List, Wouldn't it make things clearer if we, like Peirce, made a distinction between the immediate object conceived of as a possibility, or as an actuality, or as a necessity? On the basis of this modal division between the the three ways in which the immediate object of thought may serve as a presentation in mind, he makes a distinction between signs that are descriptive, those that are designative, and those that are copulative. Having taken a quick look, I don't see any place in the CP where Peirce characterizes the Immediate Object as some sort of average or mean over many objects of thought. Having said that, my hunch is that there is something to the suggestion, but it pertains to the manner in which we make the simplest sorts of comparisons between objects of thoughts--such as comparisons between the hues of two colors in what we perceive (e.g., the sensation of the color of a green cushion and that of a yellow chair).
As such, we might be able to fill in some of Peirce's account of what is necessary to make such comparisons between two aspects of a percept by taking a closer look at what he says about the laws of quality. This is from his discussion of genuine triads in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within. There are three clauses of the laws of quality. 1) Every quality is perfect and in itself such as it is. 2) Two qualities can be in two different sorts of relations to each other: a) independent (somewhat resemble and somewhat differ); b) one a mere determination of the other, where the order differs in evolution or synthesis versus involution or analysis. 3) Relates to the respects or 3rd qualities in which qualities may be compared: a) quality of the quality (hue); b) absolute intensity; c) purity, or relative intensity of the strongest elements. (Paraphrased in outline form from CP, 1.484) Putting this account of the laws of quality together with his account of comparison would yield a richer explication of the conception of being. This, I think, would provide us with a key component in what is needed to interpret what Peirce says about being in passages such as the following: That which distinguishes both sensations proper and emotions from the feeling of a thought, is that in the case of the two former the material quality is made prominent, because the thought has no relation of reason to the thoughts which determine it, which exists in the last case and detracts from the attention given to the mere feeling. By there being no relation of reason to the determining thoughts, I mean that there is nothing in the content of the thought which explains why it should arise only on occasion of these determining thoughts. If there is such a relation of reason, if the thought is essentially limited in its application to these objects, then the thought comprehends a thought other than itself; in other words, it is then a complex thought. An incomplex thought can, therefore, be nothing but a sensation or emotion, having no rational character. This is very different from the ordinary doctrine, according to which the very highest and most metaphysical conceptions are absolutely simple. I shall be asked how such a conception of a being is to be analyzed, or whether I can ever define one, two, and three, without a diallelon. Now I shall admit at once that neither of these conceptions can be separated into two others higher than itself; and in that sense, therefore, I fully admit that certain very metaphysical and eminently intellectual notions are absolutely simple. But though these concepts cannot be defined by genus and difference, there is another way in which they can be defined. All determination is by negation; we can first recognize any character only by putting an object which possesses it into comparison with an object which possesses it not. A conception, therefore, which was quite universal in every respect would be unrecognizable and impossible. We do not obtain the conception of Being, in the sense implied in the copula, by observing that all the things which we can think of have something in common, for there is no such thing to be observed. We get it by reflecting upon signs -- words or thoughts; we observe that different predicates may be attached to the same subject, and that each makes some conception applicable to the subject; then we imagine that a subject has something true of it merely because a predicate (no matter what) is attached to it -- and that we call Being. The conception of being is, therefore, a conception about a sign -- a thought, or word; and since it is not applicable to every sign, it is not primarily universal, although it is so in its mediate application to things. Being, therefore, may be defined; it may be defined, for example, as that which is common to the objects included in any class, and to the objects not included in the same class. But it is nothing new to say that metaphysical conceptions are primarily and at bottom thoughts about words, or thoughts about thoughts; it is the doctrine both of Aristotle (whose categories are parts of speech) and of Kant (whose categories are the characters of different kinds of propositions). (CP 5.294) What role, if any, does the conception of a mean, or an average, or a normal, play in the account of being when he says: "We do not obtain the conception of Being, in the sense implied in the copula, by observing that all the things which we can think of have something in common, for there is no such thing to be observed. We get it by reflecting upon signs -- words or thoughts; we observe that different predicates may be attached to the same subject, and that each makes some conception applicable to the subject; then we imagine that a subject has something true of it merely because a predicate (no matter what) is attached to it -- and that we call Being." Kant has a rather pregnant account of the role of a mean in what is aesthetically presented in sensation and/or imagination in his analysis of the experience of the sublime. (see Critique of Judgment, On the Analysis of the Sublime) I have a hunch that Peirce may be drawing on the Kantian account of the conditions that pertain to the aesthetic estimation of what is normal under some estimate of a mean when he says these sorts of things about the conception of Being. After all, we get a very different account of the aesthetic conditions of unity, infinity and totality in the 3rd Critique than the account of the logical conditions of unity, infinity and totality that is found in the 1st and 2nd Critiques. The relationship between these aesthetic and logical conditions for cognition are nicely tied together in the Jäsche Lectures on Logic, which we know Peirce read with considerable care. