Dear Helmut: You write: "With things, that cannot take habits I meant inanimate things. Trees, apples, bean stalks, dragons, elves are organisms, which can. I do not think that I am a nerdish spoilsport of fairytales, just from claiming that inanimate things do not habitize."
But Peirce writes, in the 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551: "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there." http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/quasi-mind *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>* 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 Telephone: (814) 808-5702 *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 7:17 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Ben, Kirstima, list, > yes! Interesting, valuable and lovely. And not contradicting anything I > wrote: With things, that cannot take habits I meant inanimate things. > Trees, apples, bean stalks, dragons, elves are organisms, which can. I do > not think that I am a nerdish spoilsport of fairytales, just from claiming > that inanimate things do not habitize. But: The apple does not want to > refresh the eater, and is not red or golden because of its own will. The > habit is not that of the apple, but that of the evolution. This one can see > and still remain an agnostic who likes fairytales. Science based not on > ideology, but on research, is not blunt, nor dull, nor limits it the > possibility to tell and digest fairy- and other tales. However, it shifts > the subjects people are afraid of. While in ancient times like the stone > age people were haunted by dragons, apple trees, autocratic gods, in > scientific cultures, like buddhism, which is a science based on research, > they rather fear the universe mirroring their own deeds, for example. And > fairytales: Not all of them are pure wisdom, I think. Maybe many of them > have the function to discipline children by betraying and disinforming > them. When a childs mind is crowded with ideas about kings and princesses, > this child wont get the idea that monarchy is but natural. Ok, maybe I am > or want to be a spoilsport of fairytales..., but not of all. > Best, > Helmut > > 16. Juli 2016 um 22:04 Uhr > [email protected] wrote: > > Ben, > > A most interesting & valuable post! > > I do hope all involved in this discussion will pay attention to this > response of yours. > > Kirsti > > Ben Novak kirjoitti 16.7.2016 21:00: > > Dear Helmut and List: > > > > Helmut asks: "Can things take habits?" > > > > Discussion of Peirce's theory of habit reminds me of G. K. > > Chesterton's discussion of the logic of fairy tales in "The Ethics of > > Elfland", which in turn strongly resonates with Peirce's "Neglected > > Agument." Here is an extract from the former of the part relevant to > > the current discussion on Peirce-L. Chesterton writes of "a certain > > way of looking at life, which was created in me by the fairy tales, > > but has since been meekly ratified by the mere facts.": > > > > It might be stated this way. There are certain sequences or > > developments (cases of one thing following another), which are, in the > > true sense of the word, reasonable. They are, in the true sense of the > > word, necessary. Such are mathematical and merely logical sequences. > > We in fairyland (who are the most reasonable of all creatures) admit > > that reason and that necessity. For instance, if the Ugly Sisters are > > older than Cinderella, it is (in an iron and awful sense) necessary > > that Cinderella is younger than the Ugly Sisters. There is no getting > > out of it. Haeckel may talk as much fatalism about that fact as he > > pleases: it really must be. If Jack is the son of a miller, a miller > > is the father of Jack. Cold reason decrees it from her awful throne: > > and we in fairyland submit. If the three brothers all ride horses, > > there are six animals and eighteen legs involved: that is true > > rationalism, and fairyland is full of it. But as I put my head over > > the hedge of the elves and began to take notice of the natural world, > > I observed an extraordinary thing. I observed that learned men in > > spectacles were talking of the actual things that happened -- dawn and > > death and so on -- as if they were rational and inevitable. They > > talked as if the fact that trees bear fruit were just as necessary as > > the fact that two and one trees make three. But it is not. There is an > > enormous difference by the test of fairyland; which is the test of the > > imagination. You cannot imagine two and one not making three. But you > > can easily imagine trees not growing fruit; you can imagine them > > growing golden candlesticks or tigers hanging on by the tail. These > > men in spectacles spoke much of a man named Newton, who was hit by an > > apple, and who discovered a law. But they could not be got to see the > > distinction between