Soren, Edwina, Jon, Jeff, List:
It appears to me that there are two considerations; 1) whether we can know and communicate an objective manner by which to distinguish the *correct* form from the variety of interpretants/meanings and 2) whether Peirce is able to aid us. >From my point of view, I can’t tell which method you are employing to fix belief. It appears as a smattering of methods of tenacity, *a priori* and authority. Aren’t there some rules we ought to follow if we claim the scientific method? From this, I can only conclude that Peirce must have failed in his attempt to aid us in coming to agreement…for who would blame *us*? Soren: In what way do you say Hegel’s philosophy resembles Peirce’s objective idealism? In a few theological essays, I’ve read that one starts with faith in God or the revelation. I am not aware of any particular revelation except for the ones that are no longer surprising to me; the natural things, mostly. So, I ought to start with faith in God but who is God to a skeptic but the Being, the Object/Sign/Interpretant, to whom revelation is assigned? A revelation (and by connection, the Being) that is expected to transcend whatever claims we can ever impose on it. So, what is it to start with an idea logically and not psychologically, if terms come with disputed histories? How about starting with the creation of ideas? Are not ideas new, at least, novel to us? ‘Which is first’ when it comes to ideas? For instance, where does genuine doubt belong in inquiry when it is doubt in our minds about a matter at hand? For example, is it mind or matter that makes something surprising to you but not to me? Is the idea that follows yours or mine in that case? Would that not, then, be a situation in which an idea starts in mind and not matter, since matter is common to us but the idea is only yours and not mine? Best, Jerry Rhee On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 11:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Soren: > > Thank you for your comments - I agree; I think that the debate on 'which > is first' rests within our dualism, derived from Cartesianism. > > That's why I see Peirce's objective idealism as NOT the same as idealism, > which does present Mind as primordial/primary. Nor is it materialism for > the same reason. My view is that, within Peirce's philosophy, Mind cannot > exist except as matter; and Matter cannot exist except within the > organizational habits of Mind. Neither is first in either existentiality > or, certainly, reality. This, to me, is also an Aristotelian analysis. > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Søren Brier <[email protected]> > *To:* 'Jon Alan Schmidt' <[email protected]> ; Edwina Taborsky > <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> ; [email protected] ; > [email protected] ; Lucia Santaelle Braga ([email protected]) > <[email protected])> > *Sent:* Monday, August 22, 2016 12:22 PM > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > Dear Jon and Edwina > > > > In a way I think that you are both right. But I think the focus on if > matter or mind was first is not very fruitful and may come from our > dualistic upbringing. I view Peirce as a synechist triadic process > philosopher. He has accepted the term objective idealist for his philosophy > and accepted that there are some similarities with Hegel’s philosophy, but > that his own was much more realistic. I think his semiotic philosophy makes > him produces something for which we may not have a concept yet. I discussed > it with Lucia Santaella some years ago, who told me that she was looking > into this problem. But I have never seen anything from her in English on > the matter so far. But maybe she can enlighten us? Ivo Ibri have a chapter > on it in Vinicius and Eliseo’s new book: *Peirce and Biosemiotics: A > guess at the riddle of life*, on which I have just finished a review to > CHK. But I do not think he solved this problem, but developed another view. > Personally I am still wondering what kind of force it is that a sign (not > its tokens) is? In a way it neither physical or psychological. > > > > Best > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 22. august 2016 15:19 > *To:* Edwina Taborsky > *Cc:* Peirce-L; [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > > > Edwina, List: > > > > I try to be careful to use appropriate disclaimers when I am expressing a > subjective opinion, but the issue here is an objective fact--in CP 6.24-25, > Peirce explicitly defines idealism as the view that the psychical law is > primordial, while the physical law is derived and special, and then > declares that this is precisely his view. Other passages in his writings > shed further light on it, including some important nuances; but unless you > can show me one where he clearly and definitively refutes this position, I > rest my case. I leave it to the judgment of the List community which of us > has the more persuasive argument. > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 7:53 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jon, list > > > > With regard to the reality/fact, that we are BOTH reasonably intelligent > explorers and analysts of Peircean semiosis - then, I think such an opinion > is made clear