Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18807 ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18808 GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18810 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18811 JS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18812 BU:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18813 JR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18814 JS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18815 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18816 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18817 HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18818 JR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18819 HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18821 HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18822
Ben, Gary R, Jon S, Edwina, List, There are too many things going on in my real-world environment and too many issues being raised all at once on the List, plus the Gmane archives that I use to keep threads untangled in my head went down for maintenance for several days and came back with many threads broken and out of order, so I will have to take this slow and be selective about all the side-tracks we tend to get shunted off on. Also penned a new title by way of trying to stay focused. Regards, Jon On 5/2/2016 2:48 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > Ben, Gary R, Jon S, Edwina, List, > > I won't have a chance for a full reply for a while, > so let me just state some of the basic principles > that I have applied for almost fifty years now in > the matter of “How To Read And Understand Peirce”. > > There is a long-running strain of Peirce commentary that > sees radical modifications in his thinking over the years. > I do not belong to that tradition. I see more continuity > than radical re-thinking in his thought through the years. > But seeing things that way is due to a certain perspective. > > I apply the same principles of charitable and critical > interpretation to Peirce that I do to any other writer. > > Charity entails a search for a consistent interpretation if one > is possible at all. Charity goes only so far with some writers > and some styles of writing, contradictions of a sort that cannot > be glossed over develop almost immediately and about all one can > do is read things emotively-impressionistically after that point. > In Peirce's case I almost always find that a little extra charity > repays itself in the long run. That is not to deny the apparent > inconsistencies that we find in Peirce's work, taken whole cloth, > as many have noted many, but it does imply a particular strategy > for dealing with the wrinkles that do appear. > > Out of time ... will continue later ... > > Jon > > On 5/2/2016 1:27 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: >> Jon A., Jon S., Gary R., Edwina, >> >> Jon A., I see a problem with your criticism, in that >> it seems precise in itself yet too vague in application. >> >> It's not apparent to me that Gary R. or Jon S. or I have >> been treating categories as non-relational essences, at least >> in any way that you would not also be accusing Peirce of doing. >> If you think that Peirce went too far in that direction, please >> say so. >> >> There is not only the quote from CP 2.711 which I gave recently >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-05/msg00002.html >> but also another passage, in the third-to-last paragraph >> (EP 1:198-9, W 3:337-8, CP 2.643, CLL 151-2) of >> "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" (1878) >> >> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_13/August_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_VI >> >> in which Peirce associates the three modes of inference with categories >> on the basis of the categorial nature of their respective conclusions. >> Once again, the deductive conclusion (result) is volitional (Second), >> the inductive conclusion (rule) is habitual (Third), and the abductive >> conclusion (case) is sensuous (First). In these discussions, a lot of >> the relational aspects are left implicit; Peirce doesn't in those places >> exposit the whole theory of the categories complete with tuples. >> >> As we know, in later years Peirce instead associated deduction with >> thirdness and induction with secondness, this time at least partly >> because of the modalities of the conclusions that they produce: >> "Deduction proves that something _/must be/_; Induction shows that >> something _/actually is/_ operative; Abduction merely suggests that >> something _/may be/_." (CP 5.171) http://www.textlog.de/7658.html . >> >> If you think that Peirce went too far in such direction, please say so. >> It would clarify at least a little your criticism of the rest of us here. >> You're allowed to criticize us and Peirce too. We know that I don't share >> Peirce's view of the categories, and I seem to recall from misty years ago >> that you don't regard them as basic, the integers, if anything, were your >> basics, and you have been interested first of all in the tuples and the >> irreducibility of some dyads, some triads, and no higher-ads, in which >> regard you do agree with Peirce. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> On 5/2/2016 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >> >>> Jon A., List: >>> >>> I gather that you believe this whole discussion to be misguided, but >>> does that warrant blocking the way of inquiry for those of us who are >>> still interested in exploring it? Perhaps the outcome will be a consensus >>> that it is indeed a mistake to assign categories to rule/case/result at all … >>> or that it makes no practical difference what assignments we make … or that >>> the "correct" assignments depend on which aspect of the categories is in focus. >>> Or maybe the outcome will be no consensus at all; the attempt might still be >>> worthwhile anyway. >>> >>> I tend to "default" to the categories as possibility/actuality/necessity, and >>> that guides where I stand currently on this particular matter. Others might >>> lean more toward quality/relation/representation, or feeling/action/thought, >>> or chance/law/habit. How do we resolve situations when these different >>> characterizations of Peirce's three categories suggest different answers? >>> Per your latest message, what exactly is the "critical question that has >>> to be asked," and at which "step of analysis" should we be asking it? >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon S. >>> >>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:24 AM, >>> Jon Awbrey <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: >>> >>>> Jon S., >>>> >>>> Most of the old timers on this List have already heard >>>> and ignored this advice more times than I could care to >>>> enumerate but since you and maybe a few other onlookers >>>> may not have heard it before, I will give it another try. >>>> >>>> Peirce's categories are best viewed as categories of relations. >>>> To a first approximation, firstness, secondness, thirdness are >>>> simply what all monadic, dyadic, triadic relations, respectively, >>>> have in common. (At a second approximation, we may take up the >>>> issues of generic versus degenerate cases of 1-, 2-, 3-adicity, >>>> but it is critical to take the first approximation first before >>>> attempting to deal with the second.) >>>> >>>> In that light, thirdness is a global property of the whole triadic >>>> relation in view and it is a category error to attribute thirdness >>>> to any local domain or any given element that participates in that >>>> relation. >>>> >>>> As it happens, we often approach a complex relation by picking one of >>>> its elements, that is, a single tuple as exemplary of the whole set of >>>> tuples that make up the relation, and then we take up the components of >>>> that tuple in one convenient order or another. That method lends itself >>>> to the impression that k-ness abides in the k-th component we happen to >>>> take up, but that impression begs the question of whether that order is >>>> a property of the relation itself, or merely an artifact of our choice. >>>> >>>> Failing to examine that question puts us at risk for a type of error >>>> that I've rubricized as the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Abstraction” (FOMA). >>>> As I see it, there is a lot of that going on in the present discussion, >>>> arising from a tendency to assign Peircean categories to everything in >>>> sight, despite the fact that Peirce's categories apply only to certain >>>> levels of structure. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >> > -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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