> On May 7, 2016, at 5:56 AM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: > > It’s true that this discourse has an ontological aspect, i.e. takes us into > metaphysics, as Peirce usually called that science. But for Peirce, this is > not really a distinct kind of analysis, but rather a development of logic as > semiotic itself. “Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute > acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as > truths of being” (CP 1.487, from “The Logic of Mathematics; An Attempt to > Develop My Categories From Within”).
This is true that Peirce’s logic as semiotic and ontology as semiotic meet in some way. Yet, when doing the type of logic we must think of in terms of ontology with its spatio-temporal issues (at least as Peirce typically conceives of it) verses logical entailment from a bird’s eye view there are big differences. It’s that difference that I was more getting at.
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