by the liberal use of such phrases as 'in my view', in my > opinion, in my analysis'...rather than assertions YOU are misreading etc... > > > > With regard to the objective idealism of Peirce - you are right - I didn't > explain myself well. I did not mean neutralism, where both materialism and > idealism are originating forces and thus cancel each other; I meant that > both co-exist; neither can exist without the other. I simply don't read his > objective idealism - which i consider as NOT equivalent to idealism [while > it appears that you do] - as considering that idealism is primordial.As to > which is first - his outline of the emergence of the universe is that - > before matter - there was nothing. [1.411] That means - no Mind. No matter > and no mind- instead; just nothing. > > > > And "it would be a mistake to conceive of the psychical and the physical > aspects of matter as two aspects absolutely distinct" 6.268. Since they are > not distinct - then, I don't see how idealism is primordial. Objective > idealism, on the other hand, merges the psychical and physical. It doesn't > define them as ONE force; it acknowledges they are two - but - they were > never separate. > > > > Therefore, my reading of Peirce sees his objective idealism as quite > different from your reading of him as an idealist. > > > > Actually, if one wants to discuss primordial forces, one can consider the > Three Categories, where 'three elements are active in the world; first, > chance; second, law; and third, habit-taking' 1.409. Before the forces of > matter [Secondness] and mind [Thirdness], there was chance/randomness > [Firstness]. This too suggests that neither the material nor mental forces > are primordial. > > > > But - "Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have > come something, by the Principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. > Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though > time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the > first, because resulting from it. Then thre would have come other > successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the > tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, until the events would > have been bound together into something like a continuous flow" 1.412. > > > > My view of the above is that neither the mental nor the material are > primordial; they co-develop. To me - that is what objective idealism means. > > > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > > *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> ; [email protected] > > *Sent:* Sunday, August 21, 2016 10:01 PM > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > > > Edwina, List: > > > > With all due respect--I am not lecturing you, I never suggested that you > are dumb or ignorant, and I am certainly not self-designating myself as The > Authority. Your claim, which you even underlined for emphasis, was that > "*Peirce > rejects all three outlines and considers 'both the psychical and the > physical as primordial'.*" This is simply not the case, and the words > that you implied to be quoted directly from Peirce never appear in the > actual text of CP 6.24-25, which Gary F. helpfully provided in full. In > fact, Peirce flatly rejected this notion as the essence of neutralism. > > > > CSP: Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as > Ockham's razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be supposed > than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on > a par, *it seems to render both primordial*. (emphasis added) > > > > As for the view that he espoused as his own, here are the key portions > again. > > > > CSP: ... the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone > as primordial, which is idealism ... The one intelligible theory of the > universe is that of objective idealism ... > > > > By deductive inference--really, just simple substitution--Peirce's stated > view here is that the one intelligible theory of the universe is that > (objectively) the psychical law alone is primoridial, while the physical > law is derived and special. The whole structure of the passage is that > there are only three alternatives, and he explicitly rejects the other two > (neutralism and materialism). There is no legitimate way to justify any > other reading. > > > > You seem to think that Peirce's use of "objective idealism" in CP 6.25, > rather than just "idealism," is significant. Maybe so, but whatever he > meant by "objective idealism," he still meant idealism in the sense that > the psychical law is primoridial, and the physical law is derived and > special. There is nothing whatsoever in the text that suggests otherwise. > As for the other passage that I quoted ... > > > > CSP: ... *idealism *[is] the doctrine that ideas are everything ... I > have proposed to make *synechism *mean the tendency to regard everything > as continuous. (CP 7.565, EP 2.1; 1893) > > > > Here the "idealism" that he specifically rejects is "the doctrine that > ideas are everything"; in other words, that the psychical laws are > *exclusive*, rather than just *primordial*, such that there really is no > such thing as matter at all--*only *mind. Synechism, by contrast, is the > doctrine that mind and matter