Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18807
ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18808
GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18810
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18811
JS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18812
BU:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18813
JR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18814
JS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18815
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18816
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18817
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18818
JR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18819
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18821
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18822
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18823
Ben, Gary R, Jon S, Edwina, List,
BU: I see a problem with your criticism, in that it seems precise
in itself yet too vague in application.
For my part, I see a distinctive paradigm of thought and practice
immanent in Peirce's work and all I've been trying to do for many
years now has been to nudge it a little further from immanence to
implementation. It is precisely the engagement with applications
that brings these criticisms to the fore.
Applications to empirical situations force one to view sign relations
as large collections of triples, you might even say clouds of triples.
A sign relation, in this extended sense, is more like the environment
in which our discussion and thought takes place than any single focal
triple of the too-fixed gaze. Any attempt at significant application
simply never gets off square one, or rather triangle one, if it fails
to step back and take in the big picture of an extended sign relation.
Hoping that point is appreciated, I'll move on to the next one next.
Regards,
Jon
On 5/3/2016 7:45 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
> Ben, Gary R, Jon S, Edwina, List,
>
> There are too many things going on in my real-world environment
> and too many issues being raised all at once on the List, plus
> the Gmane archives that I use to keep threads untangled in my
> head went down for maintenance for several days and came back
> with many threads broken and out of order, so I will have to
> take this slow and be selective about all the side-tracks
> we tend to get shunted off on. Also penned a new title
> by way of trying to stay focused.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 5/2/2016 2:48 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>> Ben, Gary R, Jon S, Edwina, List,
>>
>> I won't have a chance for a full reply for a while,
>> so let me just state some of the basic principles
>> that I have applied for almost fifty years now in
>> the matter of “How To Read And Understand Peirce”.
>>
>> There is a long-running strain of Peirce commentary that
>> sees radical modifications in his thinking over the years.
>> I do not belong to that tradition. I see more continuity
>> than radical re-thinking in his thought through the years.
>> But seeing things that way is due to a certain perspective.
>>
>> I apply the same principles of charitable and critical
>> interpretation to Peirce that I do to any other writer.
>>
>> Charity entails a search for a consistent interpretation if one
>> is possible at all. Charity goes only so far with some writers
>> and some styles of writing, contradictions of a sort that cannot
>> be glossed over develop almost immediately and about all one can
>> do is read things emotively-impressionistically after that point.
>> In Peirce's case I almost always find that a little extra charity
>> repays itself in the long run. That is not to deny the apparent
>> inconsistencies that we find in Peirce's work, taken whole cloth,
>> as many have noted many, but it does imply a particular strategy
>> for dealing with the wrinkles that do appear.
>>
>> Out of time ... will continue later ...
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 5/2/2016 1:27 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>>> Jon A., Jon S., Gary R., Edwina,
>>>
>>> Jon A., I see a problem with your criticism, in that
>>> it seems precise in itself yet too vague in application.
>>>
>>> It's not apparent to me that Gary R. or Jon S. or I have
>>> been treating categories as non-relational essences, at least
>>> in any way that you would not also be accusing Peirce of doing.
>>> If you think that Peirce went too far in that direction, please
>>> say so.
>>>
>>> There is not only the quote from CP 2.711 which I gave recently
>>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-05/msg00002.html
>>> but also another passage, in the third-to-last paragraph
>>> (EP 1:198-9, W 3:337-8, CP 2.643, CLL 151-2) of
>>> "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" (1878)
>>>
>>>
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_13/August_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_VI
>>>
>>> in which Peirce associates the three modes of inference with categories
>>> on the basis of the categorial nature of their respective conclusions.
>>> Once again, the deductive conclusion (result) is volitional (Second),
>>> the inductive conclusion (rule) is habitual (Third), and the abductive
>>> conclusion (case) is sensuous (First). In these discussions, a lot of
>>> the relational aspects are left implicit; Peirce doesn't in those places
>>> exposit the whole theory of the categories complete with tuples.
