Anything can be a Peircean object, including how something feels, what is felt, and any other category you might want. Peircean objects, as he says, are rather like Platonic ideas, but without the Platonism. They are close to what analytic philosophy calls the referent.
Weather in Chicago can certainly be a sign, but in the example coolness is a sign of rain. John Collier Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Tom Gollier [mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, 18 March 2016 3:26 AM To: Peirce List Subject: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Tom Gollier <tgoll...@gmail.com<mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com>> Date: Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 6:25 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry To: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> Jon, Thanks for your reply. If we take "object" in sense of an objective, why isn't "avoiding rain" the object? I really don't see how "rain" gets to be the object in either sense of "object". As for "coolness" being a sign of impending rain, that it is, but only within the context of a diagrammatic understanding of the "weather in Chicago". Other signs also function within such a sign/diagram — "cloudiness" for example. And, of course, the diagram/sign being employed could vary in complexity from something created in terms of temperature gradients, continental air masses, and such as that to one consisting of a couple of rules of thumb. In short, I'm not arguing there is no an object-sign-interpretant where "coolness" is the sign, but: 1. I would interpret this as: what is being felt (object), "coolness" (sign), and "rain" (interpretant), 2. And, this object-sign-interpretant is just one relationship within the diagram/sign, "weather in Chicago," that would, it seems to me, more clearly correspond with the situation being described. Tom
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