are *continuous*--but still, the psychical > law is primordial, and the physical law is derived and special. That is > precisely why and how "matter is effete mind." > > > > Now, if you want to argue that Peirce was *wrong *about this--i.e., that > the psychical law and physical law are somehow *both *primoridial > (neutralism), or that *neither *is--then you are welcome to make your > case. However, as demonstrated above, it is false to claim that this was > Peirce's own view as expressed in these two passages. > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 7:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jon - I would appreciate it if, rather than lecturing me on my > 'misreading' or misunderstanding of Peirce, you would acknowledge that we > are both explorers in Peircean analysis and that it is quite possible > that I am not quite as dumb and ignorant as you suggest I am - and that we > are both, equally, continuously exploring and analyzing his works. We may > indeed disagree with each other's explorations and analysis - but I don't > think that either one of us should self-designate oneself as The Authority. > > > > i agree with your clarification of neutralism: the two, Mind and Matter > are not independent of each other - and I've been saying that all along - > but, with regard to Peirce's view - his objective idealism does not, in > my view, posit that the psychical is primordial - which is Platonism. His > Objective idealism is not identical with 'idealism' but quite different > from it. He's quite clear that Mind operates within Matter but nowhere does > he separate them. He's Aristotelian, not a Platonist. I'm sure you also > know the equally famous quotation: > > > > 4.551. "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in > the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world". > > > > I don't consider that he ever thought of Mind and Matter as equivalent - > and I've no idea why you come up with such a supposition that I think that > way. BUT - they do not exist, in my view, separately. > > > > You wrote: "However, this reflects more of a change in emphasis than a > change of position. What he specifically rejected here was that ideas are > *everything*, not that psychical laws are *primordial*. So once again, > your disagreement is with Peirce--in this case, a very sharp and > fundamental one." > > > > What do you understand by the phrase 'ideas are everything'? And again - I > don't see where he supports the concept that 'psychical laws are > primordial'. I don't see him separating the two, Mind and Matter - and to > posit that psychical laws are primordial - requires a separation - which he > rejects. He acknowledges that Mind and Matter are not identical; after all > - his whole set of categories is based around such an analysis - but- i > don't see where he posits that either one exists separately from the other. > > > > His Objective Idealism is not the same as idealism because of this > entanglement of Mind and Matter. For 'there cannot be a General without > Instances embodying it" 4.551. [Now, that's pure Aristotle right there!!] > > > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > > *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> ; [email protected] > > *Sent:* Sunday, August 21, 2016 8:11 PM > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > > > Edwina, List: > > > > I know that you did not make it up; I am quite familiar with the citation > from Peirce, since it is one of his most famous remarks. Your statement, > "Mind > only exists as articulated within Matter," is fine as far as it goes if you > mean "exists" strictly in the Peircean sense that is confined to > Secondness; but it is certainly NOT the case, according to Peirce, that > "Mind only has Being as articulated in Matter," or that "there is only Mind > as articulated in Matter." Again, why would he say that "matter is effete > mind" if he believed that there is no other kind of mind? That would mean > that matter and mind are *equivalent*, whereas he viewed them as > *continuous* (more below). > > > > More seriously, it seems that you are completely misreading CP 6.24-25 > (also EP 1.293; 1891). Please review it again carefully. Notice that the > subject heading is "Objective Idealism." Peirce proposes exactly three > options for the relation between physical and psychical laws--neutralism if > they are independent, materialism if the physical laws are primordial, or > idealism if the psychical laws are primordial. He then dismisses > materialism as "quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense," > and eliminates neutralism by means of Ockham's razor. He then concludes > with precisely what you quoted--he unambiguously *embraces *idealism, > which in his own words means that he held "the physical law as derived and > special, *the psychical law alone as primordial*." > > > > Now, only a couple of years later, Peirce distinguished his synechism from > idealism. > > > > CSP: For two centuries we have been affixing -ist and -ism to words, in > order to note sects which exalt the importance of those elements which the > stemwords signify. Thus, *materialism *is the doctrine that matter is > everything, *idealism *the doctrine that ideas are