a true law, a law of reason, and the mere fact of > > apples falling. If the apple hit Newton's nose, Newton's nose hit the > > apple. That is a true necessity: because we cannot conceive the one > > occurring without the other. But we can quite well conceive the apple > > not falling on his nose; we can fancy it flying ardently through the > > air to hit some other nose, of which it had a more definite dislike. > > We have always in our fairy tales kept this sharp distinction between > > the science of mental relations, in which there really are laws, and > > the science of physical facts, in which there are no laws, but only > > weird repetitions. We believe in bodily miracles, but not in mental > > impossibilities. We believe that a Bean-stalk climbed up to Heaven; > > but that does not at all confuse our convictions on the philosophical > > question of how many beans make five. > > > > Here is the peculiar perfection of tone and truth in the nursery > > tales. The man of science says, "Cut the stalk, and the apple will > > fall"; but he says it calmly, as if the one idea really led up to the > > other. The witch in the fairy tale says, "Blow the horn, and the > > ogre's castle will fall"; but she does not say it as if it were > > something in which the effect obviously arose out of the cause. > > Doubtless she has given the advice to many champions, and has seen > > many castles fall, but she does not lose either her wonder or her > > reason. She does not muddle her head until it imagines a necessary > > mental connection between a horn and a falling tower. But the > > scientific men do muddle their heads, until they imagine a necessary > > mental connection between an apple leaving the tree and an apple > > reaching the ground. They do really talk as if they had found not only > > a set of marvellous facts, but a truth connecting those facts. They do > > talk as if the connection of two strange things physically connected > > them philosophically. They feel that because one incomprehensible > > thing constantly follows another incomprehensible thing the two > > together somehow make up a comprehensible thing. Two black riddles > > make a white answer. > > > > In fairyland we avoid the word "law"; but in the land of science they > > are singularly fond of it. Thus they will call some interesting > > conjecture about how forgotten folks pronounced the alphabet, Grimm's > > Law. But Grimm's Law is far less intellectual than Grimm's Fairy > > Tales. The tales are, at any rate, certainly tales; while the law is > > not a law. A law implies that we know the nature of the generalisation > > and enactment; not merely that we have noticed some of the effects. If > > there is a law that pick-pockets shall go to prison, it implies that > > there is an imaginable mental connection between the idea of prison > > and the idea of picking pockets. And we know what the idea is. We can > > say why we take liberty from a man who takes liberties. But we cannot > > say why an egg can turn into a chicken any more than we can say why a > > bear could turn into a fairy prince. As ideas, the egg and the chicken > > are further off from each other than the bear and the prince; for no > > egg in itself suggests a chicken, whereas some princes do suggest > > bears. Granted, then, that certain transformations do happen, it is > > essential that we should regard them in the philosophic manner of > > fairy tales, not in the unphilosophic manner of science and the "Laws > > of Nature." When we are asked why eggs turn to birds or fruits fall in > > autumn, we must answer exactly as the fairy godmother would answer if > > Cinderella asked her why mice turned to horses or her clothes fell > > from her at twelve o'clock. We must answer that it is magic. It is not > > a "law," for we do not understand its general formula. It is not a > > necessity, for though we can count on it happening practically, we > > have no right to say that it must always happen. It is no argument for > > unalterable law (as Huxley fancied) that we count on the ordinary > > course of things. We do not count on it; we bet on it. We risk the > > remote possibility of a miracle as we do that of a poisoned pancake or > > a world-destroying comet. We leave it out of account, not because it > > is a miracle, and therefore an impossibility, but because it is a > > miracle, and therefore an exception. All the terms used in the science > > books, "law," "necessity," "order," "tendency," and so on, are really > > unintellectual, because they assume an inner synthesis, which we do > > not possess. The only words that ever satisfied me as describing > > Nature are the terms used in the fairy books, "charm," "spell," > > "enchantment." They express the arbitrariness of the fact and its > > mystery. A tree grows fruit because it is a magic tree. Water runs > > downhill because it is