It strikes me that Chesterton's essay provides a great series of examples for a lecture on Hume.
Jay Sent from my iPhone > On Jul 16, 2016, at 4:05 PM, "[email protected]" > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Ben, > > A most interesting & valuable post! > > I do hope all involved in this discussion will pay attention to this > response of yours. > > Kirsti > > Ben Novak kirjoitti 16.7.2016 21:00: >> Dear Helmut and List: >> Helmut asks: "Can things take habits?" >> Discussion of Peirce's theory of habit reminds me of G. K. >> Chesterton's discussion of the logic of fairy tales in "The Ethics of >> Elfland", which in turn strongly resonates with Peirce's "Neglected >> Agument." Here is an extract from the former of the part relevant to >> the current discussion on Peirce-L. Chesterton writes of "a certain >> way of looking at life, which was created in me by the fairy tales, >> but has since been meekly ratified by the mere facts.": >> It might be stated this way. There are certain sequences or >> developments (cases of one thing following another), which are, in the >> true sense of the word, reasonable. They are, in the true sense of the >> word, necessary. Such are mathematical and merely logical sequences. >> We in fairyland (who are the most reasonable of all creatures) admit >> that reason and that necessity. For instance, if the Ugly Sisters are >> older than Cinderella, it is (in an iron and awful sense) necessary >> that Cinderella is younger than the Ugly Sisters. There is no getting >> out of it. Haeckel may talk as much fatalism about that fact as he >> pleases: it really must be. If Jack is the son of a miller, a miller >> is the father of Jack. Cold reason decrees it from her awful throne: >> and we in fairyland submit. If the three brothers all ride horses, >> there are six animals and eighteen legs involved: that is true >> rationalism, and fairyland is full of it. But as I put my head over >> the hedge of the elves and began to take notice of the natural world, >> I observed an extraordinary thing. I observed that learned men in >> spectacles were talking of the actual things that happened -- dawn and >> death and so on -- as if they were rational and inevitable. They >> talked as if the fact that trees bear fruit were just as necessary as >> the fact that two and one trees make three. But it is not. There is an >> enormous difference by the test of fairyland; which is the test of the >> imagination. You cannot imagine two and one not making three. But you >> can easily imagine trees not growing fruit; you can imagine them >> growing golden candlesticks or tigers hanging on by the tail. These >> men in spectacles spoke much of a man named Newton, who was hit by an >> apple, and who discovered a law. But they could not be got to see the >> distinction between a true law, a law of reason, and the mere fact of >> apples falling. If the apple hit Newton's nose, Newton's nose hit the >> apple. That is a true necessity: because we cannot conceive the one >> occurring without the other. But we can quite well conceive the apple >> not falling on his nose; we can fancy it flying ardently through the >> air to hit some other nose, of which it had a more definite dislike. >> We have always in our fairy tales kept this sharp distinction between >> the science of mental relations, in which there really are laws, and >> the science of physical facts, in which there are no laws, but only >> weird repetitions. We believe in bodily miracles, but not in mental >> impossibilities. We believe that a Bean-stalk climbed up to Heaven; >> but that does not at all confuse our convictions on the philosophical >> question of how many beans make five. >> Here is the peculiar perfection of tone and truth in the nursery >> tales. The man of science says, "Cut the stalk, and the apple will >> fall"; but he says it calmly, as if the one idea really led up to the >> other. The witch in the fairy tale says, "Blow the horn, and the >> ogre's castle will fall"; but she does not say it as if it were >> something in which the effect obviously arose out of the cause. >> Doubtless she has given the advice to many champions, and has seen >> many castles fall, but she does not lose either her wonder or her >> reason. She does not muddle her head until it imagines a necessary >> mental connection between a horn and a falling tower. But the >> scientific men do muddle their heads, until they imagine a necessary >> mental connection between an apple leaving the tree and an apple >> reaching the ground. They do really talk as if they had found not only >> a set of marvellous facts, but a truth connecting those facts. They do >> talk as if the connection of two strange things physically connected >> them philosophically. They feel that because one incomprehensible >> thing constantly follows another incomprehensible thing the two >> together somehow make up a comprehensible thing. Two black riddles >> make a white answer. >> In fairyland we avoid the word "law"; but in the land of science they >> are singularly fond of it. Thus they will call some interesting >> conjecture about how forgotten folks pronounced the alphabet, Grimm's >> Law. But Grimm's Law is far less intellectual than Grimm's Fairy >> Tales. The tales are, at any rate, certainly tales; while the law is >> not a law. A law implies that we know the nature of the generalisation >> and enactment; not merely that we