everything, *dualism *the > philosophy which splits everything in two. In like manner, I have proposed > to make *synechism *mean the tendency to regard everything as continuous. > (CP 7.565, EP 2.1; 1893) > > > > However, this reflects more of a change in emphasis than a change of > position. What he specifically rejected here was that ideas are > *everything*, not that psychical laws are *primordial*. So once again, > your disagreement is with Peirce--in this case, a very sharp and > fundamental one. > > > > Finally, I never said that the Representamen is identical with Thirdness. > What I said is "that Representation is Peirce's paradigm example of > Thirdness, and that Signs [i.e., Representamens] are the means by which all > Representation takes place." > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 6:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jon - I didn't make up the sentence 'matter is effete mind'. It's Peirce's > phrase. > > > > "The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective > idealism; that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical > laws" 6.25. > > > > And as he says in 6.24, 'The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so > prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, > will hardly find defenders today"...and he goes on to describe whether > physical laws and the psychical law are to be taken as a) 'independent of > each other; , or b) the psychical law as derived [with the physical as > primordial], or c) the physical law as derived with the psychical as > primordial'.....6.24. *Peirce rejects all three outlines and considers > 'both the psychical and the physical as primordial'.* > > > > i totally disagree with any notion that there is such a thing as > non-materialized Mind, i.e., that there is such a thing as 'non-effete' > Mind. And I don't agree with your view that Peirce thinks such a thing for > that would be to put the psychical as primordial and he rejects that...Read > his outline of Objective Idealism 6.24 > > > > And the Representamen is not identical with Thirdness. As you can see in > the ten classes of Signs, [8.341] the Representamen is in a mode of > Thirdness in 6 of these classes, in a mode of Secondness in 3 and in a mode > of Firstness in 1 class. And - yet, he defines them ALL as Signs. > > > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > > *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> ; [email protected] > > *Sent:* Sunday, August 21, 2016 6:38 PM > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > > > Edwina, List: > > > > I think that we are still stumbling on the term "exists." Again, we agree > that Qualisigns and Legisigns only *exist *in their instantiations > (Replicas or Tokens); but those instantiations are all *actually *Sinsigns. > A Qualisign or Legisign *as such* has no brute reactions with anything > else, which means that it does not satisfy Peirce's definition of existence > (e.g., CP 1.431-433). > > > > ET: Mind only exists as articulated within Matter ... Again 'matter is > effete Mind'. > > > > This right here is why I find myself wondering if you are a materialist, > rather than a synechist as Peirce was, along with your flat denial > previously that the inner and outer worlds belong to a single continuum. > The statement that "matter is effete mind" implies, to me, that mind is the > more fundamental concept--and that there is such a thing as mind that is *not > *effete, and therefore *not "*articulated within matter." Although it > might be improper to say that such non-effete mind "exists," it certainly > does have Being in Peirce's way of thinking. After all, he famously > offered "A Neglected Argument for the Reality [not existence] of God," and > God is clearly an example of mind that is not "articulated within matter." > > > > ET: I disagree with your insistence that the Sign is 'Peirce's paradigm > example of Thirdness'. > > > > I suppose that it might have been more accurate for me to say that > Representation is Peirce's paradigm example of Thirdness, and that Signs > are the means by which all Representation takes place. But really, your > disagreement is with Peirce; here is a longer excerpt of the entire passage > from which Jerry quoted only a snippet. > > > > CSP: The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in > active power to establish connections between different objects, especially > between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is > essentially a Sign--not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially > such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power > of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. (CP 6.455, EP > 2.435; 1908) > > > > A soul is another example of mind that is not "articulated within matter." > > > > EW: I refer to the full triad of three Relations as a Sign; and the > Representamen as a 'sign'. See Peirce's discussion of these Relations in > 8.335, 8.337. > > > > The Sign is *triadic*, but that does not mean that it is *itself* a triad > of relations. Those two passages have to do with the classification of > Signs *based on* their relations. The Sign itself is always still the > Representamen that *has* those relations, rather than another