Edwina, List: ET: I reject also your linear outline of Peirce, where you reject an earlier description as inaccurate and rely instead, only on the later description.
Perhaps I gave you the wrong impression. I do not *reject *Peirce's earlier writings, I just tend to *give more weight* to his later writings, on the supposition that they likely reflect further careful contemplation and refinement. For this very reason, I find that chronological arrangements (such as W and EP) are generally preferable to topical arrangements (such as CP)--they facilitate tracing out the *development *of Peirce's thought over time, which is not necessarily linear, but is certainly dynamic rather than static. ET: I disagree with your reading of Peirce that a categorical mode of Firstness is an Idea. An idea is a mental aspect. Lowercase, yes; capitalized, no. Again, Peirce is explicit about this in "A Neglected Argument," right from the beginning--"Some words shall herein be capitalized when used, not as vernacular, but as terms defined. Thus an 'idea' is the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy; but 'Idea,' nearer Plato's idea of ἰδέα, denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it." (CP 6.452) In other words, "Idea" (capitalized) is closer in meaning to "quality" and (especially) "possibility" than "idea" (lowercase). ET: I don't see the term 'god' as a synonym of Mind - and Mind is immanent in Nature ... As I quoted previously, Peirce *defines *"God" as "pure mind," and states quite clearly that God is *not *"immanent in Nature." ET: I continue to read the NA as a metaphoric argument for the three modes of argumentation of Abduction, Induction, Deduction. That is interesting, but I have not come across such an interpretation in my research to date. Is it explicated and defended anywhere in the literature, so that I can read up on it? Why did Peirce title the article "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" if his true objective was to offer a metaphoric argument for the three modes of argumentation? ET: What was before our universe: As Peirce wrote - nothing. [1.274 I am not sure how that particular citation supports your assertion. In any case, Peirce's cosmological diagram obviously has the blackboard in place "before" anything at all is drawn on it. Of course, a word like "before" is inherently problematic when we are talking about something that "happened" outside of time as we know it. If you are willing, I would still be genuinely interested in understanding how you reconcile each of the following. - You consider Peirce a pantheist; but he stated that God is *not *immanent in nature. - You take the three Universes of Experience to be "intellectual concepts of argumentation," rather than the categories; but Peirce stated that God is the independent *Creator *of the three Universes, and that those consist of Ideas or ideal possibilities, Matter or physical facts, and Mind. - You reject Platonism and resist any attribution of it to Peirce; but he stated that there are many "Platonic worlds," only one of which led to "the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be." I am not here insisting that my reading of Peirce is "right" and yours is "wrong"; I am simply requesting fuller explanations of these *apparent *discrepancies between your views and his writings. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Oct 10, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon, list > > 1) I don't deal with 'draft' vs 'final' version. I don't think that > Peirce's thought was ever, in a way, a 'final complete statement'. So, I > reject also your linear outline of Peirce, where you reject an earlier > description as inaccurate and rely instead, only on the later description. > I think he knew what he was talking about in much of the early as well as > the later writings. So, I don't focus on the dates - early or late - while > you do. > > 2) With regard to Firstness, and indeed, all the categories - I think we > read Peirce very differently on them. I repeat my reading of Peirce > that Firstness as experienced is a 'sensation', a holistic > quality-of-feeling', [and no- sensation is NOT Secondness until it is > experienced as 'other; its first stage is just and only the > pure intellectually unaware feeling of the senses]. I don't use the term > 'feeling' and 'sensation' on my own; Peirce uses those terms to describe > FIrstness. As soon as we be come aware of that feeling - it becomes > SECONDNESS; that brute awareness of 'otherness'. And then, analytic > awareness of it - is within the mode of Thirdness. So- I reverse your > outline. > > The *quality* of, eg, red, or hardness, in 1.422, is a sensual aspect of > the material continuity of the red body or the piece of iron; i.e, it is, > as continuity, in a mode of Thirdness. But -the* experience* of this > quality- within the red body or the piece of iron [never mind within an > external interaction] - is in a mode of Firstness. It remains there, as a > possibility of experience. > > I disagree with your reading of Peirce that a categorical mode of > Firstness is an Idea. An idea is a mental aspect. Certainly some STATE that > is in a mode of Firstness is independent of thought and is 'existential' > [you can't deny that feeling of heat!]..but - that feeling could be known, > intellectually, at some later time. I can certainly see that the Relation > of a Representamen, in a mode of Thirdness, to an Object -can be in a mode > of Firstness, an iconic idea. But a pure mode of Firstness - a rhematic > iconic qualisign? That's not an idea. > > Now- does the capacity-to-produce this feeling in an other [let's say the > feeling of heat from a volcano] only exist in the interaction of the > volcano with its envt? Of course not - the capacity-to-produce the feeling > of heat [which is *experienced* by an other as a FEELING of HEAT - is a > possibility within the volcano - just as the other attributes of the > volcano; namely, its chemicals etc..are a definitive part of its > identity]. But - my point is that the experience of Firstness is within > interaction. I consider the Peircean semiosic world to be one that is > continuously dynamic and interactive. > > 3) I see too many references to the role of Mind in Peirce - and his > outlining of this Mind in the physico-chemical, biological and > socioconceptual world - to reject its similarities within all three > realms. I don't see the term 'god' as a synonym of Mind - and Mind is > immanent in Nature - understanding that this Mind is a developing, > evolving, complex process. > > 4) And I continue to read the NA as a metaphoric argument for the three > modes of argumentation of Abduction, Induction, Deduction. > > What was before our universe: As Peirce wrote - nothing. [1.274 > > Edwina >
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