I think tables can be fraught with problems. For example..I agree with Jerry's 
question about:

1) deduction/induction/abduction....corresponding to the modes of Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness.
I'd see it as abduction/induction/deduction

2) And I have a problem with symbols/generality/interpreter. What? Symbols are, 
as the Relation between the Representamen and the Object - in a mode of 
Thirdness. So, how have you put them into a mode of Firstness?
And 'generality' is the opposite of Secondness.
And an 'interpreter'? An external agent-who-interprets? As Thirdness?

3) I also have a problem with your putting these three categorical modes in a 
linear order, as First/Second/Third.  There is no ordinality in the categories.

4) I also reject your 'past/present/future', for the nature of Firstness is its 
very 'presentness', while the nature of Secondness is its 'past' - ie, that is 
has closure.

5) And reject your 'sign/object/interpretant' for the three nodal sites can be 
in any one of the three modal categories.

6)And reject your 'conscious[feeling]; self-consciousness; mind.....though i 
see your point. But feeling is not the same as consciousness. When you become 
conscious of that feeling, you've moved out of Firstness.

That's as far as I've gone.

Edwina Taborsky


  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jerry Rhee 
  To: Jerry LR Chandler 
  Cc: Peirce List ; Mike Bergman 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2016 2:06 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Knowledge Representation


  Hi Mike,



  I like your table of threes.  I think tables such as yours help others to 
extract the regularity for themselves.  Peirce did that exercise: 



  “This list is fortunately very short…I find only three, Quality, Reaction, 
Mediation. Having obtained this list of three kinds of elements of 
experience…the business before me was the mixed one of making my apprehension 
of three ideas which had never been accurately grasped as clear and plain as 
possible, and of tracing out all their modes of combination. This last, at 
least, seemed to be a problem which could be worked out by straightforward 
patience… I said to myself, this list of categories, specious as it is, must be 
a delusion of which I must disabuse myself. Thereupon, I spent five years in 
diligently, yes, passionately, seeking facts which should refute my list….”



  But he also discovered some dangers in the method; that he will have trouble 
communicating it to others because the force of evidence can only be 
apprehended through experience.  



  Among your list is “induction deduction abduction”.  

  I think it ought to be abduction deduction induction (then recursion).  

  Would you mind justifying why yours and not mine?



  Also, as Edwina mentioned, there are differences between interpretant and 
meaning.  So why interpretant and not meaning?  




  Finally, I think a person working in AI should be concerned with what makes 
for a good abduction as opposed to any other formulation.  So why eros and not 
epithumia?




  http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm



  hth,

  Jerry Rhee



  On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 10:15 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
<[email protected]> wrote:

    Mike, List:


    Thanks for posting your views on your interpretation of CSP’s writings in 
relation to AI.


    While I agree with many (if not most of your comments,) I offer a comment 
on only one:


    The nature needed to be the sign because that is how information is 
conveyed, and the trichotomy parts were the fewest “decomposable” needed to 
model the real world; we would call these “primitives” in modern terminology. 
Here are some of Peirce’s thoughts as to what makes something “indecomposable” 
(in keeping with his jawbreaking terminology) [7]:

    “It is a priori impossible that there should be an indecomposable element 
which is what it is relatively to a second, a third, and a fourth. The obvious 
reason is that that which combines two will by repetition combine any number. 
Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.” (CP 1.298) 


    The logic of this proposition  is grounded on the meaning of the term 
“com-bines”, that is a binary operation is intrinsic to such a Liebnizian 
perspective. 


    However, if the logical operation of composition of parts of a whole FUSE 
the elements into a singular object (as in CSP’s usage of the notion of a 
continuum), then one can imagine the whole is not subject to separation, that 
is, decomposition.  Example: Antecedent is sand.  Consequence is glass. The 
logical operation is heat. 


    In modern mathematics, this conundrum expresses itself as the relation 
between discrete and continuous mathematics, between finite arithmetics and 
topologies. 


    To further confound the tensions between CSP’s proposition and Mother 
Nature, the logic of the chemical combinations may be a single bindings, double 
bindings, and triple bindings.  Typically, if these bindings are antecedent 
premises, decomposition of such bindings result in different consequences.  


    Thus, the assertion that:
    Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.” (CP 
1.298) 
    may not be so simple.


    Cheers


    Jerry




      On Mar 22, 2016, at 9:17 AM, Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote:


      Hi All,

      Here is my take on how Peirce may contribute to knowledge representation 
for the area I work in, knowledge-based artificial intelligence:

      
http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/

      I welcome any comments or suggestions (or errors of omission or 
commission!), since we plan to use this approach much going forward.

      Thanks!

      Mike Bergman



      -----------------------------
      PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . 
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with 
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .









    -----------------------------
    PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . 
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with 
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .










------------------------------------------------------------------------------



  -----------------------------
  PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . 
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with 
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to