrine of 
> continuity of some sense is part of Peirce’s thinking.
>  
> I tend to read Peirce as speaking rather loosely here to get the general idea 
> of the phaneron in experience without necessarily making it a definite idea. 
> That is it is something pointed to in experience rather than an artificial 
> category with carefully delineated meaning. This would of course also be more 
> in keeping with Peirce’s maxim and his logic of vagueness.
>  
> The other interesting part are the universal aspects of the phaneron. Again 
> this pops up in German phenomenology with Husserl as well as post-Husserlean 
> phenomenologists. Peirce is of course doing something different from Husserl. 
> One has to be very careful reading one in terms of the other as there are so 
> many places they differ. But the question of what is common to minds is a 
> problem for Husserl as well. I think Peirce’s assumption something is common 
> is a typical one. However I again think that some of Peirce’s other arguments 
> and ideas should make us careful here.
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