>>>
>>> As we know, in later years Peirce instead associated deduction with
>>> thirdness and induction with secondness, this time at least partly
>>> because of the modalities of the conclusions that they produce:
>>> "Deduction proves that something _/must be/_; Induction shows that
>>> something _/actually is/_ operative; Abduction merely suggests that
>>> something _/may be/_." (CP 5.171) http://www.textlog.de/7658.html .
>>>
>>> If you think that Peirce went too far in such direction, please say so.
>>> It would clarify at least a little your criticism of the rest of us here.
>>> You're allowed to criticize us and Peirce too. We know that I don't share
>>> Peirce's view of the categories, and I seem to recall from misty years ago
>>> that you don't regard them as basic, the integers, if anything, were your
>>> basics, and you have been interested first of all in the tuples and the
>>> irreducibility of some dyads, some triads, and no higher-ads, in which
>>> regard you do agree with Peirce.
>>>
>>> Best, Ben
>>>
>>> On 5/2/2016 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon A., List:
>>>>
>>>> I gather that you believe this whole discussion to be misguided,
>>>> but does that warrant blocking the way of inquiry for those of us
>>>> who are still interested in exploring it? Perhaps the outcome will
>>>> be a consensus that it is indeed a mistake to assign categories to
>>>> rule/case/result at all … or that it makes no practical difference
>>>> what assignments we make … or that the "correct" assignments depend
>>>> on which aspect of the categories is in focus. Or maybe the outcome
>>>> will be no consensus at all; the attempt might still be worthwhile
>>>> anyway.
>>>>
>>>> I tend to "default" to the categories as possibility/actuality/necessity,
>>>> and that guides where I stand currently on this particular matter.
>>>> Others might lean more toward quality/relation/representation, or
>>>> feeling/action/thought, or chance/law/habit. How do we resolve
>>>> situations when these different characterizations of Peirce's
>>>> three categories suggest different answers? Per your latest
>>>> message, what exactly is the "critical question that has to
>>>> be asked," and at which "step of analysis" should we be
>>>> asking it?
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon S.
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:24 AM,
>>>> Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jon S.,
>>>>>
>>>>> Most of the old timers on this List have already heard
>>>>> and ignored this advice more times than I could care to
>>>>> enumerate but since you and maybe a few other onlookers
>>>>> may not have heard it before, I will give it another try.
>>>>>
>>>>> Peirce's categories are best viewed as categories of relations.
>>>>> To a first approximation, firstness, secondness, thirdness are
>>>>> simply what all monadic, dyadic, triadic relations, respectively,
>>>>> have in common. (At a second approximation, we may take up the
>>>>> issues of generic versus degenerate cases of 1-, 2-, 3-adicity,
>>>>> but it is critical to take the first approximation first before
>>>>> attempting to deal with the second.)
>>>>>
>>>>> In that light, thirdness is a global property of the whole triadic
>>>>> relation in view and it is a category error to attribute thirdness
>>>>> to any local domain or any given element that participates in that
>>>>> relation.
>>>>>
>>>>> As it happens, we often approach a complex relation by picking one of
>>>>> its elements, that is, a single tuple as exemplary of the whole set of
>>>>> tuples that make up the relation, and then we take up the components of
>>>>> that tuple in one convenient order or another. That method lends itself
>>>>> to the impression that k-ness abides in the k-th component we happen to
>>>>> take up, but that impression begs the question of whether that order is
>>>>> a property of the relation itself, or merely an artifact of our choice.
>>>>>
>>>>> Failing to examine that question puts us at risk for a type of error
>>>>> that I've rubricized as the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Abstraction” (FOMA).
>>>>> As I see it, there is a lot of that going on in the present discussion,
>>>>> arising from a tendency to assign Peircean categories to everything in
>>>>> sight, despite the fact that Peirce's categories apply only to certain
>>>>> levels of structure.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon
>>>>>
>>>
>>
>
--
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