Jerry - I see; but I'm not a fan of Plato. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Jerry Rhee To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L ; Gary Fuhrman Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 6:05 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Edwina, list: Joking only as far as Plato: “Athenian. And now, I beseech you, reflect; — you would admit that we have a threefold knowledge of things? Athenian. I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the definition of the essence, and the name — these are the three; and there are two questions which may be raised about anything... Athenian. I mean, that when we are asked about the definition and give the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the definition — in either case, whether we give name or definition, we speak of the same thing, calling “even” the number which is divided into two equal parts. Athenian. And what is the definition of that which is named “soul”? Can we conceive of any other than that which has been already given — the motion which can move itself? Cleinias. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul? Athenian. Yes” ~Plato, Laws, Book X. One, two, three…name, definition, essence…(observed) object, sign, interpretant… Best, Jerry R On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 4:56 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: Jerry: I presume you are joking. I meant what I wrote. The Sign doesn't have a 'soul' and I've no idea what a soul is. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Jerry Rhee To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L ; Gary Fuhrman Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 5:06 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, list: When you say, “I do want to emphasize that when I refer to Sign, I refer not to the Representamen, but to the Relations the sign/representamen has with the objects and interpretants.” Do you mean in other words, “not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul”? ~NA one, two, three…mind, body, soul…the one over many… Best, Jerry R On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 3:43 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: Jon, list Yes - I guess we'll have to 'agree to disagree'. I feel the same way towards you - as you do to me; that is, I feel that your way of thinking is 'inconsistent with Peirce's writings' (as I read them"..and also, unpersuasive. Just a few comments. I think that your insistence that existence refers only to entities in states of Secondness rejects the individual experience and realities of several of the 10 classes of Signs: the rhematic iconic qualisign; the rhematic iconic legisign; the rhematic symbolic legisign, and of course, the argument symbolic legisign. I note also that Peirce himself wrote: 'generals must have a real existence" 5.312. Their existence is within instantiations - a very Aristotelian view [rather than Platonic] and Peirce was an Aristotelian. No, I don't give priority to matter over mind. How do you come to such a conclusion? I consider that matter only exists as organized by/within Mind. And Mind only exists as articulated within Matter. And I don't see where in Peirce you could conclude that he considered that Mind has priority over matter. He doesn't see them, as you seem to do, as two different entities. Again 'matter is effete Mind'. Yes, meaning is embodied as Thirdness. Thirdness refers to the laws, the habits of organization - and such habits are 'embodied meaning'. They are the generalization of habits of the formation of, eg, protoplasm and as such, provide the TRUTH/meaning..of 'how to be a protoplasm. See 6.250-255. Meaning is also found in the Interpretant - which in its turn, will affect and evolve the habits of Thirdness. I disagree that these normative habits are not 'embodied' within matter. Where else could they be other than within the instantiations? As habits, as generals, they are real; as articulated in instances, they exist. The rhematic iconic qualisign exists 'as a state in itself' within an individual's experience. It is a Sign - and there is no Secondness nor Thirdness - it operates entirely within the mode of Firstness. So, I disagree with your insistence that the Sign is 'Peirce's paradigm example of Thirdness'. Yes, we have two different meanings of 'sign'. I refer to the full triad of three Relations as a Sign; and the Representamen as a 'sign'. See Peirce's discussion of these Relations in 8.335, 8.337. See also where Peirce often refers to the Representamen alone as a sign, and also, INCLUDES its 'two objects' and its 'three interpretants' 8.333. My use of the capitalized Sign INCLUDES these Relations; that is, again - my use of 'sign' refers only to the Representamen. My use of 'Sign' refers to the Relations the sign/representamen has with the objects and interpretants. I use both terms: triadic semiosic process and semiosis - but I do want to emphasize that when I refer to Sign, I refer not to the Representamen, but to the Relations the sign/representamen has with the objects and interpretants. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Peirce-L ; [email protected] Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 3:57 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, List: We may just have to let our disagreements stand at this point, because I find your way of thinking highly inconsistent with Peirce's writings (as I read them) and wholly unpersuasive. Still, I am glad for the opportunity to sharpen my own thinking, and thank you (again) for the discussion. Strictly speaking, Qualisigns and Legisigns never exist; only Sinsigns, although they can and do function as Replicas of Qualisigns and Legisigns. Furthermore, since all Symbols are Legisigns, Symbols never exist, either. The actual spoken or written or thought word, "man," is not a Symbol per se; it is a Replica of a general Symbol. The Real Symbol that is instantiated as "man" still has Being independently of those instantiations, even though it does not exist apart from them. You state a couple of times that you do not separate mind and matter, but you seem to give priority to matter over mind, whereas I think that Peirce clearly took the opposite view. How can Meaning--or anything else--be "embodied in Thirdness"? Embodiment is Secondness by definition. This is why I have so much trouble with your statements like, "the Sign operates only within individuals!" Individuals are also Secondness by definition, but Signs are Peirce's paradigm example of Thirdness. Finally, terminological ethics dictates that you really need to come up with a different term for "the triadic semiosic process," or whatever it is that you mean by "Sign," because it clearly deviates from Peirce's consistent usage, as others have often pointed out to you. Why not just call it "semiosis"? Regards, Jon On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 8:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: Jon, list, see my replies below 1) JON: It sounds like you take the view that the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants are the same as the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants. I have not definitively made up my mind about that, but lean more toward seeing them as distinct trichotomies. EDWINA: Yes, I consider the two sets of terms to refer to the same actions. I disagree with adding more Interpretants to the process. 2) JON: The English word "man" is a Symbol, which makes it a Legisign or Type, which means that its Being is general. While it indeed only "exists" in its instantiations--Replicas, which are Sinsigns or Tokens--it is Real independently of them. This is NOT Platonism, it is Peircean three-category Realism. EDWINA: Yes, the word man is a symbol. But the symbol exists only within the triadic semiosis; that is, the Legisign doesn't exist 'per se'. It is REAL as a general but generals only exist within instantiation. So, the word 'man' only functions as a symbol when it is instantiated in a particular triad - whether it be the single man or the Argument referring to Man. 3) JON: One thing on which we do agree is that "the full range of meaning falls within the purview of Thirdness." But this says nothing more than that meaning is a matter of the Interpretants--all three of them--rather than the Sign or the Objects. I am not aware of anything in Peirce's writings that warrants characterizing the Immediate Interpretant as internal to the individual, rather than internal to the Sign. EDWINA: But the Sign operates only within individuals! The semiosic triad doesn't operate outside of matter - whether that matter be a man, a tree, an insect....Mind is not separate from matter. That's Cartesian and Peirce is not a Cartesian. And I consider that meaning is embodied within the Object - after all, as Peirce wrote, 'matter is effete Mind'. 6.25; and 'matter is mind hidebound with habits' 6.158. Meaning is embodied within Thirdness. The object is a Form of Meaning..and makes more meaning in its interactions with other Signs [instantiations of matter]...and these develop the Habits even more. 4) JON: Regarding determination, as I said before, I understand it mainly as constraint, not causation. The Dynamic Object can only generate certain Immediate Objects, and each of those can only be represented by certain Signs. The Final Interpretant will be one or more of the Dynamic Interpretants, which will all fall within the range of the Immediate Interpretant, which is dictated by the Sign. EDWINA: I consider that the semiosic process is more complex than you outline. The DO may indeed, in its own nature, have a limited range of data output that can become an IO - IF THAT DO were singularly causal of that IO. But it isn't. For example, when I, who am processing input data from an external DO, arrive at my own IO [and I maintain it is internal to me]...that same input data is merged with other input data. How do I separate them? And I don't agree that the IO 'can only be represented by certain Signs' [I presume you mean the Representamen]. If I am receiving input data, a noise and a visual image, then, my ability to process this sensual input....is transformed by my habits/knowledge [Representamen]...and I can come up with various Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants. 'It's just noise; it's a bird; it's a plane; it's Superman. The Final Interpretant involves a community. 5) JON: I am not sure what you mean when you say, "But a Sign operates within matter!" Are you suggesting that Signs ONLY operate within matter? I am pretty sure that Peirce would never condone such a statement. EDWINA: Yes - I do suggest that Signs [by which I mean the triadic semiosic process as well as the category of Thirdness]...only operates within instantiations. And instantiations are existential in time and space. That means that they are material. That includes mental concepts which operate within the frog's leg as well as the human mind. I simply don't see Signs, both the triad and the Thirdness...operating outside of such particularization. 6) JON: Again, the Immediate Object is internal to the Sign itself. I took "individual site-of-semeiosis" as a substitute for "human mind"; if this is not how you are using that term, then I guess that I need you to explain it. EDWINA: No- I don't separate Mind and Matter. Nor does Peirce. See his The Law of Mind, 6.150 and on; 6.255 and on. 6.277 and on..... 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