> On Jun 13, 2016, at 9:55 AM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > > I think that it's worth making the point that the signal/noise relation > involves an idea of what questions or interests the quasi-mind has in the > semiosis, i.e., one quasi-mind's signal is another quasi-mind's noise, and a > phenomenon may appear to involve different signs and objects of interest to > different quasi-minds, and may vary in those regards for a given quasi-mind > through its shifts of questions and interests; such shifting may itself > become involved in larger semiosis.
This is an important point. (I think it’s largely the point Derrida raises using Peirce and why so many castigate him as well) That is I think one implication of how semiosis works is that separating out connotation from denotation is difficult. Further (and here I’m more following Eco) any object signifies via it’s sign through codes or habits of interpretation that get applied. (I’m intentionally using the passive form here as I think it gets better at the phenomena) That means that signs carry with them numerous interpretants - some wanted and some not related to the topic at hand. A famous example of this that again got Derrida castigated was noting the sexual connotations of imaginary numbers in mathematical symbology. Of course Derrida wasn’t denying the proper meaning, but was just getting at this point about signal/noise and how objects and not interpreters matter. That is the interpreter can’t shift out all these other meanings signs carry with them. This also explains how meanings shift in language since one improper connotation can happen enough that it takes on the force of habit. Literally the literal meaning can reverse. (Forgive the pun)
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