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Benjamin Udell [[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2016 11:14 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being Ozzie, John, Clark, list, Yes, I've noticed the problem with the word "the" in the past. Peirce often uses the definite article, but there are places where I used the indefinite article instead, although I never became thoroughgoing about it. Much of what you and Clark have just said seems rather thoughtful to me. Tom, you wrote, Second, however, the immediate object in one's mind may actually be an 'average' version of the object described in textbooks or by a parent, teacher or boss. If the individual has no relevant prior experience upon which to draw, the immediate object that appears in his/her mind will correspond (more-or-less) to this average. It is a generalization, or stereotype. That seems true to me. There are some further perspectives perhaps worth considering. Peirce somewhere talks about taking a companion's experience as one's own, say, if the companion has better eyesight. The companion reports discerning a ship on the horizon, while one sees just a blurry patch there, which one lets count as the object in question. There's an idea of the commind floating around there. Anyway, Peirce didn't always use the narrowest interpretation of the word "experience." Still, the less direct an experience, the less experiential it seems. (Even a physical object of experience turn out on analysis to be statistical in some sense, even when there is no practical prospect of calculating such object's specific statistics. The table as one sees it with all human-perceptual clarity is compatible with innumerable alternate microstates.) I'd say that the immediate object does sometimes seem an average, but also sometimes a simplification. In the cases that you discuss, in which it becomes complicated, it still seems to involve some simplification from that which one would think if one could be more deliberate about it, notwithstanding that it may also be more complicated than it would be if one were learn enough about the object. I remember years ago Joe Ransdell posted a message "What 'fundamenal psychological laws' is Peirce referring to?" (22 Sept. 2006) https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg01394.html . Joe wrote: In "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce says that "a man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change n his opinions, and if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychologicl laws -- I do not see what can be said against his doing so". [End quote of Joe & Peirce] As I recall, people in reply agreed that one of the laws that Peirce had in mind must have been the law of association, but then what would the other law be? At some point in the last two years I found a passage where Peirce discusses the law of association and a law of simplification as the two great psychological laws. Unfortunately, with my recent computer problem, I lost the note that I made of it. Anyway, my point is when discussing a Peircean conception, and discerning in it a dependence on an idea of an average, it's useful to ask oneself (even if only for a moment) also whether it depends on an idea of simplicity. Tom, you wrote, I would remove the word "statistical" from the original Wiki statement, but retain the word average. It is already surrounded by quotes, which warns the reader not to expect an exact calculation. [End quote] The word "average" should not actually be returned to the article since as a Wikipedia article it needs, in representing Peirce's views, to stick to things that Peirce actually said or virtually said, as opposed to further conclusions drawn by Wikipedia article writers, even if the conclusions seem good. Best, Ben On 6/23/2016 12:36 PM, Ozzie wrote: John, Clark, Ben U, List ~ The term 'average' seems too narrowly conceived, both in the original Wikipedia discussion of the immediate object, and in the present discussion (of the Wiki passage). Immediate object: the object as represented in the sign, a kind of statistical, "average" version of the given object. First, objects have multiple signs, which the Wikipedia definition above fails to recognize by mentioning 'the' sign. That wording creates an impression that the 'average version' of an object has a specific, unidimensional interpretation. It seldom does. If an object has 2+ relevant signs, the idea of a calculated average (sign) has little meaning. The Wiki passage confuses this matter by referring to a 'statistical' average, which implies (insists) that calculation is possible. Second, however, the immediate object in one's mind may actually be an 'average' version of the object described in textbooks or by a parent, teacher or boss. If the individual has no relevant prior experience upon which to draw, the immediate object that appears in his/her mind will correspond (more-or-less) to this average. It is a generalization, or stereotype. For a person who *does have prior experiences to draw upon, the immediate object that comes to mind may differ significantly from the social-average version of that object. For this worldly individual, the immediate object will be a complex version of the object -- encompassing to varying degrees the social consensus (learned) view, personal experiences with the object and time spent reflecting upon prior experiences. More recent experiences may be weighted more heavily than distant ones. Rewarding and painful experiences may be weighted more heavily than those with no reward or pain attached to them. This view of the (immediate) object, too, is an average version which resides inside of a single mind. It is a complex, weighted average that cannot be represented by a number. I would remove the word "statistical" from the original Wiki statement, but retain the word average. It is already surrounded by quotes, which warns the reader not to expect an exact calculation. Regards, Tom Wyrick On Jun 23, 2016, at 3:16 AM, John Collier <<mailto:[email protected]>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: The “average” notion is distinctly misleading. Suggests an external averager that does not exist. It is an abstraction at best, and typically ignores aspects of the dynamics object (but I think could even get it entirely wrong and still be the immediate object – it depends on context for this to happen) John Collier Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Clark Goble [mailto:[email protected] ] Sent: Thursday, 23 June 2016 12:07 AM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being On Jun 22, 2016, at 1:10 PM, Benjamin Udell <<mailto:[email protected]>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: i. Immediate object: the object as represented in the sign [DELETE], a kind of statistical, "average" version of the given object [END DELETE. Gary Richmond, as I recall, convinced me that my text there was mistaken]. Yes, I’m not sure I’d agree with the “average” notion either. At the Wikipedia articles there are footnotes with references to primary sources, often with links to the primary sources. I have to confess I don’t check Wikipedia on technical topics often due to most being a mix of good and egregious. But I think you and others are to be praised for trying to improve the Peirce related areas.
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