Thread:http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18467
JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18486
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18508
TG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18511
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18512

Cf:http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/15/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-16/
Cf:http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/

Tom, List,

Let me dispel any notion that “the interpretant introduces
the person as part of the object-sign-interpretant structure”.
We may have left it implicit or unclear in the text, but the
lower case “i” and the dashed lines in the figure were meant
to suggest the agency of the interpreter and the circumstance
that signs and interpretants reside nearer the personal sphere
than the objects, generally speaking.  I think you know all the
reasons why primers in semiotics tend to start out talking about
interpreters and only gradually abstract away to interpretants.
But I see now that was faulty notation, as it's more usual to
read a lower case “i” as indicating a member of a local set I.
Next time I will use a Greek iota for the interpretive agent.

Regards,

Jon

On 3/16/2016 12:57 PM, Tom Gollier wrote:
> Jon,
>
> I think there's a troubling narrowness interpreting
> this situation as something like:
>
> "In this narrative we can identify the characters
> of the sign relation as follows:  *coolness* is a
> Sign of the Object *rain*, and the Interpretant
> is *the thought of the rain’s likelihood*."
>
> First of all, how can something that has not yet occurred be
> the object?  And what of all the other things "coolness" might
> indicate (be a sign of in that sense)?  And the interpretant
> introduces the person as part of the object-sign-interpretant
> structure?
>
> Personally, I prefer to see the "sign" as a diagram of the elements
> and relationships abstracted from this situation, the "object".  And,
> the interpretant, "rain," is then the inference being made using one
> of those elements, "coolness", and its relationship to rain.  I think
> this view would accord well with Peirce's description of a diagram used
> in problem-solving; it would allow the "rain" to remain virtual rather
> than actual (along the lines set out by Deleuze); and it also doesn't
> bring the man into the sign structure itself.  He enters only in his
> use of it to make the personal inference that he ought to quicken
> his pace.
>
> Tom
>

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