have noticed some of the effects. If >> there is a law that pick-pockets shall go to prison, it implies that >> there is an imaginable mental connection between the idea of prison >> and the idea of picking pockets. And we know what the idea is. We can >> say why we take liberty from a man who takes liberties. But we cannot >> say why an egg can turn into a chicken any more than we can say why a >> bear could turn into a fairy prince. As ideas, the egg and the chicken >> are further off from each other than the bear and the prince; for no >> egg in itself suggests a chicken, whereas some princes do suggest >> bears. Granted, then, that certain transformations do happen, it is >> essential that we should regard them in the philosophic manner of >> fairy tales, not in the unphilosophic manner of science and the "Laws >> of Nature." When we are asked why eggs turn to birds or fruits fall in >> autumn, we must answer exactly as the fairy godmother would answer if >> Cinderella asked her why mice turned to horses or her clothes fell >> from her at twelve o'clock. We must answer that it is magic. It is not >> a "law," for we do not understand its general formula. It is not a >> necessity, for though we can count on it happening practically, we >> have no right to say that it must always happen. It is no argument for >> unalterable law (as Huxley fancied) that we count on the ordinary >> course of things. We do not count on it; we bet on it. We risk the >> remote possibility of a miracle as we do that of a poisoned pancake or >> a world-destroying comet. We leave it out of account, not because it >> is a miracle, and therefore an impossibility, but because it is a >> miracle, and therefore an exception. All the terms used in the science >> books, "law," "necessity," "order," "tendency," and so on, are really >> unintellectual, because they assume an inner synthesis, which we do >> not possess. The only words that ever satisfied me as describing >> Nature are the terms used in the fairy books, "charm," "spell," >> "enchantment." They express the arbitrariness of the fact and its >> mystery. A tree grows fruit because it is a magic tree. Water runs >> downhill because it is bewitched. The sun shines because it is >> bewitched. >> I deny altogether that this is fantastic or even mystical. We may have >> some mysticism later on; but this fairy-tale language about things is >> simply rational and agnostic. It is the only way I can express in >> words my clear and definite perception that one thing is quite >> distinct from another; that there is no logical connection between >> flying and laying eggs. It is the man who talks about "a law" that he >> has never seen who is the mystic. Nay, the ordinary scientific man is >> strictly a sentimentalist. He is a sentimentalist in this essential >> sense, that he is soaked and swept away by mere associations. He has >> so often seen birds fly and lay eggs that he feels as if there must be >> some dreamy, tender connection between the two ideas, whereas there is >> none. A forlorn lover might be unable to dissociate the moon from lost >> love; so the materialist is unable to dissociate the moon from the >> tide. In both cases there is no connection, except that one has seen >> them together. A sentimentalist might shed tears at the smell of >> apple-blossom, because, by a dark association of his own, it reminded >> him of his boyhood. So the materialist professor (though he conceals >> his tears) is yet a sentimentalist, because, by a dark association of >> his own, apple-blossoms remind him of apples. But the cool rationalist >> from fairyland does not see why, in the abstract, the apple tree >> should not grow crimson tulips; it sometimes does in his country. >> This elementary wonder, however, is not a mere fancy derived from >> the fairy tales; on the contrary, all the fire of the fairy tales is >> derived from this. Just as we all like love tales because there is an >> instinct of sex, we all like astonishing tales because they touch the >> nerve of the ancient instinct of astonishment. This is proved by the >> fact that when we are very young children we do not need fairy tales: >> we only need tales. Mere life is interesting enough. A child of seven >> is excited by being told that Tommy opened a door and saw a dragon. >> But a child of three is excited by being told that Tommy opened a >> door. Boys like romantic tales; but babies like realistic tales -- >> because they find them romantic. In fact, a baby is about the only >> person, I should think, to whom a modern realistic novel could be read >> without boring him. This proves that even nursery tales only echo an >> almost pre-natal leap of interest and amazement. These tales say that >> apples were golden only to refresh the forgotten moment when we found >> that they were green. They make rivers run with wine only to make us >> remember, for one wild moment, that they run with water. I have said >> that this is wholly reasonable and even agnostic. >> [I do not know why the last paragraph copied in a different font size >> than the ones before..., but you can find the whole essay in a >> singular font online at: >> http://www.cse.dmu.ac.uk/~mward/gkc/books/orthodoxy/ch4.html [5] >> Best, >> Ben Novak >> BEN NOVAK [6] >> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 >> Telephone: (814) 808-5702 >> _"All art is mortal, __not merely the individual artifacts, but the >> arts themselves._ _One day the last portrait of Rembrandt_ _and the >> last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—__though possibly a >> colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—__because the last >> eye and the last ear accessible to their message __will have gone." >> _Oswald Spengler >> On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 1:19 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >> wrote: >>> Dear Gary F., list, >>> you wrote: >>> "Peirce says here that ‘the law of habit’ – as opposed to the >>> ‘fundamental law of mind,’ which is the _tendency_ of all things >>> to _take_ habits – ‘is a simple formal law, a law of efficient >>> causation.’". >>> I donot think, that things can take habits. I think, only organisms >>> can. Also I think, that efficient cause cannot form a habit, but >>> only final cause can, which final cause is only a cause of >>> organisms, but not of inanimate nature. (and example cause too, >>> nervous animals/brain, but that is only my hobby topic). Ok, the >>> whole universe may well be an organism (and something comparable to >>> a brain animal too), but then it is the universe, that takes habits, >>> not the things. By the way: What about binary laws, eg. the >>> conservation laws, that only make sense if being exact? (Energy is >>> exactly conserved). There is no way for them to might have evolved >>> by growth of any kind. They are, if habits, saltatory emergent ones. >>> So habits, if you want to expand the term like Peirce did, are not >>> only growth affairs, but can be emergent too. See my last post in >>> the thread "the autors claim...". Binary laws cannot be due to "ever >>> so minute changes", and if Peirce has claimed that, he was wrong, I >>> think. Imagine a universe, in which energy is not exactly conserved, >>> but increases: This universe would glow white hot and explode in >>> nearly no time. If energy would decrease, it would immediately >>> shrink, cool down, and vanish. Peirce is not an overwise guru, he >>> might have been wrong in one or the other minor aspect, but all in >>> all he did a good job, and was right. But in this case, there is a >>> problem, I think. So please do not answer with Peirce-quotations, >>> but with your own thoughts. Can things take habits?? >>> Best, >>> Helmut >>> 13. Juli 2016 um 17:39 Uhr >>> [email protected] wrote: >>> Here’s another Peircean post from my blog, a rather long one >>> linking Peirce’s cosmology with semiotic causality. >>> Gary f. >>> According to Peirce’s cosmological hypothesis, evolution is a >>> continuing process of _growth_ which accounts for both the diversity >>> and the regularities we observe in a universe both mental and >>> physical. >>> The regularities or ‘laws’ of nature result from the >>> habit-taking tendency, which tends toward the extreme >>> ‘crystallization’ of form which in physics we call ‘matter.’ >>> But the behavior patterns of the physical universe are never >>> completely determinate, the laws of nature never absolutely exact, >>> because the habit-taking tendency is countered and complemented by a >>> spontaneity which keeps the universe alive and accounts for the >>> growing diversity and complexity of forms. This spontaneity is >>> primal to the mental side of evolution, which involves both taking >>> and breaking habits. >>> Here is Peirce’s explanation of the ‘Uniformity’ of nature in >>> Baldwin’s Dictionary [1]: >>> The hypothesis suggested by the present writer is that all laws are >>> results of evolution; that underlying all other laws is the only >>> tendency which can grow by its own virtue, the tendency of all >>> things to take habits. Now since this same tendency is the one sole >>> fundamental law of mind, it follows that the physical evolution >>> works towards ends in the same way that mental action works towards >>> ends, and thus in one aspect of the matter it would be perfectly >>> true to say that final causation is alone primary. Yet, on the other >>> hand, the law of habit is a simple formal law, a law of efficient >>> causation; so that either way of regarding the matter is equally >>> true, although the former is more fully intelligent. Meantime, if >>> law is a result of evolution, which is a process lasting through all >>> time, it follows that no law is absolute. That is, we must suppose >>> that the phenomena themselves involve departures from law analogous >>> to errors of observation. But the writer has not supposed that this >>> phenomenon had any connection with free-will. In so far as evolution >>> follows a law, the law of habit, instead of being a movement from >>> homogeneity to heterogeneity, is growth from difformity to >>> uniformity. But the chance divergences from law are perpetually >>> acting to increase the variety of the world, and are checked by a >>> sort of natural selection and otherwise (for the writer does not >>> think the selective principle sufficient), so that the general >>> result may be described as ‘organized heterogeneity,’ or, >>> better, rationalized variety. In view of the principle of >>> continuity, the supreme guide in framing philosophical hypotheses, >>> we must, under this theory, regard matter as mind whose habits have >>> become fixed so as to lose the powers of forming them and losing >>> them, while mind is to be regarded as a chemical genus of extreme >>> complexity and instability. It has acquired in a remarkable degree a >>> habit of taking and laying aside habits. The fundamental divergences >>> from law must here be most extraordinarily high, although probably >>> very far indeed from attaining any directly observable magnitude. >>> But their effect is to cause the laws of mind to be themselves of so >>> fluid a character as to simulate divergences from law. All this, >>> according to the writer, constitutes a hypothesis capable of being >>> tested by experiment. >>> Peirce says here that ‘the law of habit’ – as opposed to the >>> ‘fundamental law of mind,’ which is the _tendency_ of all things >>> to _take_ habits – ‘is a simple formal law, a law of efficient >>> causation.’ Ten years earlier, in his ‘Reply to the >>> Necessitarians,’ Peirce had written that the necessitarian, while >>> believing that irregular events are inexplicable, also says >>> that the laws of nature are immutable and ultimate facts, and no >>> account is to be given of them. But my hypothesis of spontaneity >>> does explain irregularity, in a certain sense; that is, it explains >>> the general fact of irregularity, though not, of course, what each >>> lawless event is to be. At the same time, by thus loosening the bond >>> of necessity, it gives room for the influence of another kind of >>> causation, such as seems to be operative in the mind in the >>> formation of associations, and enables us to understand how the >>> uniformity of nature could have been brought about. (W8:123, CP >>> 6.60) >>> This ‘other kind of causation’ is called by Jesper Hoffmeyer >>> _semiotic causality_, which ‘gives direction to efficient >>> causality, while efficient causality gives power to semiotic >>> causality’ (Hoffmeyer 2008, 64). This duality or complementarity >>> of causes accounts for the two sides of evolution, the physical and >>> the psychical or mental. >>> Semiotic causality is implicit in Peirce’s definitions of >>> ‘sign,’ which generally follow the path of _determination_ >>> object > sign > interpretant: >>> I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, >>> which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is >>> both determined by the object _relatively to the interpretant_, and >>> determines the interpretant _in reference to the object_, in such >>> wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object >>> through the mediation of this ‘sign.’ (EP2:410) >>> The reverse side of this path of determination is a path of >>> representation: the sign _represents_ the object _to_ the >>> interpretant, which then represents the sign – by determining >>> another interpretant sign, or else a ‘habit-change,’ which is >>> both an end of semiotic causality and a governor of efficient >>> causation, i.e. a determinant of future transformations in the >>> physical realm. Any actual occurrence of semiotic >>> _determination_/_representation_ must itself determine and represent >>> a change in a state of mind, quasi-mind or bodymind: in other words, >>> it must _make a difference_ to that bodymind, and this difference is >>> _both_ semiotically and efficiently caused. >>> In other words, the _logical interpretant_ of a sign, as a >>> ‘habit-change’ or modification of the guidance system which >>> ‘gives direction’ to the subsequent _practice_ of the guided >>> system or bodymind, will determine the energetic interpretants [2] >>> of future signs, which over time will make the path of practice by >>> walking it. This in turn will make a difference to the physical (as >>> well as the mental) context of further semiosis. >>> In terms of evolutionary biology, the way a type of organism >>> interacts with its environment can effect changes in both organism >>> and environment, which may in turn affect the ability of the species >>> to be represented in another generation of organisms. Over time, >>> then, natural selection will weed out the _ethos_ which does not >>> maintain its viability as an occupant of its ecological niche. But >>> natural selection must have a variety of possibilities to select >>> from, and does not in itself account for that variety. Hence the >>> need for the hypothesis that spontaneity or ‘chance’ is a primal >>> element in an evolving universe such as the one we all inhabit. >>> } Freedom lies only in our innate human capacity to choose between >>> different sorts of bondage, bondage to desire or self esteem, or >>> bondage to the light that lightens all our lives. [Sri Madhava] { >>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [3] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway >>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on >>> "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. >>> PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To >>> UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to >>> [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY >>> of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [4] . >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [4] . >> Links: >> ------ >> [1] http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Uniformity >> [2] http://gnusystems.ca/TS/prx.htm#semenerg >> [3] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ >> [4] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> [5] http://www.cse.dmu.ac.uk/~mward/gkc/books/orthodoxy/ch4.html >> [6] http://bennovak.net > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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