Clark, List, Interesting post. And also: *The entire universe <https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Universe> is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs <https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Sign>.*
I too very much admire Kelly Parker's book, while I agree that it has some problems. Or should I say, it has been superseded and/or corrected in certain topics by scholarship since it was published (1998). Kelly (who btw, is a terrific fellow) is very ecologically minded as you no doubt know, seems to have turned his attention to Royce. However, I haven't followed him very far in that direction. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 2:57 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Jun 9, 2016, at 12:26 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > > How is reality a process of semiosis if it's independent of what is > thought concerning the object? > > > Because of Peirce’s conception of ontology as semiosis. He’s somewhat > Hegelian in this sense. You have pure chance which semiotically develops > habits which are the objects themselves. > > Peirce is pretty clear on all this although it’s arguably his most > controversial position. I think one can productively embrace Peirce without > embracing his ontology. > > The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of > the existing universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic > forms themselves have become or are becoming developed. (CP 6.194) > > > [W]e must not assume that the qualities arose separate and came into > relation afterward. It was just the reverse. The general > indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous. (CP 6.199) > > The evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has for an early stage of > it, a vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a continuum > of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the individual > dimensions to be distinct. It must be by a contraction of the vagueness of > that potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular, > that the world of forms comes about. (CP 6.196) > > The evolution of the universe itself is the move from pure vagueness into > pure determination or habit. To talk about an object is itself to talk > about a habit. The idea that Peirce has completely determined objects that > enter into semiosis is itself incorrect. Rather the objects themselves are > bundles of habits. This is why Peirce can talk about a human as a symbol. > > all things have a tendency to take habits. . . . [For] every conceivable > real object, there is a greater probability of acting as on a former > like occasion than otherwise. This tendency itself constitutes a > regularity, and is continually on the increase. . . . It is a generalizing > tendency; it causes actions in the future to follow some generalizations of > past actions; and this tendency itself is something capable of > similar generalizations; and thus, it is self-generative. (CP 1.409) > > The quasi-flow which would result would, however, differ essentially from > time in this respect, that it would not necessarily be in a single stream. > Different flashes might start different streams, between which there should > be no relations of contemporaneity or succession. So one stream might > branch into two, or two might coalesce. But the further result of habit > would inevitably be to separate utterly those that were long separated, and > to make those which presented frequent common points coalesce into perfect > union. Those that were completely separated would be so many different > worlds which would know nothing of one another; so that the effect would be > just what we actually observe. (CP 1.412) > > > The object independent of semiosis is the real, no? Perhaps what you mean > by "real" is "truth”? > > > Nope. The object is part of semiosis. The real is not defined against > semiosis (which is continuous) but against finitude. Thus the real is that > which doesn’t depend upon what any finite community thinks about it. Rather > it’s defined in terms of unlimited semiosis or continuity. > > And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first > have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, > when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this > fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private inward > determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such > as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or > later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is > therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. (CP 5.311) > > That passage doesn’t mention continuity in terms of this finality. But > it’s not hard to find examples where he says that. I just had that quote > handy. > > One thing that may confuse people is that Peirce distinguishes between > *being* and *being represented*. I’ve noticed that often in philosophy, > especially the more nominalistic sorts of idealisms, that they are equated > in various ways. Either through a correspondence theory of truth ala > Descartes or by simply hiding the non-representational as a never > approachable “in-itself” leaving only representation as the real. This > tendency then goes through various streams in both analytic and continental > thought. > > If you’re interested in this topic Kelly Parker in *The Continuity of > Peirce’s Thought *has a very good chapter on “The Problem of > Extra-Semiotic Entities” starting around page 219. It’s a great book (with > a few tiny problems). However he’s very good at analyzing this problem of > entities as they are in or outside of semiosis. If you need I have a scan > of the relevant passage I’d posted to Peirce-L numerous years ago. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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