Clark, if you’re referring to this —

More what I was getting at is that logically red as a class of wavelengths in a 
given language/culture is entailed by a narrower color within those wavelengths.

I would call that a psycholinguistic issue, not a logical one. The logical 
point is that scarlet is a determination of red because it’s a kind of red. 
It’s true that physical parameters such as wavelength will collude with 
cultural parameters to determine whether an individual calls that color “red” 
or not, but this psycholinguistic fact is not in itself culturally relative.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Clark Goble [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 9-May-16 10:41
To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on the Definition of Determination

 

 

On May 7, 2016, at 5:56 AM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>  
wrote:

 

It’s true that this discourse has an ontological aspect, i.e. takes us into 
metaphysics, as Peirce usually called that science. But for Peirce, this is not 
really a distinct kind of analysis, but rather a development of logic as 
semiotic itself. “Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute 
acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as 
truths of being” (CP 1.487, from “The Logic of Mathematics; An Attempt to 
Develop My Categories From Within”).

 

This is true that Peirce’s logic as semiotic and ontology as semiotic meet in 
some way. Yet, when doing the type of logic we must think of in terms of 
ontology with its spatio-temporal issues (at least as Peirce typically 
conceives of it) verses logical entailment from a bird’s eye view there are big 
differences. It’s that difference that I was more getting at.

 

 

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