entity that > *is* those relations. > > > > I do not expect to convince you, but your usage here is simply not > Peircean, and only serves to confuse matters because he did consistently > interchange Sign with Representamen--and once distinguished them only by > saying, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly > there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP 2.273; 1903). In other > words, all Signs are Representamens, but some Representamens may not be > Signs. In particular, any Representamen that does not determine a mental > "effect upon a person" (EP 2.478; 1908) is not a Sign. > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 3:43 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jon, list > > Yes - I guess we'll have to 'agree to disagree'. I feel the same way > towards you - as you do to me; that is, I feel that your way of thinking is > 'inconsistent with Peirce's writings' (as I read them"..and also, > unpersuasive. > > > > Just a few comments. > > > > I think that your insistence that existence refers only to entities in > states of Secondness rejects the individual experience and realities of > several of the 10 classes of Signs: the rhematic iconic qualisign; the > rhematic iconic legisign; the rhematic symbolic legisign, and of course, > the argument symbolic legisign. > > > > I note also that Peirce himself wrote: 'generals must have a real > existence" 5.312. Their existence is within instantiations - a very > Aristotelian view [rather than Platonic] and Peirce was an Aristotelian. > > > > No, I don't give priority to matter over mind. How do you come to such a > conclusion? I consider that matter only exists as organized by/within Mind. > And Mind only exists as articulated within Matter. And I don't see where > in Peirce you could conclude that he considered that Mind has priority over > matter. He doesn't see them, as you seem to do, as two different entities. > Again 'matter is effete Mind'. > > > > Yes, meaning is embodied as Thirdness. Thirdness refers to the laws, the > habits of organization - and such habits are 'embodied meaning'. They are > the generalization of habits of the formation of, eg, protoplasm and as > such, provide the TRUTH/meaning..of 'how to be a protoplasm. See > 6.250-255. Meaning is also found in the Interpretant - which in its turn, > will affect and evolve the habits of Thirdness. > > I disagree that these normative habits are not 'embodied' within matter. > Where else could they be other than within the instantiations? As habits, > as generals, they are real; as articulated in instances, they exist. > > > > The rhematic iconic qualisign exists 'as a state in itself' within an > individual's experience. It is a Sign - and there is no Secondness nor > Thirdness - it operates entirely within the mode of Firstness. So, I > disagree with your insistence that the Sign is 'Peirce's paradigm example > of Thirdness'. > > > > Yes, we have two different meanings of 'sign'. I refer to the full triad > of three Relations as a Sign; and the Representamen as a 'sign'. See > Peirce's discussion of these Relations in 8.335, 8.337. See also where > Peirce often refers to the Representamen alone as a sign, and also, > INCLUDES its 'two objects' and its 'three interpretants' 8.333. My use of > the capitalized Sign INCLUDES these Relations; that is, again - my use of > 'sign' refers only to the Representamen. My use of 'Sign' refers to the > Relations the sign/representamen has with the objects and interpretants. > > > > I use both terms: triadic semiosic process and semiosis - but I do want > to emphasize that when I refer to Sign, I refer not to the Representamen, > but to the Relations the sign/representamen has with the objects and > interpretants. > > > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > > *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> ; [email protected] > > *Sent:* Sunday, August 21, 2016 3:57 PM > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > > > Edwina, List: > > > > We may just have to let our disagreements stand at this point, because I > find your way of thinking highly inconsistent with Peirce's writings (as I > read them) and wholly unpersuasive. Still, I am glad for the opportunity > to sharpen my own thinking, and thank you (again) for the discussion. > > > > Strictly speaking, Qualisigns and Legisigns never *exist*; only Sinsigns, > although they can and do function as Replicas of Qualisigns and Legisigns. > Furthermore, since all Symbols are Legisigns, Symbols never *exist*, > either. The *actual *spoken or written or thought word, "man," is not a > Symbol *per se*; it is a Replica of a *general *Symbol. The Real Symbol > that is instantiated as "man" still has *Being *independently of those > instantiations, even though it does not *exist *apart from them. > > > > You state a couple of times that you do not separate mind and matter, but > you seem to give priority to matter over mind, whereas I think that Peirce > clearly took the opposite view. How can Meaning--or anything else--be > "embodied in Thirdness"? Embodiment is Secondness by definition. This is > why I have so much trouble with your statements like, "the Sign operates > only within individuals!" Individuals are