bewitched. The sun shines because it is > > bewitched. > > > > I deny altogether that this is fantastic or even mystical. We may have > > some mysticism later on; but this fairy-tale language about things is > > simply rational and agnostic. It is the only way I can express in > > words my clear and definite perception that one thing is quite > > distinct from another; that there is no logical connection between > > flying and laying eggs. It is the man who talks about "a law" that he > > has never seen who is the mystic. Nay, the ordinary scientific man is > > strictly a sentimentalist. He is a sentimentalist in this essential > > sense, that he is soaked and swept away by mere associations. He has > > so often seen birds fly and lay eggs that he feels as if there must be > > some dreamy, tender connection between the two ideas, whereas there is > > none. A forlorn lover might be unable to dissociate the moon from lost > > love; so the materialist is unable to dissociate the moon from the > > tide. In both cases there is no connection, except that one has seen > > them together. A sentimentalist might shed tears at the smell of > > apple-blossom, because, by a dark association of his own, it reminded > > him of his boyhood. So the materialist professor (though he conceals > > his tears) is yet a sentimentalist, because, by a dark association of > > his own, apple-blossoms remind him of apples. But the cool rationalist > > from fairyland does not see why, in the abstract, the apple tree > > should not grow crimson tulips; it sometimes does in his country. > > > > This elementary wonder, however, is not a mere fancy derived from > > the fairy tales; on the contrary, all the fire of the fairy tales is > > derived from this. Just as we all like love tales because there is an > > instinct of sex, we all like astonishing tales because they touch the > > nerve of the ancient instinct of astonishment. This is proved by the > > fact that when we are very young children we do not need fairy tales: > > we only need tales. Mere life is interesting enough. A child of seven > > is excited by being told that Tommy opened a door and saw a dragon. > > But a child of three is excited by being told that Tommy opened a > > door. Boys like romantic tales; but babies like realistic tales -- > > because they find them romantic. In fact, a baby is about the only > > person, I should think, to whom a modern realistic novel could be read > > without boring him. This proves that even nursery tales only echo an > > almost pre-natal leap of interest and amazement. These tales say that > > apples were golden only to refresh the forgotten moment when we found > > that they were green. They make rivers run with wine only to make us > > remember, for one wild moment, that they run with water. I have said > > that this is wholly reasonable and even agnostic. > > > > [I do not know why the last paragraph copied in a different font size > > than the ones before..., but you can find the whole essay in a > > singular font online at: > > http://www.cse.dmu.ac.uk/~mward/gkc/books/orthodoxy/ch4.html [5] > > > > Best, > > Ben Novak > > > > BEN NOVAK [6] > > 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 > > Telephone: (814) 808-5702 > > > > _"All art is mortal, __not merely the individual artifacts, but the > > arts themselves._ _One day the last portrait of Rembrandt_ _and the > > last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—__though possibly a > > colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—__because the last > > eye and the last ear accessible to their message __will have gone." > > _Oswald Spengler > > > > On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 1:19 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > > wrote: > > > >> Dear Gary F., list, > >> you wrote: > >> "Peirce says here that ‘the law of habit’ – as opposed to the > >> ‘fundamental law of mind,’ which is the _tendency_ of all things > >> to _take_ habits – ‘is a simple formal law, a law of efficient > >> causation.’". > >> > >> I donot think, that things can take habits. I think, only organisms > >> can. Also I think, that efficient cause cannot form a habit, but > >> only final cause can, which final cause is only a cause of > >> organisms, but not of inanimate nature. (and example cause too, > >> nervous animals/brain, but that is only my hobby topic). Ok, the > >> whole universe may well be an organism (and something comparable to > >> a brain animal too), but then it is the universe, that takes habits, > >> not the things. By the way: What about binary laws, eg. the > >> conservation laws, that only make sense if being exact? (Energy is > >> exactly conserved). There is no way for them to might have evolved > >> by growth of any kind. They are, if habits, saltatory emergent ones. > >> So habits, if you want to expand the term like Peirce did, are not > >> only growth affairs, but can be emergent too. See my last post in > >> the thread "the autors claim...". Binary laws cannot be due to "ever > >> so minute changes", and if Peirce has claimed that, he was wrong, I > >> think. Imagine a universe, in which energy is not exactly conserved, > >> but increases: This universe would glow white hot and explode in > >> nearly no time. If energy would decrease, it would immediately > >> shrink, cool down, and vanish. Peirce is not an overwise guru, he > >> might have been wrong in one or the other minor aspect, but all in > >> all he did a good job, and was right. But in this case, there is a > >> problem, I think. So please do not answer with Peirce-quotations, > >> but with your own thoughts. Can things take habits?? > >> Best, > >> Helmut > >> > >> 13. Juli 2016 um 17:39 Uhr > >> [email protected] wrote: > >> > >> Here’s another Peircean post from my blog, a rather long one > >> linking Peirce’s cosmology with semiotic causality. > >> > >> Gary f. > >> > >> According to Peirce’s cosmological hypothesis, evolution is a > >> continuing process of _growth_ which accounts for both the diversity > >> and the regularities we observe in a universe both mental and > >> physical. > >> > >> The regularities or ‘laws’ of nature result from the > >> habit-taking tendency, which tends toward the extreme > >> ‘crystallization’ of form which in physics we call ‘matter.’ > >> But the behavior patterns of the physical universe are never > >> completely determinate, the laws of nature never absolutely exact, > >> because the habit-taking tendency is countered and complemented by a > >> spontaneity which keeps the universe alive and accounts for the > >> growing diversity and complexity of forms. This spontaneity is > >> primal to the mental side of evolution, which involves both taking > >> and breaking habits. > >> > >> Here is Peirce’s explanation of the ‘Uniformity’ of nature in > >> Baldwin’s Dictionary [1]: > >> > >> The hypothesis suggested by the present writer is that all laws are > >> results of evolution; that underlying all other laws is the only > >> tendency which can grow by its own virtue, the tendency of all > >> things to take habits. Now since this same tendency is the one sole > >> fundamental law of mind, it follows that the physical evolution > >> works towards ends in the same way that mental action works towards > >> ends, and thus in one aspect of the matter it would be perfectly > >> true to say that final causation is alone primary. Yet, on the other > >> hand, the law of habit is a simple formal law, a law of efficient > >> causation; so that either way of regarding the matter is equally > >> true, although the former is more fully intelligent. Meantime, if > >> law is a result of evolution, which is a process lasting through all > >> time, it follows that no law is absolute. That is, we must suppose > >> that the phenomena themselves involve departures from law analogous > >> to errors of observation. But the writer has not supposed that this > >> phenomenon had any connection with free-will. In so far as evolution > >> follows a law, the law of habit, instead of being a movement from > >> homogeneity to heterogeneity, is growth from difformity to > >> uniformity. But the chance divergences from law are perpetually > >> acting to increase the variety of the world, and are checked by a > >> sort of natural selection and otherwise (for the writer does not > >> think the selective principle sufficient), so that the general > >> result may be described as ‘organized heterogeneity,’ or, > >> better, rationalized variety. In view of the principle of > >> continuity, the supreme guide in framing philosophical hypotheses, > >> we must, under this theory, regard matter as mind whose habits have > >> become fixed so as to lose the powers of forming them and losing > >> them, while mind is to be regarded as a chemical genus of extreme > >> complexity and instability. It has acquired in a remarkable degree a > >> habit of taking and laying aside habits. The fundamental divergences > >> from law must here be most extraordinarily high, although probably > >> very far indeed from attaining any directly observable magnitude. > >> But their effect is to cause the laws of mind to be themselves of so > >> fluid a character as to simulate divergences from law. All this, > >> according to the writer, constitutes a hypothesis capable of being > >> tested by experiment. > >> > >> Peirce says here that ‘the law of habit’ – as opposed to the > >> ‘fundamental law of mind,’ which is the _tendency_ of all things > >> to _take_ habits – ‘is a simple formal law, a law of efficient > >> causation.’ Ten years earlier, in his ‘Reply to the > >> Necessitarians,’ Peirce had written that the necessitarian, while > >> believing that irregular events are inexplicable, also says > >> > >> that the laws of nature are immutable and ultimate facts, and no > >> account is to be given of them. But my hypothesis of spontaneity > >> does explain irregularity, in a certain sense; that is, it explains > >> the general fact of irregularity, though not, of course, what each > >> lawless event is to be. At the same time, by thus loosening the bond > >> of necessity, it gives room for the influence of another kind of > >> causation, such as seems to be operative in the mind in the > >> formation of associations, and enables us to understand how the > >> uniformity of nature could have been brought about. (W8:123, CP > >> 6.60) > >> > >> This ‘other kind of causation’ is called by Jesper Hoffmeyer > >> _semiotic causality_, which ‘gives direction to efficient > >> causality, while efficient causality gives power to semiotic > >> causality’ (Hoffmeyer 2008, 64). This duality or complementarity > >> of causes accounts for the two sides of evolution, the physical and > >> the psychical or mental. > >> > >> Semiotic causality is implicit in Peirce’s definitions of > >> ‘sign,’ which generally follow the path of _determination_ > >> object > sign > interpretant: > >> > >> I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, > >> which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is > >> both determined by the object _relatively to the interpretant_, and > >> determines the interpretant _in reference to the object_, in such > >> wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object > >> through the mediation of this ‘sign.’ (EP2:410) > >> > >> The reverse side of this path of determination is a path of > >> representation: the sign _represents_ the object _to_ the > >> interpretant, which then represents the sign – by determining > >> another interpretant sign, or else a ‘habit-change,’ which is > >> both an end of semiotic causality and a governor of efficient > >> causation, i.e. a determinant of future transformations in the > >> physical realm. Any actual occurrence of semiotic > >> _determination_/_representation_ must itself determine and represent > >> a change in a state of mind, quasi-mind or bodymind: in other words, > >> it must _make a difference_ to that bodymind, and this difference is > >> _both_ semiotically and efficiently caused. > >> > >> In other words, the _logical interpretant_ of a sign, as a > >> ‘habit-change’ or modification of the guidance system which > >> ‘gives direction’ to the subsequent _practice_ of the guided > >> system or bodymind, will determine the energetic interpretants [2] > >> of future signs, which over time will make the path of practice by > >> walking it. This in turn will make a difference to the physical (as > >> well as the mental) context of further semiosis. > >> > >> In terms of evolutionary biology, the way a type of organism > >> interacts with its environment can effect changes in both organism > >> and environment, which may in turn affect the ability of the species > >> to be represented in another generation of organisms. Over time, > >> then, natural selection will weed out the _ethos_ which does not > >> maintain its viability as an occupant of its ecological niche. But > >> natural selection must have a variety of possibilities to select > >> from, and does not in itself account for that variety. Hence the > >> need for the hypothesis that spontaneity or ‘chance’ is a primal > >> element in an evolving universe such as the one we all inhabit. > >> > >> } Freedom lies only in our innate human capacity to choose between > >> different sorts of bondage, bondage to desire or self esteem, or > >> bondage to the light that lightens all our lives. [Sri Madhava] { > >> > >> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [3] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway > >> > >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on > >> "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. > >> PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To > >> UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > >> [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY > >> of the message. More at > >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [4] . > >> > >> ----------------------------- > >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY > >> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > >> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe > >> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [4] . > > > > > > > > Links: > > ------ > > [1] http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Uniformity > > [2] http://gnusystems.ca/TS/prx.htm#semenerg > > [3] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ > > [4] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > > [5] http://www.cse.dmu.ac.uk/~mward/gkc/books/orthodoxy/ch4.html > > [6] http://bennovak.net > >
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