> On Jun 13, 2016, at 10:40 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Some passing thoughts…
> 
> Can you extend your categorization of “EXISTENCE” to the meanings of the 
> sciences?
> 
> Is this paragraph applicable to the "real/existent distinctions" among such 
> logical terms as organic, organ, organism, and organization?
> 
> Or, is it a profound philosophical attempt to explain metaphysics? 
> 

A few relevant quotes I think.

I call your attention to the fact that reality and existence are two different 
things. […]

Existence [. . .] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other 
characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. 
Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of which 
is that things that are real are whatever they really are, independently of any 
assertion about them. If Man is the measure of things, as Protagoras said, then 
there is no complete reality; but being there certainly is, even then. 

[...] It will not be necessary to go into that question, which is one of great 
delicacy. It will be sufficient to point out certain respects in which reality 
and existence differ. Let us suppose two seeds to be exactly alike. I do not 
say that two seeds ever are so; but we are now merely considering the meanings 
of two words, and, therefore, we are free to imagine any state of things we 
can. We will suppose, then, that not merely to our senses, but to any 
conceivable senses, those seeds are precisely alike, except that they are in 
different places. But now we will suppose that I am really resolved to plant 
those two seeds in such different soil, and to treat them so differently, that 
they will grow into plants whose flowers will have different colors. They 
really will be different, whatever anybody may say or think. I have made 
certain dispositions, so that I myself could not now have it otherwise. Their 
future difference is then a reality, already. For the time has already passed 
at which anybody’s dictum could make the fact otherwise. Yet I have not decided 
what the colors of the flowers of each are to be; for one of the two seeds will 
be taken at random, and placed in one soil and the other in another. Now, when 
it comes to the existence of those flowers, the colors will be absolutely what 
they will be. There can be no uncertainty or ambiguity about existence. The 
reality, however, of my determination of the colors is not altogether certain.

(CP 6.349)

One implication of this use is that perhaps nothing is fully determinate. 
However as a practical matter Peirce appears to take matter as determinate. How 
he’d respond to the discoveries of the early to mid 20th century regarding 
matter isn’t clear. 

Regarding God, I think Peirce’s argument about realism but not existence is due 
to the methodological limits of musement in the Neglected Argument. Musement 
can tell use about God’s firstness only.




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