also Secondness by definition, > but Signs are Peirce's paradigm example of Thirdness. > > > > Finally, terminological ethics dictates that you really need to come up > with a different term for "the triadic semiosic process," or whatever it is > that you mean by "Sign," because it clearly deviates from Peirce's > consistent usage, as others have often pointed out to you. Why not just > call it "semiosis"? > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 8:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jon, list, see my replies below > > 1) JON: It sounds like you take the view that the immediate/dynamic/final > interpretants are the same as the emotional/energetic/logical > interpretants. I have not definitively made up my mind about that, but > lean more toward seeing them as distinct trichotomies. > > EDWINA: Yes, I consider the two sets of terms to refer to the same > actions. I disagree with adding more Interpretants to the process. > > 2) JON: The English word "man" is a Symbol, which makes it a Legisign or > Type, which means that its Being is general. While it indeed only "exists" > in its instantiations--Replicas, which are Sinsigns or Tokens--it is Real > independently of them. This is NOT Platonism, it is Peircean > three-category Realism. > > EDWINA: Yes, the word man is a symbol. But the symbol exists only within > the triadic semiosis; that is, the Legisign doesn't exist 'per se'. It is > REAL as a general but generals only exist within instantiation. So, the > word 'man' only functions as a symbol when it is instantiated in a > particular triad - whether it be the single man or the Argument referring > to Man. > > 3) JON: One thing on which we do agree is that "the full range of meaning > falls within the purview of Thirdness." But this says nothing more than > that meaning is a matter of the Interpretants--all three of them--rather > than the Sign or the Objects. I am not aware of anything in Peirce's > writings that warrants characterizing the Immediate Interpretant as > internal to the individual, rather than internal to the Sign. > > EDWINA: But the Sign operates only within individuals! The semiosic triad > doesn't operate outside of matter - whether that matter be a man, a tree, > an insect....*Mind is not separate from matter.* That's Cartesian and > Peirce is not a Cartesian. > > And I consider that meaning is embodied within the Object - after all, as > Peirce wrote, 'matter is effete Mind'. 6.25; and 'matter is mind hidebound > with habits' 6.158. Meaning is embodied within Thirdness. The object is a > Form of Meaning..and makes more meaning in its interactions with other > Signs [instantiations of matter]...and these develop the Habits even more. > > 4) JON: Regarding determination, as I said before, I understand it mainly > as constraint, not causation. The Dynamic Object can only generate certain > Immediate Objects, and each of those can only be represented by certain > Signs. The Final Interpretant will be one or more of the Dynamic > Interpretants, which will all fall within the range of the Immediate > Interpretant, which is dictated by the Sign. > > EDWINA: I consider that the semiosic process is more complex than you > outline. The DO may indeed, in its own nature, have a limited range of data > output that can become an IO - IF THAT DO were singularly causal of that > IO. But it isn't. For example, when I, who am processing input data from an > external DO, arrive at my own IO [and I maintain it is internal to > me]...that same input data is merged with other input data. How do I > separate them? > > And I don't agree that the IO 'can only be represented by certain Signs' > [I presume you mean the Representamen]. If I am receiving input data, a > noise and a visual image, then, my ability to process this sensual > input....is transformed by my habits/knowledge [Representamen]...and I can > come up with various Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants. 'It's just noise; > it's a bird; it's a plane; it's Superman. The Final Interpretant involves a > community. > > 5) JON: I am not sure what you mean when you say, "But a Sign operates > within matter!" Are you suggesting that Signs ONLY operate within matter? > I am pretty sure that Peirce would never condone such a statement. > > EDWINA: Yes - I do suggest that Signs [by which I mean the triadic > semiosic process as well as the category of Thirdness]...only operates > within instantiations. And instantiations are existential in time and > space. That means that they are material. That includes mental concepts > which operate within the frog's leg as well as the human mind. I simply > don't see Signs, both the triad and the Thirdness...operating outside of > such particularization. > > 6) JON: Again, the Immediate > Object is internal to the Sign itself. I took "individual > site-of-semeiosis" as a substitute for "human mind"; if this is not how you > are using that term, then I guess that I need you to explain it. > > EDWINA: No- I don't separate Mind and Matter. Nor does Peirce. See his The > Law of Mind, 6.150 and on; 6.255 and on. 6.277 and on..... > > Regards, > > Jon > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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