Val Daniel - thank you also pointing this out. I've argued against that 
space-enclosing equilateral triangle for years. It is NOT representative of the 
Peircean triad; instead, the best image is of the 'three prongs' - or, as I 
wrote in my first comment this morning - that 'umbrella spoke triad', outlined 
in 1.347. I wrote:

5) I do, however, quibble with your triangle. Peirce himself didn't use the 
triangle. See 1.347, where he uses an 'umbrella spoke triad'. This image 
OPENS the semiosic process to networking, whereas the triangle, in my view, 
is a closed, one-way linear process and obscures the power of semsiosis.

That closed triangle is the wrong image of the semiosic process - and has been 
discussed before  - but I don't keep archival data. But thanks for that comment.

Edwina



  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: E Valentine Daniel 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2016 6:20 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Knowledge Representation


  Hello Mike, Edwina, Jerry, fellow-archivists among the P-Listers:
  I notice that Mike's table of threes was accompanied by a diagrammatic 
representation of the sign (with its three constitutive correlates) by a 
space-enclosing equilateral triangle.  Peirce never used this particular 
diagrammatic representation but used instead  the diagram of a three prongs 
converging/diverging in/from a point to represent the triadic sign.  In 
addition to  being more effective (and truer-to-Peirce) representation, not 
only of the sign qua sign but also as the best opening gambit for representing 
semiosis itself, some contributors to that deeply archived conversation 
provided the list with many other logical and philosophical reasons and 
arguments in favor of the three-pronged representation of the signs over the 
triangular representation of same.  Is there anyone on the list who, per 
chance, either saved that particular discussion or can lead me to that string 
of yester-year? Besides being personally grateful to such a lead I also think 
that it would shed critical light of the table provided by Mike.


  Thank you.


  val daniel


  E. Valentine Daniel
  Professor of Anthropology
  Columbia University
  1200 Amsterdam Avenue
  New York, NY 10027

  (212) 854-7764
  [email protected]


    On Mar 22, 2016, at 3:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:


    I think tables can be fraught with problems. For example..I agree with 
Jerry's question about:

    1) deduction/induction/abduction....corresponding to the modes of 
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness.
    I'd see it as abduction/induction/deduction

    2) And I have a problem with symbols/generality/interpreter. What? Symbols 
are, as the Relation between the Representamen and the Object - in a mode of 
Thirdness. So, how have you put them into a mode of Firstness?
    And 'generality' is the opposite of Secondness.
    And an 'interpreter'? An external agent-who-interprets? As Thirdness?

    3) I also have a problem with your putting these three categorical modes in 
a linear order, as First/Second/Third.  There is no ordinality in the 
categories.

    4) I also reject your 'past/present/future', for the nature of Firstness is 
its very 'presentness', while the nature of Secondness is its 'past' - ie, that 
is has closure.

    5) And reject your 'sign/object/interpretant' for the three nodal sites can 
be in any one of the three modal categories.

    6)And reject your 'conscious[feeling]; self-consciousness; mind.....though 
i see your point. But feeling is not the same as consciousness. When you become 
conscious of that feeling, you've moved out of Firstness.

    That's as far as I've gone.

    Edwina Taborsky


      ----- Original Message ----- 
      From: Jerry Rhee
      To: Jerry LR Chandler
      Cc: Peirce List ; Mike Bergman
      Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2016 2:06 PM
      Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Knowledge Representation


      Hi Mike,


      I like your table of threes.  I think tables such as yours help others to 
extract the regularity for themselves.  Peirce did that exercise: 


      “This list is fortunately very short…I find only three, Quality, 
Reaction, Mediation. Having obtained this list of three kinds of elements of 
experience…the business before me was the mixed one of making my apprehension 
of three ideas which had never been accurately grasped as clear and plain as 
possible, and of tracing out all their modes of combination. This last, at 
least, seemed to be a problem which could be worked out by straightforward 
patience… I said to myself, this list of categories, specious as it is, must be 
a delusion of which I must disabuse myself. Thereupon, I spent five years in 
diligently, yes, passionately, seeking facts which should refute my list….”


      But he also discovered some dangers in the method; that he will have 
trouble communicating it to others because the force of evidence can only be 
apprehended through experience.  


      Among your list is “induction deduction abduction”.  
      I think it ought to be abduction deduction induction (then recursion).  
      Would you mind justifying why yours and not mine?


      Also, as Edwina mentioned, there are differences between interpretant and 
meaning.  So why interpretant and not meaning?  


      Finally, I think a person working in AI should be concerned with what 
makes for a good abduction as opposed to any other formulation.  So why eros 
and not epithumia?



      http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm


      hth,
      Jerry Rhee


      On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 10:15 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
<[email protected]> wrote:

        Mike, List:


        Thanks for posting your views on your interpretation of CSP’s writings 
in relation to AI.


        While I agree with many (if not most of your comments,) I offer a 
comment on only one:


        The nature needed to be the sign because that is how information is 
conveyed, and the trichotomy parts were the fewest “decomposable” needed to 
model the real world; we would call these “primitives” in modern terminology. 
Here are some of Peirce’s thoughts as to what makes something “indecomposable” 
(in keeping with his jawbreaking terminology) [7]:

        “It is a priori impossible that there should be an indecomposable 
element which is what it is relatively to a second, a third, and a fourth. The 
obvious reason is that that which combines two will by repetition combine any 
number. Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.” (CP 
1.298) 


        The logic of this proposition  is grounded on the meaning of the term 
“com-bines”, that is a binary operation is intrinsic to such a Liebnizian 
perspective. 


        However, if the logical operation of composition of parts of a whole 
FUSE the elements into a singular object (as in CSP’s usage of the notion of a 
continuum), then one can imagine the whole is not subject to separation, that 
is, decomposition.  Example: Antecedent is sand.  Consequence is glass. The 
logical operation is heat. 


        In modern mathematics, this conundrum expresses itself as the relation 
between discrete and continuous mathematics, between finite arithmetics and 
topologies. 


        To further confound the tensions between CSP’s proposition and Mother 
Nature, the logic of the chemical combinations may be a single bindings, double 
bindings, and triple bindings.  Typically, if these bindings are antecedent 
premises, decomposition of such bindings result in different consequences.  


        Thus, the assertion that:
        Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.” (CP 
1.298) 
        may not be so simple.


        Cheers


        Jerry




          On Mar 22, 2016, at 9:17 AM, Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote:


          Hi All,

          Here is my take on how Peirce may contribute to knowledge 
representation for the area I work in, knowledge-based artificial intelligence:

          
http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/

          I welcome any comments or suggestions (or errors of omission or 
commission!), since we plan to use this approach much going forward.

          Thanks!

          Mike Bergman



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