Jon, list
Well, it's rather clear that we read Peirce differently.
I read the NA as an outline of the three methods of argumentation, with the use
of 'god' as an example. I think that if you google 'Peirce Neglected Argument
abduction deduction induction' that you'll find plenty of articles focused on
that.
I also don't agree with your view that the Three Universes are a 'more mature'
outline of the three categories. I see the three universes, comparing them to
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, do this only in the most superficial manner -
for Abduction, although acting within the freshness and novelty of Firstness
only exists as such - within the nested work of Secondness and Thirdness.
Otherwise, its content would disappear like a cloud.
And - the three categories are, in my reading of Peirce, PRIMAL - and basic to
existence, for none of the ten classes of Signs [and all existence is in Signs]
- could function without those categories.
And - you view Thirdness as Mind [or, Mind as Thirdness] whereas I consider
that Mind operates within all three categorical modes - and Thirdness requires
Secondness and Firstness as components.
So- our readings of Peirce differ quite a bit.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2016 10:58 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Edwina, List:
As a matter of fact, I have read that particular article, since it came up in
the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking." Chiasson's thesis is that Peirce
was really writing about "the attitude and method from which all decisions of
importance to the conduct of a life should begin." I find this implausible for
the same reason as your previous suggestion that he was really offering "a
metaphoric argument for the three modes of argumentation"--if that were the
case, why is it not reflected in the title? Surely the burden of proof is on
anyone who claims that Peirce's intention was anything other than describing a
neglected argument for the reality of God.
In any event, Chiasson's article does not discuss the three Universes of
Experience at all, so I am still looking for a good reason to think that they
correspond to retroduction/induction/deduction rather than
Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. Obviously Peirce's article does discuss those
three types of inference, but it does so quite explicitly. The interesting
thing is that it never brings up the categories--which is why it makes a lot of
sense to recognize them as the Universes.
Regards,
Jon
On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 9:33 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Jon, list
You wrote:
Searching the List archives and the Internet in general has (so far)
turned up no rationale for instead taking them to represent the three types of
inference.
By 'three types of inference' - I am guessing that you mean the three types
of argumentation. That's how I read the NA - and as I said - it's been analysed
in this way before. Phyllis Chiasson, a respected Peirce scholar, certainly
makes such an analysis.
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/chiasson/revisit.htm
I suggest you google: 'Peirce neglected argument and abduction' - and
you'll come up with further discussion. So, it's strange that you haven't come
across this argument before.
And I don't consider the three universes as equivalent to the three
categories. I don't see how one can analyze the ten classes of signs without
the use of the three categories - and the three universes would be irrelevant
in that analysis of the semiosic process.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Helmut Raulien ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2016 9:58 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Edwina, List:
ET: I think that one has to first define 'God'. If the term means
'pure mind' then, this fits in with Peirce's analysis ...
The handful of quotes that I included in my post to start this thread
give us a pretty good idea of how Peirce defined God, at least with respect to
his cosmology, which is (after all) what we are discussing. "Pure mind" is
only one aspect, and God is certainly not identical to mind--according to
Peirce, God is also Ens necessarium; Creator of all three Universes of
Experience and everything in them, without exception; not immanent in them or
in nature, but independent of them, or at least two of them; omniscient,
omnipotent, and infinitely benign.
ET: ... for he considers that Mind is 'immanent in nature'.
Except that he never actually says this, using these particular words. I
guess it depends on how we define "immanent" and "nature."
ET: This means that the results of the process of abduction, an act of
immediate Firstness. can be moved into the present instantation of inductional
experience..and then, backed up by analysis over time, or, deduction.
Peirce, of course, put these in a different order--abduction, then
deduction, then induction. The hypothesis must be explicated in order to
determine whether and how it can be evaluated.
ET: Panpsychism seems to have a different meaning ...
Terms like pantheism, panentheism, and panpsychism seem to be rather
broad and vague, with considerable overlap. Given the scope of Peirce's
writings, I am now inclined to avoid attaching any such labels to his thought,
except the ones that he himself used--such as synechism.
ET: There is no way, I feel, that the Categories can be removed from
being an integral component of Peircean semiosis.
I am not suggesting that the categories be removed, just that Peirce
changed his own terminology toward the end of his life. In fact, there seems
to be broad consensus among Peirce scholars that the three Universes of
Experience do correspond to the three categories. After all, what viable
alternatives are there? Searching the List archives and the Internet in
general has (so far) turned up no rationale for instead taking them to
represent the three types of inference. Would you mind sharing your own
reasons for reading "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" as "a
metaphoric argument for the three modes of argumentation"?
Thanks,
Jon
On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 2:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
I think that one has to first define 'God'. If the term means 'pure
mind' then, this fits in with Peirce's analysis - for he considers that Mind
is 'immanent in nature'. Of course, one then has to define 'Mind' - and I
disagree that it is only Thirdness, but consider that it, as a powerful
process, contains the actions of Firstness and Secondness as well - This means
that the results of the process of abduction, an act of immediate Firstness.
can be moved into the present instantation of inductional experience..and then,
backed up by analysis over time, or, deduction.
Panpsychism seems to have a different meaning, ie, "the doctrine or
belief that everything material, however small, has an element of individual
consciousness.". Since Peirce rejected consciousness as a necessary attribute
of Mind and wasn't keen on psychology - then, this definition doesn't seem to
work. However, if you remove 'individual consciousness' from the definition and
define it instead as a 'process of Mind or Reason'...then..this would, I think,
fit into the Peircean analysis.
And I don't consider the Universes as equivalent to the Categories and
thus, do not, in my view, 'supplant' the Categories. There is no way, I feel,
that the Categories can be removed from being an integral component of Peircean
semiosis. The Categories, in my reading of Peirce, are certainly not external
labels which we use to categorize experience. I read them as integral to
reality and existence.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2016 3:22 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Helmut, List:
My understanding of "pantheism" is that it entails that God is
"immanent in nature," so Peirce's explicit denial of this in three different
drafts of "A Neglected Argument" is pretty decisive evidence against deeming
him a pantheist. It seems to me that Edwina's adjustment--stating that Mind
(rather than God) is immanent in nature--is more properly classified as
panpsychism, and I do not believe that it is terribly controversial to apply
that particular label to Peirce. At least some of the other formulations that
you offered sound to me more like panentheism than pantheism, but my impression
is that there are a lot of different varieties, and I am not personally
familiar with the nuances.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 12:26 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
wrote:
List,
Regarding the question, whether Peirce was a pantheist or not, I
was thinking about the meaning of "immanent". If it means that something is
contained (nonlocally in this case), like as an epiphenomenon or a trait of
something, then something "immanent" implies not being the creator of this
thing. But if God is the creator, and still is present everywhere and
everywhen, i.e. nonlocally and nontemporally, might this still be pantheism,
though without immanence? In this case the universe does not contain God, but
the other way round. And the immanence is also the other way: God is not
immanent in the universe (or the three of them), but the universe is immanent
in God? No, maybe one cannot say so, if one believes in creation as a process,
because then in the beginning there must have been a God without a universe.
But on the other hand, this might be a too anthropocentric concept of God and
of creation: Maybe it is not a linear process, like a carpenter making a chair?
About possibilities: Are they creative or privative? Is a
possibility an invention, or something that remains when a lot of other items
in question have been identified as, or turned out to be, impossibilities? With
God as firstness, it should be the first (creative possibility) , I guess. But
this might be a hen-and-egg-question, which suggests that there was a
beginning: Either a nothing, or an everything. But maybe there was no beginning
(like eg. buddhists claim).
Best,
Helmut
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