John, Clark, Ben U, List ~ The term 'average' seems too narrowly conceived, both in the original Wikipedia discussion of the immediate object, and in the present discussion (of the Wiki passage).
> Immediate object: the object as represented in the sign, a kind of > statistical, "average" version of the given object. First, objects have multiple signs, which the Wikipedia definition above fails to recognize by mentioning 'the' sign. That wording creates an impression that the 'average version' of an object has a specific, unidimensional interpretation. It seldom does. If an object has 2+ relevant signs, the idea of a calculated average (sign) has little meaning. The Wiki passage confuses this matter by referring to a 'statistical' average, which implies (insists) that calculation is possible. Second, however, the immediate object in one's mind may actually be an 'average' version of the object described in textbooks or by a parent, teacher or boss. If the individual has no relevant prior experience upon which to draw, the immediate object that appears in his/her mind will correspond (more-or-less) to this average. It is a generalization, or stereotype. For a person who *does have prior experiences to draw upon, the immediate object that comes to mind may differ significantly from the social-average version of that object. For this worldly individual, the immediate object will be a complex version of the object -- encompassing to varying degrees the social consensus (learned) view, personal experiences with the object and time spent reflecting upon prior experiences. More recent experiences may be weighted more heavily than distant ones. Rewarding and painful experiences may be weighted more heavily than those with no reward or pain attached to them. This view of the (immediate) object, too, is an average version which resides inside of a single mind. It is a complex, weighted average that cannot be represented by a number. I would remove the word "statistical" from the original Wiki statement, but retain the word average. It is already surrounded by quotes, which warns the reader not to expect an exact calculation. Regards, Tom Wyrick > On Jun 23, 2016, at 3:16 AM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: > > The “average” notion is distinctly misleading. Suggests an external averager > that does not exist. It is an abstraction at best, and typically ignores > aspects of the dynamics object (but I think could even get it entirely wrong > and still be the immediate object – it depends on context for this to happen) > > John Collier > Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate > University of KwaZulu-Natal > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > From: Clark Goble [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Thursday, 23 June 2016 12:07 AM > To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being > > > On Jun 22, 2016, at 1:10 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > > i. Immediate object: the object as represented in the sign [DELETE], a > kind of statistical, "average" version of the given object [END DELETE. Gary > Richmond, as I recall, convinced me that my text there was mistaken]. > > Yes, I’m not sure I’d agree with the “average” notion either. > > At the Wikipedia articles there are footnotes with references to primary > sources, often with links to the primary sources. > > I have to confess I don’t check Wikipedia on technical topics often due to > most being a mix of good and egregious. But I think you and others are to be > praised for trying to improve the Peirce related areas. > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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